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Abstract 
The aim of my thesis is to excavate and interrogate the history, structure, and impact of the new Global 
Internal Displacement Regime that seeks to apply international law and humanitarian relief 
mechanisms for the protection of vulnerable populations within their sovereign borders, from the 
effects of civil conflict and social breakdown. It will demonstrate that at each level of inquiry the IDP 
Regime has been a vehicle to secure the interests of the powerful.  
The Origins of the IDP Regime are a product of a geo-political game that has been played between 
UNHCR, Western states, and Third World states since the 1940s. Similarly the Evolution of IDP norms 
were designed to eclipse and replace the 1951 Convention in order to contain refugee flows from the 
Global South to the North. This history ran parallel to the wider history of internal displacement as a 
function of population control practiced by states in both war and peace, with humanitarian 
mechanisms now justifying and employing similar structures and rhetoric. 
The Structure of the IDP Regime reveals a series of discursive reproductions of power by the manner in 
which vulnerability, paternalism, and control are constructed and intertwined with IDPs presented as 
passive, voiceless, victims; NGOs as altruistic saviours; displacement as an endemic condition of crisis 
prone Third World states; and IDP protection mechanism promoted as solutions for balancing the 
rights and privileges of humanitarians with the predatory and coercive goals of fragile states.  
Finally the Impact of the IDP Regime was evident in the civil war in northern Uganda where the 
application of humanitarian protection mechanisms became incorporated into the political economy of 
violence with aid agencies legitimating the government’s precarious counter-insurgency campaign. By 
trapping displaced masses into IDP camps, a lucrative humanitarian economy emerged that turned 
northern Uganda into a permanent zone of crisis and relief under the Cluster Approach system, which 
had initially boasted greater aid agency co-ordination and efficiency. The consequence of which was 
that 1.8 million citizens who were existing under an alternate bureaucratic category, in an alternate 
territorial space, and governed by an alternate external entity, suffered and perished from starvation, 
disease, exposure, and unchecked rebel attack.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An interesting analogy for comprehending the Global Internal Displacement Regime comes 
from Ian Hacking in his study of the reality of transient mental illnesses, where he questioned 
their validity through their haphazard conceptualisation, and highlighted the social 
repercussions of their diagnosis. In relation to the children’s condition known as Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) ‘discovered’ in the early twentieth century, he asked 
the penetrating questions:  
Fidgety children have been with us forever; then came hyperactivity; next came, 
attention deficit; at present attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, for which the steroid 
Ritalin is prescribed. Is that a real mental disorder? Or is it an artefact of psychiatry 
demanded by a culture that wants to medicalise every annoyance that troubles parents, 
teachers, bus drivers, and all the other powers that be?1  
Even more critical were the consequences of its first diagnosis, which began a process of 
‘scientific’ knowledge production which snowballed and gave birth to a plethora of specialists 
and bureaucracies, education policies, school treatment programs, pharmaceutical products, 
and voluminous academic studies, all containing their own discourses that reinforced each 
other to make ADHD an established and respected object of paediatric healthcare.  
However along the way this became open to manipulation and exploitation. Hyperactivity had 
defined disorder until the 1980s when the US psychiatry’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorder (DSM) coined the term ‘attention deficit disorder’, which effectively 
shifted diagnostic emphasis from hyperactivity to attention as the core problem of disorder. 
The implication of this was that now children with or without hyperactivity could be 
diagnosed with ADD.2 Thus education authorities created categories of children who became 
stigmatised and subjected to rigorous treatment programs. School teachers were awarded 
                                                          
1 Hacking (1998), p. 8. 
2 Singh (2002), p. 361. 
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powers beyond their professional remit to identify and even diagnose ADHD, with many 
having vested interests in either detecting and managing disruptive children or dissuading 
parents of the need for treatment due to their personal beliefs about learning disorders. 
Authorities required schools to screen children for ADHD with special education budgets 
skyrocketing. This demand created a medicine boom in the pharmaceutical industry with 
many companies engaging in drug promotion that masqueraded as professional education by 
sponsoring publications, websites and advocacy groups that offered ‘guidelines’ to teachers, 
school nurses and parents. Such a move reinforced the place of the pharmaceutical industry as 
a ‘benevolent’ and ‘authoritative’ presence within the school. The most serious impact was on 
families, with schools reporting parents who refused treatment to child protection authorities 
for neglect.      
Hacking’s critical analysis of the discovery, evolution, and trajectory of mental illness sets the 
tone for the way we should think about the Global Internal Displacement Regime. This thesis 
thus asks the question: What is the History, Structure, and Impact of the IDP Regime? In 
doing so I will endeavour to illuminate how such a regime led to the creation of complex 
systems of objectification, categorisation, manipulation and exploitation by a raft of actors. 
My underlying motivation for conducting such a study into the wider history of norms, 
policies, institutions and agents shaping the process and outcome of internal displacement is 
to reveal a diverse web of interactions within international politics, between institutions, the 
relief industry, and fragile states. Through an exposition of the histories, a deconstruction of 
the conceptual and normative make-up, and the case study of the impact in Uganda, this thesis 
will provide a counter narrative that unlocks and questions the inherent contradictions, 
assumptions, ambiguities, and dangers of the global IDP Regime. 
The Internal Displacement Regime 
The formation of the global IDP Regime is widely understood to be a reaction to the 
perceived upshot of instability and violence in the Post-Cold War era which saw state 
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collapse, civil war, popular revolt, secession, ethnic cleansing, famine and genocide, force 
millions of people from their homes to seek refuge either across or within their national 
borders. The modern regime stems from the proposed reform of the United Nations issued by 
Kofi Annan in 1997, that sought to adequately address the needs of IDPs through the 
Emergency Relief Co-ordinator of UN OCHA who was tasked with developing policy and 
operational mechanisms so that ‘all humanitarian issues, including those which fall in gaps of 
existing mandates of agencies such as protection and assistance for internally displaced 
persons, are addressed’.3 There are five elements to the Global Internal Displacement 
Regime. First the legal and advocacy dimension is comprised of the United Nations Special 
Representative to the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons. 
This post was established at the request of the Commission on Human Rights in 1992 in order 
to examine the human rights issues related to internally displaced persons and to prepare a 
relevant comprehensive study by General Assembly Resolution.  
Linked to this is the new African Union IDP Convention which is a legally binding treaty 
signed by its member states in Kampala in 2009 and ratified in 2012.4 This was an outcome of 
the initial soft law arrangement of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement which 
were a set of 25 non-binding standards for governments and international organisations in the 
protection of IDPs. Established in 1998 they detailed the rights and guarantees relevant to the 
protection of IDPs in three phases, ‘from arbitrary displacement’, ‘during displacement’, and 
the ‘safe return, resettlement and reintegration’.5 Third are the Norwegian Refugee Council 
and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) which works to formulate all 
relevant data on global IDPs which is used to advocate for the rights of the IDPs by carry out 
training programmes for Country Teams.6  
                                                          
3 Extract from Secretary General’s report to General Assembly: A/51/950 (July 1997), Renewing the 
United Nations: A Programme for Reform.  
4 The Kampala Convention: Making it real: A short guide to the AU Convention for the Protection and 
Assistance of IDPs in Africa, IDMC, (2010). 
5 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998). 
6 McNamara (2005), p. 17. 
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Fourth is the humanitarian dimension of the global IDP Regime through the creation of the 
Cluster Approach in 2005. There are three global clusters led by UNHCR. The Protection 
Cluster Working Group (PCWG) comprises over 30 implementing partners from the 
humanitarian, human rights and development community who tackle the challenges arising 
from the physical security of IDPs, property issues, gender-based violence, lack of basic 
services and the loss of personal documentation. The Camp Coordination and Camp 
Management Cluster (CCCM) is jointly led by UNHCR which focuses on conflict based 
displacement and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) which focuses on 
natural disaster based displacement. The Emergency Shelter Cluster is co-lead by UNHCR 
and IFRC and seeks to increase the effectiveness and predictability of service provision by i) 
expanding the number of qualified professionals available for rapid deployment; ii) 
developing an emergency shelter strategy and guidelines and tools for assessments, 
intervention and monitoring alongside training; and (iii) strengthening stockpiles of shelter 
and related non-food items (NFIs).7  
Finally the academic and intellectual discourse attached to the IDP Regime is spearheaded by 
the Brookings-Bern Project, which is a collaboration between the Brookings Institute and the 
University of Bern School of Law established to monitor global displacement, promote the 
dissemination and application of the Guiding Principles, lobbys governments, regional bodies, 
international organisations and civil society to create policies and. The Project publishes 
studies, articles and reports and convenes international seminars. Supplementing this has been 
the Institute for the Study of Migration at Georgetown University which has been engaged in 
a project since 2007 to determine ‘when internal displacement ends?’  
Today the Global IDP phenomenon is an acclaimed international regime endorsed by 
governments, international organisations, civil society groups, and humanitarian actors.  The 
General Assembly has since passed multiple resolutions dedicated to IDPs. In his report In 
                                                          
7 EXCOM Report EC/57/SC/CRP.18, 8 June (2006): UNHCR’s expanded role in support of the inter-
agency response to internal displacement situations, SUMMARY, p. 114. 
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Larger Freedom, the UN Secretary-General, in March 2005 urged Member States to accept 
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as “the basic international norm for 
protection” of internally displaced persons. In July 2005, the Chairman of the UN General 
Assembly in a report reaffirming the UN Millennium Declaration, under the heading 
Internally Displaced Persons, recognised the Guiding Principles as “the minimum 
international standard for the protection of internally displaced persons” . In addition the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), African Union (AU), The 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the International Authority on 
Development (IGAD) have all formally acknowledged the principles.8 
II. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
This thesis first attempts to reconcile a divide by bringing several disciplines and discourses 
to the same table. This has arisen because internal displacement is not a unified concept and 
simply attempting to define precisely what the IDP Regime consists of has become a 
herculean task. Internal displacement is rather a chameleon and a major constraint to 
analysing it stems from its multiple guises depending on the given environment which cut 
across disciplines, sub-fields and ultimately imprints itself on all the various constellations of 
human life. This emphasises how the dimensions of culture, society, the economy, and the 
political all coexist on an immanent field of interaction. This is significant because how the 
IDP is interpreted is not exclusive to any one realm and may give rise to tugs of war over the 
implementation of a given program(s) by a given actor(s). The legal discourse primarily 
regards the protection of IDPs under the black letter of national and international law.9 
However this may lead to purely symbolic protection with lawyers having no conception of 
political dynamics within fragile states. The intellectual and academic discourse seeks to 
research and produce knowledge able to better assist and direct policy towards the 
                                                          
8 Kalin (2005), p. 27. 
9 Phoung (2005), Bagshaw (2005). 
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identification and protection of IDPs.10 However this can lead to an objectification of the IDP 
as a passive, voiceless and invisible victim, encompassing a special category devoid of 
citizenship. The humanitarian discourse concerns the physical protection of vulnerable people 
arising from conflict induced displacement, either through a rights based or a needs based 
approach.11 However this may clash or become complicit with the military discourse of 
internal displacement which concerns the control of the civil populace through forced 
evacuations and concentration camps, in an attempt to deny rebel groups a resource base in 
counter insurgency warfare.12 Finally the development discourse is concerned with the 
imperative to create open and equitable societies that reduce the propensity for displacement 
through poverty and war by the employment of ‘good governance’ mechanisms which can 
facilitate infrastructural development and economic development. However this can itself 
cause development induced displacement through the construction of communications, 
transportation and energy infrastructure, which can leave hundreds of thousands stranded and 
destitute.13 Overall there is little or no interaction between fields and no introspection by each 
discourse of the changing relationships to one another. Given this state of affairs this thesis 
thus develops a broad ecumenical framework for thinking about the dynamics of IDP Regime 
which draws upon various theoretical schools including: the constructivist scholarship on 
norms, discourse theory, and political geography, all of which contribute something important 
to our understanding of the IDP Regime.  
Secondly the inability for inter disciplinary dialogue predominantly stems from the failure to 
properly historicise the IDP Regime. The few writings on internal displacement focus on the 
events after 1990, however to comprehend the regime requires us to revisit the contestations 
and debates both within the League of Nations in 1930s and within the United Nations from 
the 1940s to the present. In addition the scholarly work on internal displacement is 
predominantly divided along the lines of ethnographic studies on the lived experiences of 
                                                          
10 Deng (1993), Korn (1999), Cohen and Deng (1998). 
11 Mooney (2001). 
12 South (2007). 
13 Turton in Robinson ed. (2002), p. 27. 
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displaced people14; the political and socio economic complexities of displacement and its 
categorisation15; and the attempts to afford IDPs legal and humanitarian protection through 
durable solutions16. There is however little discussion or analysis of how, when, and why 
internal displacement has become a shibboleth of our time, nor of the consequences of this 
conceptualisation. The origins and evolution are rarely connected to further innovations, 
developments, and trends with the past and present unconnected. Instead, it is treated as an 
unprecedented phenomenon which simply fell out of the sky to the alarm of the international 
community in the Post-Cold War era. This thesis hopes to provide the first account of the 
modern IDP Regime that further links forced migration to International Relations. While the 
discipline has expanded its empirical focus beyond the hard security issues of war and peace 
to encompass a range of themes including the global economy, environment, human rights, 
and international trade, relatively little attention has been directed towards the international 
politics of forced migration, with only isolated pockets employing forced migration as an 
appendage and symptom for more traditional military threats of ethnic cleansing, genocide, 
peacekeeping, and regional stability, etc. According to Betts, forced migration ‘touches upon 
issues relating to international cooperation, globalisation, global public goods, ethnicity, 
nationalism, sovereignty, international organisations, regime complexity, security, the role of 
non-state actors, interdependence, regionalism, and North-South relations’.17  
Finally this thesis is a response to the work of Thomas Weiss & David Korn, Internal 
Displacement: Conceptualisation and its Consequences which hailed the formulation of the 
IDP concept as a positive international achievement, in line with the arguments and slogans 
that profess that People Matter and Ideas Matter. For Weiss & Korn the plight of voiceless 
                                                          
14 Brun (2003), Brun and Lund (2005), Lund (2003), Shanmugaratnam et al. (2003), Skonhoft (1998), 
Vincent and Sorensen (2001), Schrijvers (1999), Banerjee et al (2005), Mertus (2003), Van Hear 
(2002) and Birkeland (2003). 
15 Deng and Cohen (1998), Zetter (1985 & 1991), Raper (2003), UNOCHA (2003), Cernea & 
McDowell (2000), & Rajaram (2002),  Barutunski (1996, 1998, 1999), and Bennett (1999), and Qadem 
(2005) 
16 Deng (2000), Cohen (1998, 2003), Frelick (1999), Jacobsen (2001), Borton et al. (2005), Slim and 
Eguren (2004), Mooney (2003), Contat Hickel (2001), Krill (2001), Kalin (2000), Davies (1998) and 
Dubernet (2001). 
17 Betts (2009), p. 2. 
14 
 
victims was brought to the attention of the international community. They trace the origins, 
actors, politics & problems which shaped the modern IDP discourse arguing that: 
The phenomenon of internal displacement and the conceptualisation of sovereignty as 
responsibility- including the various dimensions of international protection-have had 
substantial normative, legal, and operational consequences during what, by historical 
standards, represents a remarkable brief period of time (1992-2005). They are: the 
recognition of the category itself; the acceptance of the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement; the promotion of national and international protection for IDPs; and the 
integration of internal displacement into the machinery of donors, IGOs, regional 
organisations, and NGOs. The mandate of the representative provided the platform, and 
the PID provided the intellectual firepower and institutional base.18 
 
Weiss and Korn begin their analysis with the historical background to the IDP problem from 
1992-1993. They then give an account of factors which led to the UN publication of the two 
books Protecting the Dispossessed & Masses in Flight and the formulation of the Guiding 
Principles on Internally Displaced People from 1993-1998. They document how Francis Deng 
who was the UN Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Internal Displacement 
from 1992 to 2004 attempted to address the institutional shortcomings within the UN with 
regard to IDPs and conclude with his legacy. While they state very clearly that their intentions 
are not to provide an appraisal of the effects of the IDP discourse for protection and assistance 
operations on the ground19, this thesis will document how the actual consequences and 
experience of this conceptualisation for states, aid agencies, and displaced populations in 
complex emergencies, challenge the perceived achievements.  
They only observed the IDPs suffering without recognising these unintended consequences. 
There is a whole dimension of internal displacement not analysed and airbrushed out of their 
analysis. For the authors the ‘conceptualisation’ and birth of internal displacement stemmed 
                                                          
18 Weiss and Kohn (2006), p. 7. 
19 Ibid, p. 3. 
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from the valiant efforts of Francis Deng, as the heroic figure who worked tirelessly trying to 
reconcile the suffering on the ground with bureaucratic politics in New York and Geneva.  
The title of their book represents something of a misnomer because in reality there has been 
no conceptualisation of internal displacement on its own merit. Instead what has been 
conducted by lawyers, academics and humanitarians alike, has been a simple emotional 
analogy of destitute vulnerable citizens with destitute and vulnerable refugees which reduces 
internal displacement to established international mechanisms of refugee protection. However 
to properly conceptualise and develop the core elements of this phenomenon would require 
identifying the external and internal political dynamics of state-societal relations which would 
invariably point to the vested and entrenched interests of the powerful, which dwarfs any 
attempt by academics, lawyers and humanitarians to control, manage, or change. By using the 
case study of northern Uganda I will show how the IDP Regime has impacted on fragile state-
society relations in order to ‘reconceptualise’ the initial failed ‘conceptualisation’ of internal 
displacement, which will provide a more accurate understanding of the phenomenon. The 
work of Weiss and Korn represent only a galaxy in a universe of competing agendas, geo-
political games, international humanitarian organisations and fragile states.   
The History of the IDP Regime 
Tracking the origins and evolution of the regime will give a very different perspective on its 
present outlook. To understand where the IDP Regime originated from, it is necessary to 
grapple with the causes, interests, and interactions between powerful states and international 
institutions in relation to the international politics of refugees. The forced migration literature 
that covers the history, politics, actors, and responses pertaining to refugees and the UNHCR 
contains only a modicum of historical coverage of IDPs.20 The prevailing scholarship on 
internal displacement is of the conviction that the regime began in the late 80s with 
                                                          
20 Loescher (1989, 1993, 2001, 2010), Betts (2010), Holborn (1956), Goodwin-Gill (1996), Harrell-
Bond (1986), Hathaway (2005), and Chimni (2000), Nicholson and Twomey (1999), Soguk (1999), 
and Gibney (2004).  
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proponents of the IDP Regime describing a new and unprecedented phenomenon. The origins 
of the Internal Displacement Regime are widely believed to have stemmed from the tireless 
and selfless efforts of a coalition of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and 
individuals who lobbied, reported and pressured powerful governments and institutions to 
consider internal displacement not solely a humanitarian but a human rights issue, that 
required new norms, structures and institutions. The World Council of Churches, the Quakers, 
the Refugee Policy Group, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), Caritas 
International, the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights and the 
European Foundation for Human Rights, and the Brookings Institute, were all instrumental in 
pushing for resolutions that recognised internally displaced persons. In 2000 Francis Deng 
received the Rome Prize for Peace and Humanitarian Action. In 2005 he and his colleague 
Roberta Cohen jointly received the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order. 
Finally in 2007 Deng received the Merage Foundation American Dream Leadership Award. 
In a 2006 edition of Forced Migration Review titled Putting IDPs on the map: Achievements 
and Challenges, Roberta Cohen is credited as the person who placed internal displacement on 
the agenda of human rights institutions by ‘applying the principles through fundraising for 
their translation and dissemination, organising and speaking at countless seminars and 
conferences and lobbying within the UN system…credited with defining a field of academic 
and intellectual study…establishing the case for IDPs as a category of concern’.21   
However to truly understand why a handful of individuals and institutions came to be 
regarded as the founders of the IDP Regime, we have to recognise the belief systems that 
explained the emergence of IDP issues, which describe it as a direct product of precedence set 
by a collection of wider social forces of the globalised media coupled with the rise of human 
rights discourse, and interventionism, penetrated and demolished the defensive wall of 
sovereignty, to expose, indict, and embarrass repressive governments, and elevate suffering 
masses to a level of acceptable dignity, which was enshrined in adherence to the higher values 
                                                          
21 FMR, December (2006), p. 3. 
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of global civil society. However here lies the difficulty, because it is precisely the obsession 
with this social order by humanitarians, human rights activists, lawyers, and civil society 
organisations today, which represents the subterfuge that has eclipsed the real and imminent 
interactions of geo-politics with powerful Western states seeking to curb the flow of refugees 
arriving from the global south through a new regime that nullifies the UN 1951 Refugee 
Convention through in-country protection that abrogates the need for flight.  
In addition to this UN Humanitarian Organisations have now employed IDP Camps as viable 
relief mechanisms. This practice adds another layer of complexity to the formation of the IDP 
Regime because of the parallel history of internment (villagisation, extermination, counter 
insurgency, and internal security) which has been practiced by states for over two hundred 
years for the retention of power and governance. This is perplexing because the IDP camp 
which was first a tool for population control has now been inverted to become a new and 
effective remedy to the suffering of displacement.   
The Structure of the IDP Regime 
Uncovering the history undoubtedly leads to questions of its nature and logic. Internal 
displacement has become so deeply entrenched, that it seems almost impossible to question 
due to the hegemonic status of human rights discourse at its centre, which requires an analysis 
of its discursive formations. By deconstructing aid agency literature, agency speeches, IDP 
images, academic scholarship, and field operations, we will observe how the various 
discourses of internal displacement between lawyers, academics, international organisations, 
humanitarian practitioners, military forces have affected the articulation and construction of 
the global IDP Regime, so as to comprehend the following: 
• What are the terms in which the IDP phenomenon have been framed? 
• Why are IDPs invariably framed as a ‘problem’ in need of a solution? 
• What identities are constructed by the prevailing classification system of IDPs? 
• What privileged positions are created through IDP protection structures? 
18 
 
Empirically the global IDP Regime does not generally bring about any significant reduction 
in displacement, nor the protection of internally displaced populations, for reasons that I will 
expand in the following section, precisely because it is set up in such a way that it never 
could, with institutions that are organised to primarily perpetuate themselves, and with the 
assistance to suffering people simply conducted as an appendage to this quintessential 
endeavour. Furthermore the obvious fact that the forces driving displacement (socio-
economic inequality, state fragility, colonial and Cold War legacies, the peripheral position of 
the Global South in the world economy) exist beyond the capacity and scope of any one actor 
to tackle through humanitarian solutions that only address symptoms of crises. Given such a 
reality, it therefore becomes fundamental to understand the effects the IDP Regime produces. 
Through its deconstruction, I intend to unveil how institutions addressing the global internal 
displacement generate their own forms of discourse, which simultaneously construct internal 
displacement as a particular kind of object of knowledge, which then creates a structure of 
knowledge around that object for particular interventions and outcomes by particular actors. 
By employing a critical discourse analysis as a vivisection of this conceptual apparatus: an 
investigation of how specific ideas about ‘internal displacement’ are generated in practice, 
and how they are put to use; and a demonstration what effects they end up producing, I hope 
to provide an overarching picture of the embedded knowledge-power complex of the IDP 
Regime.  
The Impact of the IDP Regime 
In order to create a resilient argument against such an entrenched and mainstream 
international regime, a firm empirical base is required to determine the way it works in 
practice and the effects it generates, so as to ascertain what happens differently due to the 
regime that would not or could not happen without it? 
 The IDP Regime has awarded citizens of a state the rights and privileges of refugees, which 
is a legal status under international law given to people who cross a sovereign boundary and 
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are therefore in need of rights outside their country of origin. The fact that aid agencies and 
donors are now officially responsible for citizens within their own borders has begun to 
distort state societal relations and become open to exploitation and manipulation. As will 
become evident in the humanitarian operations in Uganda (1996-2010), ‘projects can end up 
performing extremely sensitive political operations involving the entrenchment and expansion 
of institutional state power almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to 
which no one can object’.22 
By deconstructing and assessing the impact of the global IDP regime in northern Uganda, we 
will observe how it has formally institutionalised humanitarian politics, to the point where 
rather than respond to, exacerbate, or prolong complex emergencies, humanitarian aid 
operations become the complex emergency in of themselves. The Cluster Approach ironically 
employs the practice of internal displacement as a remedy to the suffering of internal 
displacement. The employment of concentration camps through the Cluster Approach 
framework as an effective mechanism for the delivery of aid, imprisons its recipients in a 
permanent state of relief where they are subjected to all the above pathologies and politics of 
aid agencies, with no voice, capacity or resources to escape what is presented and sustained as 
a magnanimous and noble act of human security. The dual use of the concentration camp by 
military forces and humanitarian actors for clearly diametrically opposed objectives has 
blurred the continuum between protection and control to the detriment of those displaced in 
camps. In addition most of the authors neglect to mention any of the macro level political or 
economic forces that contribute to humanitarian catastrophes or shape its responses. 
Humanitarian aid is presented as a mechanical organisation-driven process devoid of human 
agency or process. Therefore by linking the humanitarian dimension of the global IDP 
Regime to the complexities of international politics and the crises of governance, we will 
begin to establish a more comprehensive and contextualised picture that makes humanitarian 
politics and violence logical and even expected manifestations of these interactions.      
                                                          
22 Ferguson (1990), p. 256. 
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To accomplish this, a relatively neglected Foucauldian framework- that of heterotopology 
(the analytics, in other words of ‘heterotopia’) is employed. Foucault’s notion of heterotopia 
provides an avenue of conceptualising ‘differential’, or ‘other’ social spaces. These are zones 
of social activity with prescribed functions and identities which are able to operate as spaces 
of alternate social ordering; heterotopia in other words, are able to show up, critically reflect 
and subvert a society’s commonplace norms and discursive values. Heterotopia are connected 
to a series of criteria- ritualised systems of opening and closing, a codified sense of social 
functionality, a distinctive ordering of time and the spatial realisation of utopian aspirations- 
that Foucault applies as a set of steps for the analysis of spatio-discursive relations of power. 
The applied focus on the IDP camp and the Cluster Approach, will be the site in which a 
particular formation of ‘protection’ will be thrown into sharp perspective. The subsequent 
analysis identifies how a particular discourse of ‘protection’ that aid agencies and Uganda 
government mobilise as a means of justifying a series of coercive, brutal and exploitative 
measures. The spatial ordering of camps through the creation of a ‘different’ category of 
citizens, with ‘different’ rights, organised in a ‘different’ location, and governed by a 
‘different’ external entity, justify structures of power, privilege and paternalism and function 
as the ultimate and true impact of the IDP Regime.   
III. ARGUMENT 
It is my contention that by analysing the history, structure and impact we will rethink the IDP 
Regime to be purely a mechanism for accommodating a series of interests at three levels (see 
figure 1 below). The history of the IDP Regime was not simply about the discovery of 
destitute masses who shared the same characteristics as refugees and had no protection under 
international law, but a geo-political game in which the old frameworks of the 1951 
Convention had limited the interests of the powerful, with new ones thus required to replace it 
to manage and contain refugee flows, calm domestic pressures and conceal xenophobia while 
upholding international human rights obligations through the right to remain, which 
authorised interventions into the domestic affairs of weak states. The structure of the IDP 
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Regime rested upon reproducing existing power structures of Western paternalism, 
humanitarian privileges, and the control of destitute masses through the refugee protection 
system. Such structures worked to create an alternate category of people, residing in an 
alternate territorial space, protected by an alternate external actor, which employed an 
alternate set of laws and guidelines. The impact of the IDP Regime was witnessed in Uganda 
where it bolstered a fragile state in its retention of power, by becoming fully incorporated into 
the political economy of violence, by camouflaging counter-insurgency practices, maintaining 
a shining international image, and lubricating and stabilising a highly precarious patronage 
system.  In addition to this it secured the privileges & status of the relief industry operating 
within complex emergencies through a camp based system that created a series of overlapping 
vicious cycles.  
 
Figure 1  
IDP Regime Complex 
 
Research Caveats 
Geo-Politics 
Fragile States 
Relief 
Industry  
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My overall aim in this thesis was to ignite a discussion that grounded the IDP Regime within 
its ‘proper’ context of geopolitics and governance. As a result a number of important 
limitations need to be considered regarding the present study. Firstly due to the scant data on 
the history, structure and impact of the IDP Regime, there is no clear benchmark, which 
meant that much of the work had to be assembled and assessed through events, speeches, 
official reports, operations, field observations, images and informal discussions in order to 
triangulate and read between the lines of a great deal of ambiguity and contradiction. As a 
consequence many of the findings are open to alternate explanations that either build upon or 
challenge the current study. Secondly in light of this and due to the limitation of time, I do not 
attempt to provide an absolute all-encompassing narrative but acknowledge that more 
concrete data into the institutional make-up of organisations and the intricate decision making 
processes of states may illuminate or fine tune any unexplained or incomplete areas more 
rigorously, which may be the basis for further research.  
IV. METHODOLOGY 
Archival Research 
To properly historicise the IDP Regime so as to understand why the displacement of 
populations has existed throughout the history of warfare, suddenly became a prominent 
challenge for the international community in the Post-Cold War era, I had to engage the 
archival material held at the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford University which included 
reports, conferences and workshops on internal displacement. Secondly the Official Records 
of the League of Nations from 1920-1936 and the Official Records of the United Nations 
General Assembly 3rd Committee from 1947-1994. Both sources were based at the 
Commonwealth Reading Rooms at Cambridge University and revealed the long history of the 
geopolitical contestations surrounding the protection of people within their borders by the 
Great powers since the early twentieth century, which were absent from the prevailing 
literature.   
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Critical Discourse Analysis 
To detail the structure of the IDP Regime, I had to employ a discourse analysis of a diverse 
collection of artefacts, documents and images that eventually reveal a series of logics of 
control. This involved applying three methodological instruments to uncover the embedded 
structures of power. First was the central notion of activity, as Foucault warned us not to be 
overly concerned with such caricatures of power as simply repressive force that prohibits and 
constrains behaviour, but instead to be receptive to its modes of innovation, invention, and 
adaptability. Second because discourse operates to formulate given understandings it is 
important not just to consider the plenitude of meaning but the restrictive and constraining 
functions which account for the scarcity of meaning with what cannot be said, or what is 
deemed unreasonable or impossible within certain discursive domains, which in themselves 
reveal. Thirdly is resistance which arises from the dynamism of responses and exchanges 
which for Foucault is a necessary precondition for the operations of relations of power as 
without contestation there would be complete domination, subservience and obedience. 
 
Northern Uganda 
In order to uncover the material impact and unintended consequences of the IDP Regime on a 
fragile state, Uganda became the site of ethnographic fieldwork. The research was based over 
a nine month period in which I enlisted the help of a small team of five research assistants to 
interview, observe and translate 100 life histories from a cross section of people who lived 
and operated in the camps from 1996 to 2010. I selected a total of 12 IDP camps which varied 
in size from the three districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader. The people selected include 
families, youths, elderly, traditional leaders, religious denominations, security personnel, 
journalists, aid workers, camp commandants, lawyers, civil servants, and local politicians. In 
addition I conducted document collection first from the Parliamentary Library of all official 
hansards of government debates and committee meetings on the war and displacement in 
northern Uganda from 1990 to 2011. Secondly from the Gulu District Authority archives I 
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collated all correspondence and meetings between local government, NGOs, and IDPs from 
1998 to 2009. Thirdly I collected articles from the major Uganda newspaper (New Vision, 
Daily Monitor, and Observer) of public debates on northern Uganda. 
V. OUTLINE 
The thesis will be divided into three parts. The first will provide the history of the IDP 
Regime. Chapter one will document the origins of the IDP Regime as an outcome of the geo-
politics of refugees. Chapter two will then focus on the evolution of the IDP Regime through 
an analysis of how refugee norms were carefully redesigned to emerge as IDP norms that 
could eclipse the 1951 Convention and contain refugees. The second part will observe the 
structure of the IDP Regime through a critical discourse analysis. Chapter three will delineate 
the nature, logic and effects by outlining the discursive reproductions of power, privilege and 
paternalism at its heart. The third part will then apply such findings to understand the impact 
of the IDP Regime in Uganda. Chapter four will set the stage through an appreciation of this 
fragile state and how it used the IDP Regime to manage its retention of power within the 
context of a counter-insurgency campaign conducted within a lucrative civil war. Chapter five 
will apply the Foucauldian concept of heterotopia to understand how the IDP camps became 
spaces of discourse where relief and state actors could manage and secure their interests 
which culminated in the suffering of over 2 million people for over ten years.      
                                                                                                                  
VI. WIDER IMPLICATIONS 
The practical and theoretical concerns raised in this thesis go well beyond the domains of 
refugees, Uganda and the relief industry that touch upon the significant contemporary debates 
in international politics. Firstly regarding the nature of Third World sovereignty by the way in 
which sovereign territory and citizens are formally handed over to the international 
community for indefinite periods which echoes the politics of International Administration of 
War Torn states. Secondly for the emerging crises of citizenship in many developing nations 
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by the way the IDP Regime has reconfigured state-societal relations through masking and 
legitimising state predation and creation of sub-categories of citizens in already divided states. 
Finally for the accountability of international organisations who through the IDP Regime 
have now come to imprint their own agendas, interests and pathologies upon citizens within 
their borders.  
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Chapter One 
The Origins of the Internal Displacement Regime  
The International Politics of Refugees 
 
Introduction 
In 1998, the former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, stated that “Internal 
displacement has emerged as one of the great human tragedies of our time. It has also created 
an unprecedented challenge for the international community: to find ways to respond to what 
is essentially an internal crisis…protection should be central to the international response and 
[with] assistance should be provided in a comprehensive way that brings together the 
humanitarian, human rights, and development components of the United Nations”.23It has 
further been reported by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) that in the 
world today there exist over 25 million people internally displaced as a result of violent 
conflict and human rights violations, with notable cases of Iraq, Sudan, DRC, Somalia and 
Colombia containing over 1 million IDPs each. Such staggering figures have given impetus to 
governments, international organisations and NGOs to formulate and apply a series of global 
protection initiatives and national policies.24 However, why and how we reached such a new 
global consensus will be the subject of this chapter, to ab initio, draw out the historical 
roadmaps, actors, and political processes at the root of this supposedly new international 
endeavour at in-country protection. What we will come to understand is that internal 
displacement is a child of the Refugee Regime. The goal of this chapter is thus to tell a story 
of the alternate history of the IDP Regime which was an outcome of the international politics 
of refugees over a sixty year period (see table 1 overleaf). The global initiative to protect and 
assist people trapped within their own borders has not been a new and unprecedented 
                                                          
23 Preface to Deng (1998). 
24 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2011).  
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challenge, but instead a geo-political game in which UNHCR became embroiled, and had to 
make a series of adaptations in order to survive.  
Table 1. History of Refugee Politics 
Historical Period Politics of Refugees 
1920-1940 Post War Refugees Start of protection international debates with 
contestations over internal or external 
assistance.  
1950-1980 Cold War Years UNHCRs creation and adaptation through the 
emergence of IDP issues.  
1990-2000 Barriers to Asylum UNHCR transition to IDP Protection and the 
formalisation of IDP policy. 
21st Century & Beyond UNHCRs global humanitarian dominance 
through a new IDP Regime.  
 
This alternate history reveals how the imminent need for comprehensive in-country protection 
became an attractive option to prevent hundreds of thousands of people fleeing across borders 
from the Global South into Europe and North America, which silenced any international 
public accusations of racism or xenophobia and authorised the external intervention into the 
domestic affairs of states on humanitarian grounds. 
This chapter is divided into six parts. The first part will document the early years of the 
creation of the International Refugee Convention, in which the protection of the internally 
displaced was at the centre of heated debates and contestations between both the member 
states of the League of Nations in the 1930s, and the newly formed United Nations in 1949. 
The second part will discuss the Cold War years of the 50s, 60s, and 70s, in which the 
UNHCR struggled to become relevant to the Great Powers amid American attempts to 
undermine and marginalise the infant organisations that they could not control. This period 
sees UNHCR adapt and market itself to the interests of the powerful states of the Free World, 
through a number of critical interventions in East Germany, Hungary and Algeria, and the 
construction of the refugee as an object of Cold War propaganda and, ultimately through the 
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unilateral initiative of the High Commissioner, to expand beyond Europe and engage in 
reconstruction activities. These decades witnessed enormous internal displacement through 
the superpower proxy wars and indigenous national liberation struggles in the Third world.  
The third part covers the decades of the 80s and 90s which marked a watershed for UNHCR. 
The image of the refugee was once again recast with the end of the Cold War bi-polar stand-
off, to one of destitute, unskilled, non-white people from the Global South, who now arrived 
in great numbers at the doorsteps of the Global North. Funding crises’, massive refugee 
repatriation operations, un-mandated interventions in Somalia, northern Iraq and Kosovo, and 
internal rifts transformed the organisation and unofficially inaugurated internal displacement 
as a crisis through a careful repackaging and re-labelling of the refugee crisis as in-country 
protection, rather than the containment of refugee flows. The fourth section documents the 
wider structural changes in the international system that allowed the IDP Regime to take root 
through the reconceptualization of sovereignty; the birth of human security; and the rise of 
Neoliberalism and non-governmental organisations which all created the necessary space for 
UNHCR to identify and engage in internal displacement.  
The fifth part witnesses the culmination of this 60 year struggle with UNHCR coming full 
circle through the expanded mandate to engage in in-country protection which forms the IDP 
Regime and cements its existence as a permanent UN organisation. This period is marked by 
the organisation again re-inventing itself to counter potential rivals and clever lobbying and 
positioning that danced to the tune of powerful member states to once again solicit their 
support and funds. This allowed UNHCR to shape the outcomes of UN resolutions which 
paid dividends in December 2003. The final part charts the present trajectory of UNHCR in 
which dominance has now become its principle goal, through the protection of all categories 
of displaced persons. This will be evident in the political manoeuvring that has transformed 
UNHCR into the world’s largest humanitarian organisation.      
1. The Early Years 30s & 40s: The Creation of a Refugee Regime 
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The critical concern of this first historical inquiry is not only to explore how the phenomenon 
of internal displacement predates the Post-Cold War era, but how the current issues and 
debates surrounding the international Responsibility (R2P) to Protect IDPs are not new and 
were heavily deliberated in the early and mid-twentieth century respectively.  
1.2 Total War & the Birth of the Modern Refugee 
The League of Nations in the aftermath of the First World War from 1926-1933, began a 
process of creating and codifying the international protection rights afforded to refugees. This 
was as a result of two major developments. The first was the advent of total war and the 
economic, social and technological transformation it brought, through the identification of 
enemy civilians as legitimate military targets, which resulted in vast numbers of people 
escaping indiscriminate violence. Second was the dissolution of the Habsburg, Romanov, 
Ottoman and Hohenzollern empires and the expansion of nation-states which accelerated the 
drive to create ethnically, religiously and culturally homogenous societies, which removed 
and excluded hundreds of thousands from citizenship, and in many cases became scapegoats 
for failed post war recovery amid the deteriorating conditions in the global economy.25 
Hungary received hundreds of thousands of Magyar refugees from the successor states of 
Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Following the Armenian genocide which killed 
between 500,000 to 1 million, Armenian survivors fled to Soviet Armenia, Syria and Europe. 
The Greco-Turkish war of 1922 created over 1 million Anatolian Greek and Armenian 
refugees. The Russian exodus was the biggest of all, with between 1 and 2 million people 
fleeing into Germany and France in the aftermath of the collapse of tsarist Russia, the Russian 
civil war, the Russo-Polish war and the Soviet famine of 1921. In the wake of such chaos, the 
League of Nations received calls from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
to find solutions to the masses in flight.   
                                                          
25 Loescher (2001), p. 22-23. 
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The contemporary debates surrounding the formal protection of people displaced within their 
borders by the international community are believed to have begun at the International 
Conference on the Plight of Refugees, Returnees & Displaced Persons in Southern Africa 
(SARRED) held in Oslo in August 1988. However, they were first ignited by the High 
Commissioner for Refugees to the League of Nations Lord James McDonald, who in 
December 1935 resigned from the League of Nations in protest against the refusal of member 
states to deal with the root causes of refugee flows from Nazi Germany. For McDonald, this 
required a radical approach that overstepped his limited mandate with intervention to change 
the domestic structure of a predatory state26. In his letter of resignation he spelt out the 
problem clearly:  
The task of saving those victims calls for renewed efforts of the philanthropic bodies. 
The private organisations, Jewish and Christian, may be expected to do their part of the 
Governments, acting through the League, make possible a solution. But in the new 
circumstances, it will not be enough to continue the activities on behalf of those who 
flee from the Reich. Efforts must be made to remove or mitigate the causes which 
create German refugees. The efforts of the private organisations and of any League 
organisation for refugees can only mitigate a problem of growing gravity and 
complexity. In the present economic conditions of the world, the European States, and 
even those overseas, have only a limited power of absorption of refugees. The problem 
must be tackled at its source if disaster is to be avoided.27 
Such protest eighty years ago became the bedrock of current measures to address the plight of 
IDPs through root causes and preventative protection in the 1990s. The former High 
Commissioner Ogata explained in the same way as McDonald in the wake of UNHCR’s 
involvement in the 1992 Balkan wars that: 
UNHCR traditionally understood protection to mean first of all the right to seek asylum 
and the rights to return for all who desired it. We realised that in the current Balkan 
context, protection should be [re] defined above all as ‘the right to be allowed to stay in 
one’s home in safety and dignity, regardless of one’s ethnic national or religious origin. 
                                                          
26 Skran (1995), pp. 230-240. 
27 James G. McDonald, League of Nations, Resignation Letter (1935), Official Journal of the League of 
Nations (1936). 
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It is clear that protection must include the notion of prevention, but the latter can only 
be effective if backed by political action for a peaceful settlement.28 
 
McDonald concluded his letter with a plea that humanitarianism needed to trump state 
sovereignty. This was prophetic because it became the maxim for all IDP protection discourse 
fifty years later through Francis Deng’s conceptualisation of Sovereignty as Responsibility, 
Kofi Annan’s notion of Two Sovereignties and a variety of NGOs and academic institutions: 
When domestic policies threaten the demoralisation and exile of hundreds of thousands 
of human beings, consideration of diplomatic correctness must yield to those of 
common humanity. I should be recreant if I did not call attention to the actual situation, 
plead that world opinion, acting through the League and its Member-States and other 
countries move to avert the existing and impending tragedies.29 
 
1.2 International Protection for Whom: IDPs or Refugees? 
The rancour over the protection of displaced masses continued into the 1940s due to the 
return and resettlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees and those displaced in camps in 
Post-War Europe. This dominated the agenda of the 3rd Committee on Economic & Social 
Affairs of the newly formed United Nations, which necessitated the creation of a new refugee 
convention and agency. The late 1940s saw growing numbers of internally displaced people 
in post war environments in India, Pakistan, Germany, and Turkey who became the concern 
for the international community in the heated debates that attempted to further define who and 
what constituted a ‘refugee’ in order to define the protection operations and parameters of the 
new UNHCR. Sweden, The Netherlands, Greece, Canada, UK, Belgium and Turkey were of 
the opinion that the High Commissioner’s powers should not be confined to legal protection, 
but should be sufficient to meet all requirements, including those of a material and social 
                                                          
28 Statement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the International Meeting on 
Humanitarian Aid for Victims of the Conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Geneva, 29, July.(1992), p. 2. 
29 James G. McDonald, League of Nations, Resignation Letter (1935), Official Journal of the League of 
Nations (1936). Pg. x, point 17. 
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nature30. The Indian delegate, Mrs Menon, abstained from participating in these debates 
firstly because the problem of European refugees was limited in geographic scope and 
number. This required a small agency with limited resources, which would be rapidly 
depleted if a refugee definition were expanded to all displaced people. Secondly was the fact 
that resettlement was relatively easy for Europeans living in Europe who could be absorbed 
into neighbouring countries. For Mrs Menon, however, the real issue was the fact that,  
The United Nations should try to help not only special sections of the world’s 
population, but all afflicted people everywhere. Suffering knew no racial or political 
boundaries; it was the same for all. As international tension increased, vast masses of 
humanity might be uprooted and displaced. For the United Nations to attempt a partial 
remedy involving discrimination, whether accidental or deliberate, would be contrary 
to the principles of the Charter[emphasis added].31  
There resides here a striking parallel with the same arguments employed almost fifty years 
later by Francis Deng who protested against the international community for failing to assist 
IDPs in the 1990s, which became the mantra for all subsequent justifications by donors, 
humanitarians and, lawyers arguing that suffering and death do not recognise borders. In 
1989, Roberta Cohen, in a report Refugees and Human Rights: A Research and Policy 
Agenda, argued that the focus of refugee scholars on people crossing borders, and the focus of 
human rights organisations on those trapped within oppressive states, was detrimental to 
people forced to flee regardless of whether they fled within or across states32. In addition, The 
Special Advisor, Population, Refugees and Migration, to the State Department Luke Lee, 
argued in 1996 for a legal synthesis between refugees and IDPs, on the basis that  
equal rights for all individuals is implied in all universal and regional human rights 
instruments through the use of such expressions as ‘all human being’, ‘everyone’, ‘no 
one’, or ‘all’. Hence, not a single ‘right’ in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
                                                          
30 Year Book of the United Nations (1948-49), p. 593. 
31 Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Session, Third Committee, p. 377. 
32 Cohen and Morsch, Refugee Policy Group, (1989). 
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for example, is specified or implied as belonging only to refugees, and not internally 
displaced persons.33  
More recently in 2000, US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, asserted that ‘there is 
no difference between being a refugee or an IDP. In terms of what happened to them, they are 
equally victims, but they are treated differently’.34  
The universal fervour embedded in such sentiments was, however, not shared by all delegates 
within the 3rd Committee. Eleanor Roosevelt at the time representing the United States, was 
the main protagonist against the conflation of issues through the inclusion of IDPs in the 
development of a new refugee convention and critically argued that: 
The transfers of population in Germany, India, Pakistan and Turkey, for example 
unquestionably raised serious problems for the countries involved, for those 
populations had to be integrated into the social economic and political life of the 
receiving countries. Yet they [IDPs] enjoyed all the rights and privileges of the 
nationals of those countries, and did not require international protection such as was 
envisaged in the proposals before the Committee. The problem of relief arising out of 
such movements was an entirely different matter, and specific proposals should be 
made to that effect.35  
She was joined by the French delegate, Mr Rochefort, who, in December 1950, very clearly 
identified and reaffirmed the problem of extending international protection to those displaced 
within their own borders:  
They [IDPs] were under a government’s protection and enjoyed the same rights as 
other nationals; they constituted what might be called internal refugees…Extension of 
the High Commissioner’s competence to that category of refugees would have more 
serious consequences. In the first place, it would give the High Commissioner the right 
to investigate a country’s internal affairs. Secondly, it would compel the High 
Commissioner to assume responsibility for from eight to ten million persons whose 
legal status had been determined by an international decision of far-reaching 
                                                          
33 Lee (1996), p. 36-37.   
34 Holbrooke quoted in Goodwin-Gill (2000), p. 26. 
35 Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Session, Third Committee, 329th 
Meeting, 29 November (1950), p. 363. 
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importance set down in the constitutional article. Lastly, the implicit inclusion of those 
refugees in the High Commissioner’s competence might bring his mandate into conflict 
with international decisions and with governments and expose him to claims on the part 
of refugees and philanthropic governments. The problem of those refugees [IDPs] was 
grave, but it was not a problem of legal assistance. It was a problem of material 
assistance.36 [emphasis added]  
The UNHCR was thus established by General Assembly Resolution 319/4 IV/ of 1949, which 
stated very clearly in Article 1 (D) that ‘This Convention shall not apply to a person who is 
recognised by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as 
having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of 
that country’37. The responsibility to protect was thus to be granted to those who: 
Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.38 
The early years were particularly turbulent due to shortages in funding, which was only 
temporarily overcome through a generous donation of $2.9 million from the Ford Foundation 
which became its life blood. Also it had a 3 year mandate later extended for renewal every 5 
years, and it was never intended to be an operational agency that only existed to provide 
technical and legal assistance.    
2. The Cold War Years 50s, 60s & 70s: The Refugee as Propaganda Tool  
The early Cold War decades saw the UNHCR adapt to the geo-political environment. In the 
1950s, the Cold War superpowers were extremely opposed to UNHCR, with the US creating 
its own agencies outside the UN system; most notably the Intergovernmental Committee for 
                                                          
36 Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Session, Third Committee, 
December (1950). 
37 Year Book of the United Nations (1951), p. 520. 
38 Ibid, p. 521. 
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European Migration (ICEM) in 1951 and the United States Escapee Program (USEP) in 1952. 
The USSR and its Eastern European allies also perceived the agency to be a pawn of Western 
propaganda and subversion. Along with the United Nations Relief & Work Agency for 
Palestinian refugees (UNWRA) created in 1948, and the United Nations Korean 
Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), the infant UNHCR was forced to compete with these 
parallel organisations for funds and political support.39 However, a number of global crises 
emerged in the 50s for UNHCR to present its relevance to the foreign policies of both blocs.  
While UNHCR had already allocated $400,000 of the $2,900,000 received from the Ford 
Foundation for practical assistance to Berlin refugees, whose arrival in large numbers was 
affecting the position of the foreign refugees already residing in Germany, the High 
Commissioner appealed to governments for greater support in September 1953. Such a 
rallying cry bore instant fruit with goods to the value of $2,323,843 received, and the United 
States donating a staggering $15,000,000 for housing settlements for East German refugees.40  
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 saw the General Assembly call upon UNHCR to support 
the 200,000 Hungarians who had fled into Austria and Yugoslavia following the Soviet Union 
invasion. UNHCR used this opportunity to play to the interests of both East and West. The 
organisation had 
convincingly showed off itself to be the only international institution capable of dealing 
effectively with a political crisis and a refugee problem of major proportions. It had 
worked quickly to defuse the refugee crisis, and it had even earned the respect of some 
socialist governments. The office had clearly come of age and had won international 
acceptance and recognition.41  
The UNHCR’s next successful venture arose during the Algerian war of decolonisation and 
the subsequent repatriation efforts from 1951-1963, which were of serious concern precisely 
because of the potential political fall-out arising from the status of those fleeing. To label 
those Algerians fleeing into Tunisia as refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution 
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would have exposed the French atrocities and embarrassed a great power that sat on the 
Executive Committee (ExCom) for which UNHCR was accountable to. Thus the General 
Assembly immediately granted UNHCR a mandate to allow the High Commissioner to 
‘continue his action on behalf of Algerian refugees in Tunisia on a substantial scale and 
…undertake similar action in Morocco’, this was done to create the perception of flight from 
a general and ultimately ‘blameless’ state of instability. In the end, the UNHCR’s 
involvement in Algeria was a face saving exercise for a number of states, as ‘what was 
important were the political implications, rather than humanitarian or legal concerns- the 
UK’s relationship with France, the US desire to resist the Communist influence in North 
Africa, and the Tunisian perception of the strategic advantages inherent within the UN rather 
than bilateral aid’.42 Such a precedentbecame a strategic tool in the organisation’s 
management of refugee crises which was encapsulated in the creation of the pragmatic notion 
of the ‘Good Offices’. This ‘enabled the UNHCR to avoid the undesirable political 
consequences of making refugee determinations in the Third World that might damage 
relations with some of the principle Western supporters of the international refugee regime’43 
and extend limited relief to people who were not statutory refugees, which included those 
displaced within their borders. This was witnessed in Cyprus in 1972 following the coup 
d’etat and Turkish invasion which left tens of thousands displaced, and twice in 1957 and 
1962 to assist Chinese refugees in Hong Kong by encouraging contributions for assistance. 
The fourth incident was the Soviet Re-defection Campaign which sought to reclaim the 
thousands that had defected to the West through a policy of general amnesties, rehabilitation, 
and reform of the police and judiciary and police in Eastern Europe. Such a scheme was 
viewed with suspicion by the United States and its allies, who co-sponsored a resolution in 
1954 that created the United Nations Relief Fund, which was a four year plan for permanent 
solutions. UNHCR thus became aware of the available opportunity as the US recognised that 
it had to be more generous, not only to those who had fled to the West, but also to the masses 
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who were residing in camps, and being constantly subjected to Communist propaganda to 
return home. UNHCR was able to tap into this new budget, receiving $500,000 by playing to 
these fears of camp indoctrination.44   
2.1 The Refugee as a Tool of Propaganda  
The construction of the refugee as an object of Cold War propaganda was further cemented in 
the 1960s when the UNHCR invited artists Ronald Searle and Kaye Webb to visit refugee 
camps in Austria, Italy and Greece in order to document and illustrate the plight of the 
remaining 110,000 refugees and raise £4 million for World Refugee Year. Their findings 
were presented in a book entitled Refugees 1960 (see figure 2 below). The publication 
presented sketched images and testimonies of refugees which upheld the liberal values of the 
Free World with the Escapee Program of the United States constantly referred to and praised 
as the preferred destination of many trapped refugees. The refugees were not objects of 
charity, per se, with many being skilled professionals who had been forced to abandon their 
jobs and careers amid advancing Russian aggression. Furthermore, refugees were extolled for 
preserving a strong Christian identity (see figure 3), with admiration for those who ‘voted 
with their feet, because they ran, walked, or even crawled painfully and perilously away from 
their countries of their birth to find sanctuary in a Free World’.45 
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Figure 2. Refugees 1960 book cover 
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2.2 Expansion Beyond Europe 
In the 1970s, the High Commissioner Aga Khan Sedruddin carried out a number of unilateral 
actions that boosted the agency’s global profile with the expansion beyond Europe into 
Africa. What was striking about the Sedruddin tenure was the de-securitisation of forced 
migration, which contrasts with the politics of subsequent High Commissioners. For 
Sedruddin UNHCR ‘must attempt to reduce complex political questions in the minds of 
nations into simple moral and humanitarian components for the heart to answer’.46 Finally the 
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superpower struggle for the Third World and the attempts by both blocs to assist the refugee 
crisis that had arisen from the wars of decolonisation and national liberation struggles in the 
wake of independence made UNHCR the focal point once again. Huge numbers of IDPs 
existed throughout the decades of the 60s, and 70s in the wars of decolonisation and national 
liberation struggles in Africa, Asia, Middle East and Latin America, but many were irrelevant 
and subsumed into the Cold War struggle and treated as an internal issue of state sovereignty 
with no need for a dedicated international regime. UNHCR chose not to get involved on the 
basis that ‘these situations were not a matter within the competence of the High 
Commissioner and were not a matter of direct concern to the UNHCR for ‘constitutional’ and 
legal considerations’.47 This further exposed how UNHCR was now attempting to champion 
the rights of those it had once chosen to avoid involvement with due to its changing priorities: 
The Office felt that the African’s effort to set up their own refugee organisation would 
duplicate and compete with their own agency and programmes…Moreover, the 
UNHCR feared that the establishment of a separate OAU refugee office would unduly 
politicise the African refugee problem.48  
This period marked the beginnings of the expansion of the agency, which within a six year 
period had transformed itself from a non-operational agency, with no authority to lobby for 
funds to carry out limited programs, into an international institution providing humanitarian 
assistance. It had finally won the support of the major powers who realised the agency’s 
strategic value.49   
3. The Volatile 80s & 90s: Third World Refugees, Xenophobia, & Containment 
The impetus for the protection of people displaced within their borders begins in earnest with 
the large influx of refugees into the Global North in the 1980s and 1990s, which sent many 
Western governments into a state of panic. This period, according to Smyser, writing in 1985, 
was marked  
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by the unprecedented explosion in the number and impact of refugees. The numbers 
since 1945 are estimated to be as high as 60 million, more than twice the number of 
preceding 50 years and far beyond any historical experience. In many states refugees 
arrivals have shifted population patterns, altered domestic politics and shaped or even 
determined foreign policy.50  
However, a closer inspection revealed that the end of the Cold War had simply removed the 
ideological and geopolitical value of the refugee to advanced Western states. During the Post 
Second World War era and throughout the Cold War, the image of refugee had consisted of a 
white, skilled, person from the Global North escaping Communist aggression. As a result, 
resettlement had always been the preferred option from 1945-1985. This was indeed 
functional for states experiencing unprecedented economic expansion in the context of 
depleted populations. The Hungarian refugee crisis provided the US with young, skilled, and 
educated people. The US Secretary of Labour, James Mitchel, noted how ‘America’s 
instinctive reply to the call for help has enriched her economy in many ways….It is now clear 
that America has received a valuable economic bonus’.51 Thus the 80s and 90s witnesses a 
dramatic transformation in the image of the refugee, who becomes an object of suffering and 
vulnerability, with mass media projections of illiterate, weak, and starving masses fleeing 
chronic violence and instability with the little they could carry. This was confirmed by Cels 
when he commented how, 
In recent years, however, the majority of asylum-seekers have arrived haphazardly, 
fleeing civil war, the consequences of natural disasters, economic decline, and external 
aggression. The nature of their arrival, by air and either without travel documents or 
with false ones, has complicated the application of the Convention and has resulted in 
irregular movements and in refugees being ‘in orbit.52 
In the ‘new’ period it was believed that these ‘other’ immigrants would not be able to adjust 
or be accepted in Europe, and should therefore be ‘assisted’ within their home territories. 
According to Frelick, 
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The post-Cold War has become intensely solution-orientated when confronted with 
impending refugee crises, so much so that a new paradigm is emerging by which 
refugee flows are prevented before asylum seekers cross an international border, the 
definitional trip-wire that heretofore has marked the threshold step in the world’s 
response to refugees.53 
The impetus for the securitisation and the later upsurge in xenophobic sentiments towards 
refugees and asylum seekers began with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
36/148 in December 1981, which called for International Co-operation to Avert New Flows 
of Refugees, which were reported to be approximately 10 million, and which affected every 
continent (in reality Europe and North America). While the UN claimed that massive refugee 
flows were not new, it stated that the scale and impact of that of the 80s was significant 
because:  
In addition to creating individual human misery, massive flows of refugees could 
impose great political, economic and social burdens upon the international community 
as a whole, with dire effects on developing countries, particularly those with limited 
resources of their own. Massive flows might not only affect the domestic order and 
stability of receiving states but also jeopardise the political and social stability and the 
economic development of entire regions and thus endanger international peace and 
security.54    
The rhetoric of preventative protection, and the need to address root causes of refugee flows 
became the main thrust of recommendations by the UN government experts and took centre 
stage and cascaded within the global arena. However, there were immediate inconsistencies 
because while the resolution called for co-operation, as laid down in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among states, 
it later states the ‘importance of having due regard for the principle of non-intervention on the 
internal affairs of sovereign states, and also of the principle that nothing in the Charter shall 
authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic 
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jurisdiction of any state’.55 This was significant because addressing root causes of refugee 
flows within states would require some form of external intervention, especially when the 
state in question was unable or unwilling to quell the problem by its own means.  
3.1 The Rise of Barrier Restrictions to Asylum Seekers 
The 1980s and 1990s witnesses a plethora of barrier restrictions to refugee flows by states in 
the Global North which were contradictory, inconsistent, and further compounded problems. 
Richmond, in a publication titled Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism, and the New World 
Order, summed up the prevailing attitudes of the First World by likening the justification of 
their restrictive policies to those created in the South African in the 1950s, which called for a 
defence of cultural and social institutions; state security; maintenance of law and order; the 
need to preserve ethnic identity; preservation of economic privilege; and the need to regulate 
and manage population movements.56 Such paranoia was bred and projected throughout 
media sources. The Economist article of February 1992 titled Europe’s Immigrants: 
Strangers Inside the Gates claimed that ‘the healthy feeling that binds together the societies 
of Europe’s nation states now seems to be breeding something far from healthy, a mindless 
intolerance of outsiders’.57 The Financial Times article titled Behind Closed Doors, in 
October 1992, stated that ‘European electorates expect their governments to maintain a tough 
immigration policy, and that is very difficult to combine with a generous asylum policy’.58 
The most blatant expression of racism came from French Premier Jacques Chirac’s claim that 
the ‘noise and smell’ of Arab and black immigrants were driving French workers crazy.59   
The first barrier restriction was the Internal Flight/Relocation/Protection Alternative 
(IFA/IRA/IPA) which came into existence at the beginning of the 1980s as an ad hoc creation 
of a mixture of international and national jurisprudence, academic analysis and governmental 
and intergovernmental policy statements. The 1951 Refugee Convention made no mention of 
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an Internal Flight Alternative which stipulates that a person fleeing an imminent risk of being 
persecuted, at the time of leaving his country of origin may be denied refugee status if, at that 
time, there existed an alternative to flight within the country of origin. The resort to national 
protection was thus perceived as an alternative to flight, and international protection outside a 
country of origin. While such a notion became very popular in Europe and North America, it 
had inherent dangers which, in reality, facilitated internal displacement, and lacked a 
universal and principled application, with many refugees denied access on the basis that they 
could not produce enough evidence to disprove the availability of an Internal Flight 
Alternative.60  
The ill-researched criteria for Internal Flight only exposed the xenophobic sentiments of 
states, as while there was a broad agreement on where the claimant had protection, there was 
no consensus on what the notion of protection actually implied. If the persecutor was a state 
agent, then a clear problem arose with Internal Flight Alternative, because, for example, once 
a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution by a national army in one part of the country was 
established, it became comical to then expect a person to seek refuge in another part of the 
country that was controlled by that same army. Why should a person who had fled a 
repressive government in one part of the country suddenly feel safer in another part? The 
proposal of such a policy towards refugees fleeing Communism, to have sought refuge in 
another region of the Soviet Union, would have been unthinkable and ludicrous during the 
Cold War. This created another layer of complexity which itself nullified the whole IFA 
concept, because if the agent of persecution was the state, and an IFA was ‘objectively’ 
identified, then the logical conclusion was that the state was not in control of their own 
territory, and therefore any displaced person was not enjoying the protection afforded by the 
state in that given IFA. This is because a state could not simultaneously persecute and protect 
its citizens, which, ipso facto, created the conditions of internal displacement.61  
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The experiences of Canadian case law highlighted the gross platitudes of IFAs with the 
Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) of the Immigration & Refugee Board, 
determining that if refugees could avail themselves of protection from non-state actors in 
areas of a state that were under the control of a refugee’s ethnic kin, then an IFA existed.  In 
the early 1990s, Iraqi Kurdish claimants were denied access on the basis that an IFA existed 
in parts of northern Iraq which was under local Kurdish control and protected by a joint 
military US, UK, French, and Turkish no fly zone.62 However, what was completely 
overlooked was that there was no functioning government, with internal armed conflict 
erupting in 1994 between the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan which killed thousands until 1998. Furthermore, the IFA was subject to continuous 
incursions by Turkish forces to rout harbouring PKK fighters. Similarly, the Board rejected a 
number of cases of ethnic Tajiks fleeing Kabul in 1996 who were believed to have had an IFA 
in northern Afghanistan under the control and protection of General Dostrum, who at the time 
was besieged by the Taliban. However, within a year the Taliban had taken control of the 
north, killing thousands of civilians.63      
The next barrier restriction was the Convention Determining the State Responsible for 
Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European 
Communities which was signed in Dublin in June 1990. The objectives of the Dublin 
Convention were to ensure freedom of movement for persons on the territory of the Member 
states through abolition of checks at internal borders. The Convention prevented the lodging 
of simultaneous or consecutive asylum applications in the Member states by setting out 
criteria to determine the responsible state. The Schengen Convention signed in June 1990 at 
Schengen in Luxemburg between the five neighbouring states of Belgium, Holland, 
Luxemburg, France and Germany was an attempt to abolish border controls along the 
frontiers of these states, and to increase vigilance to their external frontiers through the co-
ordination of migration and law enforcement policies. According to Waever, the real issue 
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behind such policies lay in the fear of a return to a past Europe in which the balance of power 
system fragmented and culminated in national slaughter during the World Wars. The 
European security identity and debates about multiculturalism were nested in the potential 
politicisation of migration, leading to a revival of extreme nationalist and racist ideology 
which snowballed and destabilised Europe in the early twentieth century.64  
There was indeed an inherent schizophrenia with the restrictive migration policies developed 
by the EU, because, on the one hand, they sustained the image and perception of the migrant 
as a burdensome and threatening other, who challenged the internal stability of states, and 
needed to be kept at a distance. On the other hand, the EU itself is a multicultural project of a 
social, economic and political cohabitation of different nationalities.65 Fortress Europe begins 
with the removal of internal borders through the Single European Act and EC policies 
strengthened external borders to control and regulate the entrance of legitimate human traffic 
within the space of free movement. However, it was contestable whether illegal immigrants 
were smuggled into a country, as remaining in a country after a visa has expired was the most 
common form of becoming an illegal immigrant. According to Bigo, ‘The issue was no 
longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs, crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and 
clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall 
view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within 
Europe’.66 
The most high profile barrier restriction to refugees was the United States government 
program of intercepting and forcibly returning Haitian boatpeople to Haiti, which first began 
with President Ronald Reagan, who made illegal immigration a national security issue under 
Executive Order 12,324 on September 29th 1981. This policy was continued by President 
George Bush, who, in May 1992, issued Executive Order 12,807 so called ‘Kennebunkport 
Order’, that allowed the Coast Guard to forcibly repatriate Haitians interdicted at sea, without 
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any prior inquiry to ascertain whether they had valid asylum claims, on the basis that the 
refugee treaty obligations did not extend to people outside the territory of the United States.67 
Then came the Clinton administration, which, while purporting to care and assist Haitian 
refugees and reverse the previous coercive policies, guilefully maintained them. The 
ideological and economic justifications behind such restrictive programs was that Haitians 
were economic and not political, refugees. This was based on assessing the country’s chronic 
poverty, with 85% of lives below the poverty line, and a life expectancy of 55 years; adult 
literacy at 47%; the virtual collapse of infrastructure and agriculture in 1990, and the fact that 
Haiti was a stable non-Communist regime with Haitian returnees not subject to any retaliatory 
violence for attempting flight to the US.68 The US thus defined refugees as: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality…and who is 
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.69 
In light of the 1991, coup which deposed President Jean Bertrand Aristide, and the ensuing 
widespread violence, such a definition of refugee would have been expedient to the 38,000 
Haitians who risked shark-infested waters to seek sanctuary in the US. Ultimately, while such 
policies and arguments only exposed racist and xenophobic attitudes, and conveniently 
ignored the long history of unchecked American military intervention in Haiti and Central 
America under the Munroe Doctrine, they invariably created the conditions of internal 
displacement with many forced to return to a state of instability and violence.70    
3.2 The Barrage of Assaults on the 1951 Convention   
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These drastic mechanisms signalled the beginning of a tempest that would almost consume 
and destroy UNHCR. What was more alarming for the organisation was that this period was 
marked by a slew of former senior UNHCR officials, eminent legal scholars, diplomats, and 
immigration policymakers who began attacking the Refugee Regime from which the UNHCR 
received its raison d’etre. Their criticisms were particularly potent because they were 
breaking down the very system of which many had defended for so long, whilst serving in 
their own country’s diplomatic corps and working to uphold their respective national interests 
which included curbing asylum. On the surface they presented very credible, concise, and 
apolitical arguments that played down the hidden xenophobic intentions of their respective 
governments by creating the perception of a ‘new’, and ‘changing’ global environment that 
required ‘new’ improved coping structures. The first notable direct assault on UNHCR was 
by Roy McDowall, a former British immigration policymaker who dismissed the 
organisation’s imposition upon states:  
Over the past few years, UNHCR has increasingly invoked the formula that particular 
individuals or groups, whom they accept do not qualify for recognition, are of concern 
to their office. This practice is perceived by some states as the assumption by an 
international agency of the sovereign state’s function of deciding whether or not 
asylum outside the Convention should be granted. States argue that such action by 
UNHCR inhibits the normal (a proper) functions of immigration control and de facto 
enlarges the effective limitation of the refugee definition in the 1951 
Convention…states believe that, where asylum is not justified, they themselves should 
decide how those ‘selected out’ should be treated.71 
Furthermore, for McDowall, the ‘solution’ to the refugee problem was for UNHCR to curb 
their flow through the pursuit of in-country protection, which advanced states supported 
through the  
linking of development aid with regional resettlement. It is to the long-term advantage 
of major donor states-which are the prime receivers of today’s irregular movements-to 
share UNHCR’s view since funds which are now used to support extra-regional arrivals 
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in a developed states can be put to far wider use within a developing or Third World 
region.72  
Next came David Martin, who from 1978-1980 served in the Bureau of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs at the US State Department. Martin, together with a number of 
contributors, argued in the book The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s, that the 
international protection regime was slowly becoming anachronistic due to the emergence of 
‘New Asylum Seekers’ who had changed the face of asylum. He wrote that: 
…there are genuine elements of novelty in the new phenomenon that are crucial to our 
understanding. And they are differences which in the end may force us- the West and 
the world community as a whole- to rethink the exact meaning of, and appropriate level 
of ambition for, refugee law in the final decades of a crowded and violent century73 
 He claimed that establishing a refugee’s credentials so as to distinguish economic migrants 
from genuine cases of those fleeing persecution was precarious. He went on to attack the 
agencies and actors (UNHCR in particular) responsible for protecting refugees on the basis 
that: 
Refugee advocates are sometimes too ready to dismiss the new suspicions as the 
outgrowth of xenophobia and racism in the West, and to act as though it could all be 
remedied if only government officials had the courage to confront such manifestations. 
To be sure, xenophobes and racists have exploited the phenomenon for their own 
efforts at political gain. But it is not enough, in the current, simply to denounce such 
movements and argue for expansive new notions of who is entitled to refugee status.74 
Martin even went as far to claim that the refugee was in fact a unique and privileged state, 
which had arisen over decades of turmoil to afford desperate people in need protection. 
However, the arrival of the ‘new asylum’ seekers diluted and tarnished this special status. 
Martin argued that the true motives were to protect the Refugee Convention from dubious 
claims of economic migrants and therefore defended the restrictive practices of Western 
governments. Following this was Gervais Coles, a former Australian diplomat, and a former 
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senior legal advisor to UNHCR. In a chapter titled Approaching the Refugee Problem Today 
he made similar claims, first justifying the need for a new approach, which was evident in the 
fact that past unprecedented refugee crises heralded new pragmatic responses. The case in 
point was the exodus of Chinese refugees from Communist China to Hong Kong in 1954. 
Second, Coles attacked the Refugee Convention as an anachronistic concept and made a 
striking recommendation to UNHCR, which became its mantra in the 1990s and a foretaste of 
the expansion and dominance it underwent from the 2000s onwards: 
Today the High Commissioner is responsible for an organisation which must be much 
more that an operational body charged with care, and maintenance and external 
settlement: he must concern himself also with cause and prevention as well as with 
reconciliation and restoration. To advise and assist him in his key responsibility for 
seeking solutions, he needs a pool of staff with political experience, diplomatic 
background, regional expertise, and a wide range of international experience. Although 
his Office continues to need lawyers, assistance experts, and persons experienced in 
immigration work and social service, such persons cannot normally be entrusted with 
the specialised task of seeking solutions, which requires broad international political 
knowledge and diplomatic experience. Given it traditional role of providing mainly 
legal, assistance, and migration services, it would not be surprising if UNHCR had 
serious problems in adapting itself to the expanded role which is now required of it.75 
Finally, Coles produced a selective reading of Lord McDonald’s resignation in 1935, in which 
he twisted the meaning of the affair to suit his argument of the need to address root causes in 
this new ‘changing’ era. Coles argued that McDonald’s resignation was primarily due to the 
root causes of refugee flows within states as a justification for the collapse of the Refugee 
Regime and a need for a new shift. However, he did not consider the whole meaning and 
purpose of Lord McDonald’s resignation, which was an attempt to prompt states to intervene 
in Germany to deal with those very root causes. 
In addition to this was Jack Garvey, a professor of law who questioned the validity of 
UNHCR’s mandate by commenting on the irrelevance of international refugee law, which 
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rested on a humanitarian premise of human rights, from which the UNHCR derived its modus 
vivendi. For him, the refugee crisis of the 80s went beyond the humanitarian dimension 
because, firstly, the instigators of refugee movement were not ‘defeated or defunct regimes 
but existing governments, able to insist on the prerogative of sovereignty while creating or 
helping to generate refugee crises’.76 As a consequence of the criticism levelled against them, 
many would simply assert their sovereignty and explain such attacks against them as 
politically motivated. In the end, castigating governments would only exacerbate the refugee 
crisis by reducing avenues to gaining their co-operation.77 Finally James Hathaway, a 
professor of law, in his edited book Reconceiving International Refugee Law, maintained that 
the Refugee Regime had failed on the basis that it did not regard the impact it had on 
receiving states who were simply transformed into immigration societies and therefore 
explained their lack of interest in granting asylum. In another paper, Hathaway traced the 
evolution of refugee status in international law over three distinct periods 1920-1935, 1935-
1939, and 1938-1950. His agenda was to challenge the perceived rigidity of the Refugee 
Regime by exposing how it was a fluctuating concept that could adapt and morph to suit a 
given global environment: 
Refugee status then is an extremely malleable legal concept which can take on different 
meanings as required by the nature and scope of the dilemma prompting involuntary 
migration. If properly defined, refugeehood enables the maintenance of a delicate 
balance between domestic policies of controlled immigration and the moral obligation 
of the international community to respond to the plight of those forced to flee their 
countries. In order that refugee status may continue to play this role, the definitional 
framework must, as during the period analysed here, evolve in response to changing 
social and political conditions.78  
However, unlike his contemporaries, he changed the tempo of the debate by presenting a way 
forward, arguing that it could be redeemed only if, 
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Refugee law serves fewer and fewer people, less and less well, as time goes on. 
Refugee law as traditionally conceived is being subverted by a combination of non-
entrée tactics and disingenuous insistence of the ‘right to remain’. We should seize the 
moment actively to promote a new paradigm of refugee protection that is both human 
rights-based and pragmatic. Refugee law should be redesigned to take account of the 
legitimate state preoccupations that have undermined the value of law in governing 
refugee protection, but without compromising the essential commitment to protection.79 
For Hathaway proposed ‘temporary protection’. However, this begged the question of how 
temporary was temporary? The Saharawi refugees from Morocco have been in exile for over 
thirty years in neighbouring Algeria; the base from which they are currently building their 
future state. The Tutsi of Rwanda have  spent over thirty years in exile in neighbouring 
Uganda since 1959 with their attempts to ‘return home’ sparking sporadic violence which 
culminated in the 1994 genocide. Similarly, it was not until 1991 that the Eritrean population 
in Ethiopia were finally able to ‘leave’, following the creation of a new state.  
3.3 Understanding the Sub-Texts of In-Country Protection  
While the arguments against the Refugee Regime seemed convincing, and were very much 
welcomed by paranoid Western states at the time, they were constructed with a lack of 
memory, and were not grounded in any operational research. They simply amounted to a 
logical subterfuge designed to hide and rationalise xenophobic sentiments, as Chimni 
exclaimed:  
A central feature of the Post-Cold War era is that refugees are no longer welcome in the 
North, and UNHCR is being forced to come to terms with this. To face this 
development the organisation has had to either advance or go along with ideas and 
policy options which suit the powerful Northern states. Having done so it is compelled 
to justify these ideas and policies to the rest of the international community (Southern 
States, NGOs, academics, activists) through attempting to reconcile them with its 
mandate and the core principles and norms of international refugee law. It is this need 
to justify its current policies and practices which explains the new focus on research 
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and analysis. It also explains why UNHCR is an uncritical consumer of concepts and 
theories which support a particular (Northern) vision of the global refugee order.80 
Chimni noted how such fears resulted in states beginning a process of knowledge production 
that sought to justify the containment of the influx through non-entrée regimes. This involved 
the creation of a myth of difference between Refugees from the Cold War era in Europe and 
the ‘new’ Third World Refugees. Such sentiments would then justify the rejection of the exile 
bias and the need to address root causes of refugee flows. In addition, voluntary repatriation 
and protection of internally displaced people would in the end become the ‘new’ way 
forward. A survey of the literature reveals the following: Firstly it was reported that the Post-
1960s crises were of an unprecedented nature. Secondly, it was that the European refugee 
adhered to the individualist criteria of political persecution compared to the mass exodus of 
Third World refugees. Thirdly, it was voiced that advances in transport and communications 
eliminated ‘natural barriers to movement’, and therefore kept numbers low and manageable 
for the West. Fourthly, the refugee claims by non-Western asylum seekers of oppression were 
bogus, with many being economic migrants in disguise. Fifthly, the root causes of the exodus 
of Third World Refugees were as a result of internal and not international conflicts, for which 
Western states had no responsibility. Finally, the attempt to revert to the 1969 OAU 
Convention departure from the 1951 Convention was again to posit a glaring sign of 
‘difference’ between the African refugee experience and those of the European continent.  
However, a closer investigation revealed glaring inconsistencies and double standards. The 
myth of difference grounded in the root causes essentialised internalist explanations over 
external ones, which were one-sided and ignored the complexities and vast superstructure of 
actors, policies, and interests of Western states in creating and sustaining policies and 
practices that contributed to instability, inequality, violence and conflict. The devastating 
legacies of the colonial encounter and the proxy wars of the Cold War had been completely 
airbrushed. For Kibreab, this lapsus memoriae as to the nature and causes of African refugee 
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and population movements, was an attempt to confine and constrict, within a refugee 
stereotype, six hundred years of mass displacement resulting from slavery, colonial 
pacification, and forced labour (see Table 2 below).81 
Table 2. History of African Refugee Experience 
 
HISTORICAL PERIOD 
 
CAUSES OF FLIGHT 
 
 
 
African Pre-Contact Period 
 
Inter-Tribal Raids, War, & Agriculture 
Weaker tribes would seek protection from 
stronger tribes. Shifting cultivation and grazing 
areas for cattle and water sources.  
 
 
 
15th, 16th, 17th, 18th Century 
Atlantic Slave Trade  
Mass displacement from people fleeing home 
villages, escaping raids & kidnappings by slave 
traders uprooting millions for transportation & 
sale. 
 
 
 
 
19th Century  
Colonial Period 
Fleeing enslaving laws of compulsory 
recruitment to work in settler agriculture or 
forced to grow commercial crops that they were 
obliged to sell to companies that enjoyed a 
monopoly right over the purchase of all 
agricultural produce. 
 
 
 
 
Early 20th Century  
Forced Labour  
Fleeing expropriation of land through poll and 
hut taxes and forbidding the growth of cash crops 
in order to ensure supply of cheap labour for 
settlers. Fleeing over-congestion and corporal 
punishment for resisting forced labour. 
 
 
This was in addition to the peripheral position of many developing nations within the global 
economic system, which left commodity dependent nations vulnerable to market shocks, amid 
the grossly detrimental impact of the Washington Consensus in the 80s and 90s by the way 
macro-economic reforms imposed by international creditors fostering the collapse of state 
institutions that created situations of social and political divisiveness82. This was functional 
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because ‘internalist’ explanations apportioned blame on the states from which refugees were 
fleeing from as being responsible for authoring policies or undertaking actions leading to the 
outflow of refugees. Conversely, ‘externalist’ explanations would hold major powers 
responsible and generate pressure on them to assume responsibilities for the protection of 
refugees. Nevertheless, given the deluge of criticism and the welcome it received among the 
powerful states in the Global North, UNHCR was well aware of the mortal danger levelled 
against it, which began to materialise with budget cuts and an ensuing funding crisis that High 
Commissioner Hocke reacted to in 1986 when he stated that:  
I am particularly concerned about the growing negative public opinion in the West vis-
à-vis refugees and asylum seekers from the Third World. Many governments in the 
West have used this development to adopt restrictive practices which have a tendency 
to spread like a contagion…The first requirement, in my view, is to recognise that the 
circumstances of most of today’s refugee problems require a fresh look…States must 
also realise that there is no way they can legitimise their way out of the present 
predicament. You cannot prevent people who have compelling reasons for leaving their 
country from fleeing to another country for refuge. You must address the reasons which 
prompted their flight’83  
However, such a protest was a weak show of strength to an organisation which was heavily 
dependent on constant hand-outs from those powerful states84. In the late 70s and early 80s 
the High Commissioner refused to publically criticise the Mexican government for their 
forced relocation of Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees and the refusal to involve UNHCR 
or the press and human rights organisations. The UNHCR country representative who became 
critical was quickly recalled and replaced in 1984 following protest by the government85. 
Similarly, Canada which had sat on the Executive Committee since 1959, had been a prolific 
abuser of the Refugee Regime. In April 1985 anxious to weather the European immigration 
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storm, High Commissioner Paul Hartling met governments and established a forum known as 
the European Consultations, which served as a means of dialogue between UNHCR and 
European states. In 1989, UNCHR was hit by a funding crisis caused by a deficit that arose 
firstly from the increase in refugees from Somalia, Mozambique and Sudan and continued 
overflows from Afghanistan, Iran, and Vietnam, and secondly from the large expensive 
repatriation and development operations in Namibia, Sri Lanka and Nicaragua. This provided 
ammunition for dissatisfied Western states wishing to undermine the agency by first refusing 
to cover the shortfall which had reached $100 million, and secondly by creating a working 
group that scrutinised all administration, programmes, and management of funds.86 Hocke 
was later forced to resign following corruption charges regarding his abuse of expenses in 
which he and his wife had been travelling on Concorde for business trips using agency funds.  
3.5 Creating IDPs through Voluntary Repatriation & Cross Border Operations 
The UNHCR from the mid-80s had to make a series of rapid adaptations, which invariably 
created IDPs and brought them to centre stage. The first major operational attempt carried out 
with great alacrity was Voluntary Repatriation, which was a way of reducing the number of 
refugees in its care, and the huge costs of protection. This period was indeed labelled the 
‘Decade of Repatriation’ and High Commissioner Ogata, in a speech in 1992 titled Refugees: 
A Comprehensive European Strategy used her office to push for voluntary repatriation and 
preventative protection in order to allay European paranoia.87 Such a policy arose from the 
July 1985 San Remo Round Table on Voluntary Repatriation. While on the surface it was 
presented as an unofficial and non-attributable discussion forum for government ministers, 
jurists and governmental and non-governmental refugee experts, in reality the conclusions 
and observations were to be reported to the Executive Committee of UNHCR, which 
determined all UNHCR policy.88 While San Remo emphasised that voluntary repatriation 
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should not disrupt asylum by forcing refugees to return against their will, the round table 
ultimately agreed that ‘international co-operation and solidarity should be directed, first and 
foremost, in favour of the solution of return’89. Voluntary repatriation was presented as a 
humane solution, even in circumstances where it could lead to greater suffering. UNHCR’s 
1992 Note on International Protection made gross claims which contradicted its primary role 
of protecting refugees: 
Criteria for promotion and organisation of large scale repatriation must balance the 
protection needs of refugees against the political imperative towards resolving refugee 
problems…the realisation of a solution in a growing number of refugee situations today 
is most likely where the solution is made an integral part of a ‘package’ which strikes a 
humane balance between the interests of affected States and the legal rights, as well as 
humanitarian needs, of the individuals concerned.90 [emphasis added] 
This was unprecedented because it was not in UNHCR’s mandate to strike any sort of balance 
that compromised refugee protection, which confirmed that repatriation was an outcome of a 
marriage between convenient theory, untested assumptions and the interests of states.91  In 
addition, there had been little financial assistance from the developed countries which was 
interesting because ‘after decades of pursuing their geopolitical interests at a cost of billions 
of dollars, millions of lives, and massive human displacement, the Cold War’s major Western 
protagonists… are now loathe to invest even a fraction of the funds they spent fuelling Cold 
War conflicts on helping those conflict victims rebuild their lives’.92 Many scholars at the 
onset protested at the fact that there was no published research data which could be used to 
test the assumptions which governed current policies. Allen & Turton explained that the 
conceptualisation of forced migration in politico-legal terms, particularly the beliefs that the 
ending of instability lay simply in the reconstitution of the nation state as the quintessential 
social unit, formed the backbone to many UN resolutions on voluntary repatriation. However, 
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such platitudes blinded policymakers and lawyers to the reality of mass repatriation becoming 
a humanitarian catastrophe in itself, with many refugees re-entering war zones and becoming 
internally displaced.93 There were three major problems associated with repatriation. First 
were the social problems generated through acculturation to host communities, with the 
emergence of second and even third generations who became completely integrated. In such 
conditions repatriation may not have necessarily meant ‘going home’, and resulted in cultural 
and linguistic alienation from the communities in the former states. Second were the 
economic problems, with sustained livelihoods generated while in exile lost upon return. 
Third was the problem arising from the potential threats of fifth columns as ‘a country which 
has produced refugees, whose government is under attack by armed opposition movements, 
has more reason to fear that the repatriation of its people constitute a security threat’.94 
The second aspect of UNHCR adaptation was the Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in the form of 
Cross Border Operations (CBOs), conducted in Somalia in the early 90s following the civil 
war, collapse of the central authority and the famine which left 300,000 dead and 427,000 
refugees in neighbouring Kenya. The CBO was designed to supplement its existing refugee 
camps and border sites, by establishing field offices inside a country to rebuild physical and 
social infrastructure in order to support displaced people so as to reduce the numbers of 
refugees crossing the border and encourage voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees in 
Kenya (see figure 4 below).95  
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Figure 4. UNHCR SOMALIA CBO 
 
 
 
 
The QIPs were relatively cheap to administer, with a maximum threshold of US$ 50,000. The 
simple execution of QIPs at least reinforced the state of normality which, in turn, would 
induce repatriation to the zone. Apart from that, they provided amenities like drinking water 
supplies, (without which there would probably have been no resettlement). The CBO program 
was perplexing because it was not within UNHCR’s mandate to enter states and address root 
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causes or engage in any form of reconstruction or development, which went beyond the 
capacity of the agency. Instead UNHCR’s primary duty was to encourage admission of 
displaced people into states for refuge. The structure and operations of the CBOs were over- 
ambitious because they completely anaesthetised the complex emergency in Somalia by 
prematurely leap frogging from a state of relief to development within the vacuum of a 
functioning state. There were 12 categories of QIPs (Agriculture, Water, Health, Community 
Services, Education, Income Generation, Livestock, Sanitation, Infrastructure, Transport, and 
Forestry) which signalled that assistance was turning away from relief to development as: 
The injection of cash starved economy would support the broader development of 
economic activity. Entrepreneurs would be able to reinvest. Beneficiaries would be 
able to increase their rate of local purchases. There would be a little leakage from the 
local economy. Thus, economic beneficiaries from the QIP to supply seed to destitute 
dry land farmers were to be: the local merchants, the farmers themselves, those whose 
subsistence they provided, and sellers of the surplus. Ideally, they should be able to 
rebuild seed stocks from production and thus the involvement would be economically 
sustainable96  
The CBOs reduced Somalia’s deep rooted political pathologies of lawlessness and insecurity 
into simple technical assistance programs which created a false perception of hope and 
stability among Somali refugees that purely served the interests of UNHCR in its attempts to 
reduce the number of refugees in its care. For example, one QIP in Baardheere involved 
women making mats for roofing for houses destroyed by war, which was itself linked to what 
was proclaimed as a successfully run local credit union established by USAID.97 Thus both 
Voluntary Repatriation and the QIPs were a direct result of the institutional insecurity felt by 
UNHCR, which had to renew its mandate every five years and whose budget was approved 
annually, but not assured. The initiatives established by the working group had inflicted 
immense damage with reductions in camp assistance and food delivery which threatened the 
nutrition of some 200,000 refugee children. Protection seminars were cancelled; eighteen 
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branches were closed with no chance to establish a presence in Eastern Europe; camps for the 
detained Vietnamese in Hong Kong remained underfunded; but the most catastrophic aspect 
was the loss of 15% of staff. The belief among Western governments was that a smaller UN 
budget automatically equated greater efficiency.98 Kent writing in the late 80s, neatly 
encapsulated UNHCR’s perennial predicament with how: 
The greater the institutional insecurity, the less control it may have over its own agenda 
and resource base, the greater will be the propensity to define organisational objectives 
in terms of the organisational survival. Organisational survival in such cases is 
reflected in what one observer describes as ‘prudence’…There is a tendency to restrict 
activities to pre-established standard operating procedures, programmes and 
repertoires...means, not ends provide the focal point for resolving problems…For 
UNHCR ‘prudence’ pervades the whole of the organisation’s structure.99 
This is further reiterated by Wigley, writing in 2005, who observed the organisational culture 
of UNHCR and concluded that the primary task of the organisation has been self-perpetuation 
through donor accountability requirements, and relationships with host governments. Such 
pressures transformed UNHCR into a donor reporting organisation with endless 
administrative and bureaucratic tasks which has reduced field staff and resources.100    
4.  Post-Cold War Era: The Emergence of Internal Displacement Issues  
The end of the Cold War, through the changing nature of conflict, has always been the 
popular explanation for the sudden rise of internal displacement. The United States 
Committee for Refugees claimed that IDPs had risen from 1.2 million in 1989 to over 20 
million by 1997.101 According to Weiner, the savagery of internal conflicts fought between 
ethnic groups within the same territory, with the increase in the availability of arms, and 
regional spill-overs, all produced enormous numbers of IDPs.102 UNHCR, up to this point, 
had a great degree of ambivalence towards IDPs, throughout the early 70s and 80s it had been 
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engaged with internally displaced communities unofficially in a number of high profile states, 
despite continuous claims in the 90s from the High Commissioner Sadaka Ogata that the 
organisation would not formally assist IDPs in the 1990s. According to Deng and Cohen the 
explanation for UNHCR’s inactivity rested upon the notion that it was apparently ‘developing 
its expertise in individual cases of internally displacement, and all the while delaying the 
larger decision of whether it should assume responsibility for all or most situation of internal 
displacement’.103However, there is little comprehension of both the informal plans it executed 
to sustain its existence without overtly pushing for expansion. In order to explain why internal 
displacement, which was centuries old as a natural occurrence in all civil conflicts, suddenly 
became an  international regime in the late 20th century and not a phenomenon of concern in 
any other given time or place, we have to acknowledge what Hacking identifies, in his studies 
of transient mental diseases, as the Ecological Niche. These are a ‘concatenation of an 
extraordinary large number of diverse types of elements which for a moment provide a stable 
home for certain types of manifestation’.104 In this context we have to appreciate three 
structural developments in the international system during the 1990s which made internal 
displacement visible and provided UNHCR with an opportunity to rebuild and restructure 
itself as a leader in humanitarian assistance. 
4.1 The New World Order 
The first was American President George Bush’s call for a New World Order in 1990, where 
he signalled an end to tyranny and oppression in the course of the US led coalition to repel the 
aggressor, Saddam Hussein, against Kuwait, which virtually set the stage for UNHCR to 
begin officially transforming its mandate:  
Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective- a new world order- can emerge; a new 
era-freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in 
the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North, and 
South, can prosper and live in harmony…Today that new world is struggling to be 
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born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of 
law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognise the shared 
responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the 
weak.105  
The Kurdish protection in northern Iraq in 1991 was one of the great turning points for 
UNHCR because of the wider geopolitical implications for NATO. Operation Provide 
Comfort was orchestrated after the passing of UN Resolution 688 to authorise coalition forces 
in Iraq to set up camps and prevent the Kurdish population from being uprooted and entering 
Turkey as refugees, following their persecution at the hands of the Saddam regime, which had 
already pushed 2 million Kurds into Iran in March 1991.106 This was unprecedented because, 
not only did UNHCR become politicised by NATO, who would not put pressure on Turkey to 
allow the admittance of Kurdish refugees, but it marked the end of the exile bias of refugee 
protection and the global recognition of internal displacement. Ogata was well aware of the 
conundrum the UNHCR faced to the protection mandate: ‘Should we follow the legal dictate 
of not exercising our mandate inside the border and thereby refrain from helping those 
prevented from crossing, or should we stand on more realistic humanitarian grounds and 
extend whatever support we could?107 Furthermore, the actual relief and protection was 
carried out by the Allied military forces who possessed the necessary manpower, logistics and 
resources for such an operation, with UNHCR simply becoming the face of the relief effort, 
which, while bolstering UNHCR’s status, created a tension which had to be quickly 
ameliorated by Boutros Boutros Ghali.108 This involved building camps to protect Iraqi Kurds 
and preventing them from entering Turkey as refugees, which would fuel greater instability 
with a key NATO ally. In light of Operation Provide Comfort, the August 1991 Report of the 
Working Group on Solutions and Protection to ExCom, UNHCR tactically concluded that the 
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contemporary environment for refugee protection had changed and that there was a need to 
seek alternative solutions for internally displaced persons. 
International law afforded internally displaced persons was inadequate for a number of 
reasons. In the case of non-international armed conflicts, article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Protocol II of 1977 do afford fairly extensive protection to 
civilian and military victims, including the displaced persons. It is in situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions that international humanitarian law offers scant 
protection; international humanitarian law is not applicable and many human rights can 
be suspended, leaving only non-derogable human rights in effect.109    
The second international incident was the dissolution of Yugoslavia which saw conflict and 
violence erupt in the 1990s that was characterised by ethnic cleansing, rape, siege and 
bombardment, refugee flows, and foreign military intervention. The then UN Secretary, 
General Javier Perez de Cuellar invited UNHCR ‘to assist in bringing relief to needy 
internally displaced persons affected by the conflict…[which]…may also have a welcome 
preventative impact in helping to avoid the further displacement of populations’.110 In reality, 
UNHCR became politicised and ended up contributing to ethnic cleansing in July in the town 
of Bosanski Novi where the mayor organised transportation for the expulsion of the Muslim 
residents. Many were even given documents stating that they had given away their homes as 
‘gifts’, and that they were leaving ‘voluntarily’. In the end in order to prevent their 
extermination, UNHCR was blackmailed into evacuating 7,000 inhabitants out of Bosanski 
Novi into Croatia.111 Despite this Ogata maintained that  
…in a war zone operations, a humanitarian presence was the most important protection 
tool for all victims- refugees, internally displaced, and affected civilians…we saved 
innumerable lives and mitigated human suffering. We strove and came up with new 
approaches and new hypotheses to address constantly evolving situations.112  
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The events in the Balkans, whilst widely regarded as a failure, elevated the international 
profile of UNHCR. It received a new building and its expenditure rose from US$544 million 
in 1990 to US$1,307 million in 1993.113 UNHCR quickly became aware of the potential for 
media co-operation in securing its status and existence: 
By demonstrating its expertise in launching such a large-scale relief programme, the 
organisation has gained a greatly enhanced public reputation and boosted its credibility 
with donors States….For UNHCR, the operation has had particular important 
implications for the future. The organisation has clearly moved into new areas, 
somewhat away from it more traditional role as a refugee protection agency… 
UNHCR’s experience in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated the benefits that can be 
gained when media relations are treated as an important and integral part of the 
organisation’s operational activities. With the expertise and reputation UNHCR has 
acquired, the organisation is now well placed to make better use of the international 
media.114 
4.2 Changing Nature of Sovereignty 
This first global transformation dovetailed into the second component, which was the new 
conceptions of sovereignty which broke down the barriers previously chanted as justifications 
for non-intervention in the first half century of the Refugee Regime. This was a product of the 
wider Washington consensus, the main thrust of which sought the retreat of the state, and the 
expansion of the market in its place. The rolling back of the state equalled deregulation, 
welfare reform, lower taxes, and the removal of politics from the business cycle. The Post-
Cold War era witnessed an erosion and re-conceptualisation of the concept of sovereignty in 
order to facilitate humanitarian intervention amid the perceived global chaos. The UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace, recognised emphasised 
preventative diplomacy, arguing that:  
the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty […] has passed…a major intellectual 
requirement of our time is to rethink the question of sovereignty- not to weaken its 
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essence, which is crucial to international security and cooperation, but to recognise that 
it may take more than one form and perform more than one function. This perception 
could help solve problems both within and among states. And underlying the rights of 
the individual and the rights of peoples is a dimension of universal sovereignty that 
resides in all humanity and provides all peoples with legitimate involvement in issues 
affecting the world as a whole.115  
This erosion of the Westphalian state system created the necessary space for humanitarianism 
which had since been a voluntary and underfunded area. The growth of humanitarian agencies 
operating in hot-spots throughout the world thus magnified the plight of IDPs. The rise of 
humanitarianism through the non-governmental organisation (NGO) ‘giving rise to the belief 
that opposition mobilised outside the state apparatus and within some separate entity called 
‘civil society’ is the powerhouse of oppositional politics and social transformation’.116 The 
flows of emergency relief funds increased from $766 million in 1989 to $4.365 billion in 
1999 respectively, many of which went to in-country protection operations.117  
4.3 The Advent of Human Security  
The third component was in 1994 when the United Nations Human Development Report 
formulated the concept of ‘Human Security’ which redefined the concept of ‘security’ away 
from traditional notions of realpolitik involving conventional military threats.118 It had two 
main aspects: ‘First, safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and 
Second, protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life’.119 This 
was in addition to the World Bank document, World Development Report 2000: attacking 
poverty, that observed poverty as ‘the result of economic, political and social processes that 
interact with each other and frequently reinforce each other in ways that exacerbate the 
deprivation in which poor people live’.120 These multidimensional approaches went beyond 
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the definition of poverty based on per capita income, to include deprivation across the 
spectrum of human existence. It understands that poor people, ‘lack adequate food shelter, 
education and health, deprivations that keep them from leading the kind of life that everyone 
values. They also face extreme vulnerability to ill health, economic dislocation and natural 
disasters. And they are often exposed to ill treatment by institutions of the state and society 
and are powerless to influence any decisions affecting their lives’.121  
Such a definition of security received considerable criticism, as according to Floyd, ‘The 
broad vision of human security is ultimately nothing more than a shopping list; it involves 
slapping the label human security on a wide range of issues that have no necessary link. At a 
certain point, human security becomes a loose synonym for ‘bad things that can happen’, and 
it then loses all unity to policymakers’.122 For UNHCR, however, it was a blessing with Ogata 
proclaiming in 1994 that  ‘Population displacement, whether internal or international has gone 
beyond the humanitarian domain to become a major political and socio-economic issue, 
affecting regional and global stability, as the crises in former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and 
Rwanda have clearly shown’.123 This presented a momentous opportunity for UNHCR as ‘she 
could harness the power of security to increase refugee protection and to use the urgency of 
security language to garner a level of resources and attention to address the refugee problem 
that had never before been seen’.124 Such an intellectual shift in the concept of security 
opened up an endless gamut of possible activities UNHCR could conduct, which logically 
went beyond refugee protection to include operations and programs that required virtual state 
building which were beyond the scope of any UN agency.    
5. UNHCR’s Formal Transition to IDP Protection 
These structural developments allowed UNHCR to once again adapt by positioning itself to 
take the reigns on IDP protection in the 21st century. In the report of the Working Group on 
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Solutions and Protection in August 1991, internal displacement was purported to have arisen 
out of the ‘major changes in the character and composition of asylum-seekers…and have 
brought into question traditional thinking about solutions and have necessitated new 
approaches’.125 Ogata in the 1992 International Protection Report Ogata ruled out any 
protection of IDPs unless seeking to establish durable solutions stating that:  
The legal bases for UNHCR programmes on behalf of people within their own country 
are qualitatively different from those governing work on behalf of refugees in countries 
of asylum. It is nevertheless understood that UNHCR’s mandate and expertise lies in 
the areas of protection and solutions. Wherever UNHCR is called upon to assist non-
refugees…its activities must be consistent with this mandate.126  
However, the attempt at IDP protection contradicted the Note on International Protection for 
1992 which contained a reversal on the previous policy and included one of the first 
definitions of Preventative Protection that set the stage for a formal transition: 
The Working Group considered prevention to be an umbrella term covering activities 
both to attenuate causes of departure and to reduce or contain cross-border movements 
or internal displacements. Prevention is not, however, a substitute for asylum; the right 
to seek and enjoy asylum therefore, must continue to be upheld.127 
5.1 Rifts over IDP Protection 
Preventative Protection and the reorientation of the organisation were not without their critics, 
for Article 8D of the Statute promoted admission which made in-country protection a breach 
of the obligation for which UNHCR was created. The most vocal opponent was Frelick who 
had observed the events in the former Yugoslavia, and the way the term was misinterpreted 
and manipulated by both Bosnia and Croatia. He also questioned the impact it would have on 
UNHCR’s original mandate, citing the northern Iraq crisis in which ‘establishing a safe zone 
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inside Iraq became yet another way for States to create a substitute for asylum; the very 
practice the Note on Protection seeks to avoid. The safe haven zone in northern Iraq had the 
effect not only of protecting Turkey from encroachments, but also of denying Saddam 
Hussein control, over a portion of his territory’.128 Further rifts emerged over the inclusion of 
IDPs within UNHCR’s mandate between the legal and protection division, with the latter 
arguing for an expansion. UNHCR’s Director of the Division of Communication and 
Information, John Horekens, was one of the proponents who maintained that: 
The expansion of UNHCR’s role to cover categories of people other than refugees is 
consistent with the Statute of the organisation. Article 1 directs UNHCR to seek 
“permanent solutions to the problem of refugees”, while Article 9 provides that the 
organisation “shall engage in such additional activities…as the General Assembly may 
determine”. A series of General Assembly resolutions thereby provides the legal basis 
for many of the UNHCR protection activities which take place in countries of origin 
rather than countries of asylum. For example, UN General Assembly Resolution 
48/116 of 1993 encouraged UNHCR to become involved with the internally displaced 
at the request of the UN Secretary General, particularly where the refugee problem and 
internal displacement are linked, as in the cases of the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, 
the Caucasus and Tajikistan.129 
However, his argument was premised on a very selective reading of the Statute; the subject of 
which had been bitterly contested in its formation during the 3rd Committee of the General 
Assembly in 1950. The ‘additional activities’ cited were not a justification for in-country 
protection, but instead measures designed to assist the primary objective of refugee 
protection. This was specifically mentioned by the Israeli delegate Mr Robinson who stated 
that ‘what was implied in paragraph 9 was not therefore an extension of functions rationae 
personae, but simply the exercise of additional functions made necessary by repatriation or 
resettlement’.130 For Goodwin-Gill a serious weakening of the agency’s protection and legal 
authority would develop if it formerly undertook in-country protection activities, as it could 
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not simultaneously request the extension of asylum from a neighbouring state which was a 
legal right for the refugee to flee oppression, while criticising a state’s domestic practices with 
the argument that people had the right to remain, and not be displaced as refugees.131 This 
very problem arose in the Note on International Protection in 1993 which contained a 
complete reversal of the previous 1992 Note on International Protection: 
The objective of prevention is not to obstruct escape from danger or from an intolerable 
situation, but to make flight unnecessary by removing or alleviating the conditions that 
force people to flee. Defending the right to remain does not in any way negate the right 
to seek and to enjoy asylum. UNHCR has always insisted that its activities in countries 
of origin are not incompatible with and must not in any way undermine the institution 
of asylum or the individual’s access to safety.132 [emphasis added] 
In an unpublished internal paper, Loescher, working as a consultant to UNHCR, raised a 
number of serious practical implications of protecting IDPs which went beyond the scope of 
the agency and simply amounted to delusions of grandeur that where not grounded in any 
operational research.133 Erin Mooney, a consultant and a major proponent of IDP protection, 
dismissed the main arguments levelled against in-country protection as invalid. For her, the 
argument that such a move went beyond the agencies refugee centred mandate was ahistoric 
as several past General Assembly resolutions had extended its competence beyond refugees 
and asylum seekers to include stateless persons; repatriated refugees, internally displaced 
people and war affected populations.134 However, Mooney had failed to understand that 
General Assembly resolutions were simply an extension of power politics as most of the 
resolutions she cited (Algerian repatriation from Morocco and the 1953 refugee exodus from 
East to West Germany) that had endorsed or extended the authority of the High 
Commissioner were always declared ex post facto with UNHCR initially acting unilaterally to 
desperately legitimate itself among powerful states. Overall, while proponents and opponents 
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battled over the legality and logic of IDP protection, the central issue of UNHCR’s desperate 
attempt to survive extinction was overshadowed and forgotten. 
5.2 UNHCR’s IDP Credentials  
The transition to IDP protection required operational qualifications for which UNHCR had to 
present in order to be legible for the role. In 1992, the UN General Assembly passed 
Resolution 48/116 which ‘supports the strengthened efforts by the High Commissioner to 
explore protection and assistance strategies that aim at preventing conditions that give rise to 
refugees outflows and at addressing their root causes, and urges her to pursue such efforts…to 
undertake activities in favour of internally displaced persons’.135 In September 1994, 
UNHCR’s Division of International Protection published a report titled UNHCR’s 
Operational Experience with Internally Displaced Persons. The report was, in essence, a long 
resume with the organisation presenting its skills, credentials, and resources, mentioning its 
operations in twenty countries bedevilled by civil war. It also made a series of mea culpas for 
not assisting IDPs in the past and made up for the fact that while it did not have a legal 
mandate to protect IDPs it drew together a number of past General Assembly Resolutions 
which conferred upon the agency a selective and limited mandate to assist IDPs.136 The report 
included an analytical study of 15 situations of internal displacement between 1971 and 1991 
detailing the assistance and protection delivered.137 It concluded by insisting that: 
Like refugees, the internally displaced need protection, assistance, and a solution to 
their plight. It is appropriate for UNHCR, with the consent of the parties concerned, 
and provided adequate resources are available, to take part in the efforts of the 
international community on behalf of the displaced, in order both to meet their 
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compelling humanitarian needs and to contribute to the prevention and solution of 
refugee problems.138 
However, the report had a wider strategic objective because it was a defensive initiative 
against the perceived encroachments made by the Governing Council of United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) three years earlier in 1991. This was after General 
Assembly resolution 89/65 in June 1989 published two reports that discussed UNDPs 
involvement with internally displaced populations. The first report from May 1990 titled 
Refugees and displaced persons-present and future role of the United Nations Development 
Programme in the field of refugee aid and development was particularly alarming for 
UNHCR because UNDP’s involvement harmonised containment policies through its 
promotion of refugee return and in-country protection that addressed the root causes of flight: 
A search for durable solutions for refugees, the reintegration of returnees of the 
resettlement of internally displaced persons, all constitute a developmental challenge to 
Governments. Although different approaches are pursued, determined by the 
requirements and circumstances of each situation, it is clear that all categories of 
displacement, regardless of cause, need to be integrated in the socio-economic 
environment through carefully designed plans and programmes.139 
UNDP had a natural disposition to assist IDPs through its involvement within states that 
could trump any claim by UNHCR which had no expertise or mandate to intervene and 
conduct extensive development work that would have undoubtedly addressed root causes. 
This was expressed in the second report of May 1991 titled Refugees, Displaced Persons and 
Returnees which argued that: 
Against this background, a consensus has been developing that emergency operations 
which are not firmly anchored in the development process are unlikely to produce 
durable solutions, and indeed, may actively harm the development process. The former 
dichotomy of approach- whereby emergencies were managed totally separately from 
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longer-term development efforts- has been reflected in the past in both recipient and 
donor institutional arrangements as well as in conceptual approaches.140 
Much like the UNHCR report, it listed a variety of countries and situations of displacement 
where UNDP had been carrying out early warning systems, relief and emergency aid, 
recovery, rehabilitation and development operations (Iraq, Angola, Somalia, Sudan, Vietnam, 
and Central America) which again paraded its technical superiority and leadership: 
The centrepiece of the plan (Special Plan of Economic Cooperation for Central 
America) is the Regional Development for Displaced Persons (PRODERE) covering 
the six affected countries. PRODERE is managed by UNDP and is financed by a 
contribution of $115 million from the Government of Italy over a four-year period. 
PRODERE benefits 147,000 people directly and a further 305,000 indirectly. A June 
1990 CIREFCA meeting, organised by UNDP, led to pledges of a further $160 million, 
covering 33 other projects funded by the international community.141 
The report was audacious because while UNDP claimed to be seeking greater collaboration 
with other UN organisations, it made proposals that would have allowed it to fulfil both 
development and emergency duties as it claimed: ‘to enable UNDP to respond effectively to 
this challenge, it is recommended that a new humanitarian programmes support unit be 
established to assist with the mainstreaming of all emergency-related activities into UNDP 
regular operations, both in the field and headquarters’.142  
Given such a threat, the formal shift to protecting IDPs began in 1995 when Ogata explained 
to EXCOM that ‘We have shifted from a bias towards exile to a focus on the country of 
origin’ claiming that of the 27.4 million persons of concern to UNHCR, ‘almost half’ were 
residing in their own territories’.143 Such a move was fully embraced by states in the Global 
North. Following on from this, the most overt sign of UNHCR’s ambitions came during the 
UN reforms in May 1997, when Maurice Strong recommended the UNHCR to be the future 
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focal point for all humanitarian operations amid the demise of the Department for 
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), and assume the role of Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC), 
which became Ogata’s crowning moment after the political mileage UNHCR had been 
receiving throughout the 90s. The leakage of an internal report titled Humanitarian Co-
ordination: Some Preliminary Reflections sent shock waves across the UN humanitarian 
community with no consultation with agencies, who became emboldened by the outrageous 
claims it made; one being that: ‘UNHCR…is the only agency whose responsibility is to meet 
all humanitarian needs of those of its concern, as opposed to responsibilities defined by nature 
of need, age or gender’.144  
5.3 Accommodating the Interests of the Powerful  
In order to be victorious in the ferocious UN turf wars, the organisation needed powerful 
allies. In March 2000, UNHCR issued a position paper clarifying its relationship with IDPs, 
which maintained that its interest arose purely from its humanitarian mandate on behalf of 
persons displaced by persecution, situations of general violence, conflict or massive violations 
of human rights. This mandate placed upon UNHCR ‘a responsibility to advocate on behalf of 
internally displaced; mobilise support for them; strengthen its capacity to respond to their 
problems; and take the lead to protect and assist them in certain situations’.145 UNHCR 
asserted that it was ready to take the lead where its protection and solutions expertise was 
particularly relevant, or where involvement with IDPs was closely linked to the voluntary 
repatriation and reintegration of refugees. Most important was the recognition of the 
‘complementarity’ between refugees and IDPs: 
Countries of asylum may be more inclined to maintain their asylum policies if 
something is done to alleviate the suffering of the internally displaced, reduce their 
compulsion to seek asylum and create conditions conducive to return. On the other 
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hand, UNHCR’s activities for the internally displaced may be (mis)interpreted as 
obviating the need for international protection and asylum.146 
This had all been a strategic manoeuvre, as earlier in the same year the US Ambassador to the 
UN and Security Council President, Richard Holbrooke, in a statement to the Security 
Council on Promoting Peace & Security, argued that: 
I want to focus on the fact that two thirds of the refugees in the world do not fall under 
the official purview of the UNHCR. We call them IDPs…these are persons who have 
been driven from his or her home by conflict, there is no difference between being a 
refugee or an IDP. In terms of what has happened to them, they are equally victims but 
they are treated differently. The reason we all turn to the UNHCR…is precisely 
because they are our last, best hope for dealing with these problems…I hope that all of 
us would recognise that what we must do is expand the definition of what is a refugee 
and person who is internally displaced…fix the responsibility more clearly in a single 
agency.147  
Following the ‘unanticipated’ commencement of this debate in the Security Council, the High 
Commissioner regurgitated the same message in her briefing during the same Security 
Council meeting, calling for an ‘end to the distinction between the two groups’ and 
comprehensive mechanisms to protect people fleeing their homes… and comprehensive, 
regionally based solutions to their predicament’.148 In addition, Ogata blamed UNHCR’s past 
limited role on the lack of security and funds, which Holbrooke responded to by calling upon 
all states to provide more support.149   
5.4 Becoming a Permanent UN Organisation   
These tactical successes among Western states paved the way for its strategic ambition, which 
came in 2003 when the High Commission published a report titled Strengthening the 
Capacity of the UNHCR to carry out its mandate. This marked the culmination of a 60 year 
struggle for existence, in which it argued for a removal of the time limitation established by 
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Chapter 1: Article 5 of the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner which stated that 
‘The General Assembly shall review, no later than at its eighth regular session, the 
arrangements for the Office of the High Commissioner with a view to determining whether 
the Office should be continued beyond 31 December 1953’.150 UNHCR justified such a 
proposal on the basis that: 
The Office’s primary role has not changed, but new categories of persons of concern 
have been added to the responsibilities of the Office. What is needed now is to ensure 
that UNHCR is sufficiently equipped to carry out this mandate and to respond to the 
challenges of modernity.151 [emphasis added] 
The organisation claimed that such a removal would recognise that the refugee problem had 
no immediate end in sight and would allow strategic planning ‘improving multi-year 
programming, to address these situations more comprehensively’, which was tantamount to 
addressing the root causes which states in the Global North favoured. This careful move 
resulted in the UNHCR in December 2003 when it finally becomes a permanent UN 
organisation following General Assembly Resolution 58/153 on the basis of the above 
recommendation from UNHCR, which ‘Decides to remove the temporal limitation on the 
continuation of the Office of the High Commissioner contained in its resolution 57/186 and to 
continue the Office until the refugee problem is solved’.152  
6. The 21st Century & Beyond: Emergence of the IDP Regime  
With its existence now secure as a result of a series of strategic manoeuvres to re-invent itself 
to protect internally displaced persons, UNHCR now embarked on exploiting in-country 
protection to galvanise its new global position. This period witnesses a more autonomous 
organisation exercise greater power to dominate all UN humanitarian discourse.  
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 6.1 The Lubbers Era: Building the IDP Structures  
This period is marked by Convention Plus, which began in 2003 as part of the Global 
Consultations on International Protection, which brought together Northern & Southern 
states. It was a strategic response by High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers which opened the 
way for a much broader function for UNHCR because it arrived at a time when the protection 
of IDPs was on centre stage, and when the organisation was being reminded and criticised for 
neglecting its primary refugee mandate. Thus Convention Plus was Lubber’s attempt to re-
engage European donor states by developing a new inter-state agreement that would 
‘supplement’ the 1951 Convention for which many states had become averse. This was to be 
achieved by solutions in the regions of origins which was ultimately a neat reaffirmation of 
the crisis of internal displacement.153 However, it represented a serious irony whereby 
UNHCR tried to employ the migration and asylum control mechanisms and policies of the 
Global North as an ‘effective’ means of inducing those very states to commit to supporting 
and funding refugee protection within the countries of origin, which was, in reality, 
facilitating internal displacement and undermining the 1951 Convention. UNHCR was in 
effect using refugee containment to contain refugees in the hope that this would ‘assist’ 
refugees and ‘uphold’ its mandate.  
This period is further marked by massive numbers of IDPs generated through the enormous 
natural disasters during the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 2004 and the Pakistan 
earthquake of October 2005. The media attention and large scale relief operations represented 
another area of UNHCR expansion.154 In December 2005, the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) agreed to establish the Cluster Approach system with UNHCR agreeing to 
become the cluster lead for IDPs during conflict generated emergencies in the three areas: 
Protection, Emergency Shelter and Camp Coordination/Management. Such an approach was 
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aimed at ‘improving the predictability, timelines, and effectiveness of humanitarian response, 
providing operational leadership and a heightened sense of accountability’.155  
The Cluster Approach, which will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 2, was not without 
its critics. The head of the IASC, the ERC ‘has no authority to order compliance’, nor does he 
‘have funding to offer to make the decision to respond more appealing’.156 For proponents of 
IDP protection, most notably Susan Martin, the failure of clear leadership, authority, and 
funding of the current collaborative system, abrogated attempts to protect IDPs as ‘when 
everyone is responsible…no one can be held accountable for failures’.157 For them there was 
a desperate need to consolidate assistance and protection into a new UN High Commissioner 
for Forced Migrants which ‘superseding UNHCR, its mandate would include refugees 
covered under the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as well as 
individuals internally and externally displaced because of repression, conflict, natural 
disasters, environmental degradation and development-induced displacement’.158 For Martin, 
the creation of a United Nations High Commission for Forced Migrants was a better option to 
replace UNHCR as it would guarantee that all displaced persons received the same treatment, 
with the office mandated ‘to negotiate access and protection of forced migrant with 
governments and insurgent groups in both home and host countries…It would be responsible 
for developing a consolidated appeal for funding that would show donors the full range of 
financial needs in all countries’.159 Such a proposal was however unthinkable and presented a 
clear and present danger to UNHCR’s survival and dominance. In its 2006 The State of the 
World Refugee Report, in a section titled Should UNHCR become a ‘displacement agency?, it 
used the authoritative recommendations first by the former UK Secretary of State for 
International Development Hilary Benn, who asserted in relation to Darfur that ‘Is it really 
sensible that we have different systems for dealing with people fleeing their homes dependent 
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on whether they happen to have crossed an international border?’.160 Second, by a US 
Congressionally-mandated bipartisan task force on the UN, which recommended ‘redefining’ 
the mandate of UNHCR to ensure the delivery of aid to refugees, internally displaced persons 
and those affected by natural disasters.161 All these statements justified UNHCR taking a lead 
role, as it would allow states to maintain their asylum policies by reducing the need to seek 
asylum, and would create conditions conducive to return and resettlement of refugees. There 
was, however, a hidden pattern to this game, whereby the organisation would, on the surface, 
claim not to seek expansion, while subtly producing ‘knowledge’ about displacement and 
imminent and catastrophic global challenges that undoubtedly ‘fell’ within its remit, from 
which it ‘may’ have had to ‘respond if required’. The Assistant High Commissioner for 
Protection, Erika Feller, summarised this ‘quandary’ before the Executive Committee in June 
2008: 
New terminology is entering the displacement lexicon with some speed. The talk is 
now of ‘ecological refugees’. ‘climate change refugees’, the natural disaster displaced’. 
This is all a serious context for UNHCR’s efforts to fulfil its mandate for its core 
beneficiaries…The mix of global challenges is explosive, and one with which we and 
our partners, government and non-government, must together strike the right 
balance.162 
Shortly after in October 2008, in a document titled: Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and 
Human Displacement: A UNHCR Perspective, it expounded that ‘it is legitimate to ask 
whether new legal protection instruments might be needed for cross-border movements that 
are induced by climate-related reasons. UNHCR is not seeking an extension of its mandate, 
but it is our duty to alert the international community to the protection gaps that are 
emerging’ [emphasis added].163 Similarly, the current High Commissioner Antonio Guterres 
in a speech titled People on the Move: The Challenges of Displacement in the 21st Century in 
2008 stated that: ‘We at UNHCR are not trying to enlarge our mandate or increase our 
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functions. This is not the case. But we believe that the international community should focus 
on these issues and find answers to the problems of forced displacement’.164 In the same 
speech he even recognised that ‘the interpretation of who needs protection and what 
persecution means is being extended to cover non-state agents of persecution and to many 
areas linked to religion, culture, and other aspects of human life’165, all of which would no 
doubt catapult the agency into new galaxies of relief assistance.  
In that same critical year it published a policy paper describing the nexus between climate 
change and displacement, which was an attempt to control, as it maintained that ‘some 
movements prompted by climate change could indeed fall within the traditional refugee law 
framework bringing them within the ambit of international or regional instruments…as well 
as within UNHCR’s framework’.166 The paper was again a tactical manoeuvre because it first 
argued that the agency was opposed to the term ‘environmental or climate change refugee’ 
since the label refugee should only be applied to those people covered under the 1951 
Convention. However, it then recognised that there was a ‘specific’ link between climate 
change, and internal displacement.  In the lead up to the Copenhagen negotiations in 2009, it 
then published an updated policy paper which was an attempt to cannibalise the humanitarian 
discourse on climate change, claiming that, ‘All UNHCR staff involved at the country level 
with refugee and IDP settlements, both rural and urban, will need to be equipped with 
strategies to combat and cope with the effects of climate change, impacting not just on 
persons of concern to UNHCR but also broader host communities’.167 These bold statements 
were purely political posturing, according to Hall, who saw no substantial developments or 
changes within UNHCR in this period, with the agency generating reservations and weariness 
from member states regarding its enlargement to cover climate change induced 
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displacement168. Finally a 2010 speech by Guterres titled: Forced Displacement: Responding 
to the Challenge of the Next Decade marked a complete reversal on his previous claim against 
the agency’s enlargement in which he now unveiled UNHCR’s true expansionist mission to 
become the largest global welfare organisation: 
UNHCR sees itself as an organisation with the experience, expertise and delivery 
capacity to be a central instrument of the international community in supporting states 
to protect, assist and resolve the plight of people who have been forced to flee from 
their homes and who find themselves in vulnerable circumstances. In this context, 
UNHCR has assumed responsibility even when persons have not crossed international 
border. UNHCR is now leading the response to conflict-induced internal displacement 
in areas of protection, shelter and camp management. If asked to do so, we stand ready 
also to assume leadership at field level of the protection response in cases of natural 
disasters.169  
The irony inherent here was that the December 2003 General Assembly resolution that lifted 
the term limits and the Cluster Approach framework, allowed UNHCR to fulfil this broad 
operational role by giving it a mandate to enter states and employ the same administrative 
structures and responsibilities of a ‘potential’ High Commission for Forced Migrants, while 
cleverly preserving its brand name. UNHCR had simply accomplished everything that Martin 
had been proposing in all but name. In addition Martin ignored the fact that the crisis of 
internal displacement was itself a key issue in heated debates within the UN General 
Assembly 3rd Committee in the late 1940s, which culminated in a compromise over the 
protection of those displaced within their own borders as citizens, and those who fled their 
territory into other sovereign states, from which UNHCR was created. To now present a fresh 
case for the creation of an organisation that protected all categories of displaced people was to 
once again reignite fiery deliberations between powerful member states.     
6.2 Balancing Internal & External Protection 
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 Given such a momentous undertaking by one single UN agency, it became necessary to 
recount UNHCR’s past record in IDP protection, which were white-washed in its previous 
grand proposals. In a 2005 UNHCR report titled Consistent & Predictable Responses to IDPs, 
Mattar & White uncovered the inherent pathologies, ambiguities and anomalies within the 
organisation’s decision making processes in eight fragile states with large IDP populations, 
which casted a shadow of doubt on its ability to effectively protect IDPs. They showed first 
how there was no consistency in UNHCR’s timing to become engaged with IDPs. Secondly, 
there were strained relations between UNHCR and other agencies and NGOs due to its 
unpredictability and perceived dominance. Thirdly was the impact on the collaborative 
approach and the inter-agency operations and discussions, with UNHCR’s ambivalence and 
lack of defined parameters in an operational framework. Fourthly, serious rifts arose as a 
result of the conflict of mandates between refugees and IDPs. Operational problems 
developed with the agency overstretched to the point where ‘the protection needs of the 
targeted IDPs were vast, and were not essentially different from those faced by the Angolan 
population at large’.170 Similarly, Barutciski documented the unreliability and opportunism 
within UNHCR’s involvement with IDPs which brought a complete halt to humanitarian 
principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity that was evident in Kosovo, where 
UNHCR exaggerated the number of IDPs and casualty figures. At the onset of a NATO air 
campaign in 1999 UNHCR claimed that the displaced masses had been uprooted by Serbian 
forces; a declaration that could not be corroborated, but was nonetheless welcomed by NATO 
in the propaganda war. The agency then claimed that 250,000 died in the conflict of Bosnia-
Herzegovina when conservative estimates from recognised institutions (SIPRI) placed 
casualty numbers between 25,000 and 55,000.171 More importantly, the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia highlighted the overall problem of becoming a lead agency for protected 
displaced masses. Such a status ‘represents a ‘default’ position to fill a co-ordination 
                                                          
170 UNHCR, UNHCR’s programme for internally displaced people in Angola: a joint Danida/UNHCR 
review, EPAU/2001/04, May (2001), para.75. 
171 Barutciski (1996). 
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vacuum’172 which detracts from its primary role of assisting refugees, thus balancing 
impartiality within a precarious environment of civil-military relationships, with its statutory 
responsibilities, and its lead agency function became overwhelming and dangerous, factors 
which we will revisit in chapter 5.173    
6.3 History Repeating Itself 
These recent developments had all been discussed and foreseen by Mrs Roosevelt 60 years 
earlier, whose clairvoyance in the 3rd Committee had warned against the UNHCR taking on 
an expanding mandate to protect citizens within their borders: 
The problems inherent in those movements of millions of people [IDPs] could only be 
treated effectively within the framework of consideration of the total economies of the 
countries concerned, a task far beyond the competency of the High Commissioner’s 
Office for Refugees…It would commit the United Nations to undertakings which it was 
not prepared to assume and which were beyond available resources to fulfil.174.    
Thus the contemporary IDP Regime had simply brought UNHCR full circle as the entire 
history of its turbulent existence was foreshadowed by the Indian delegate, Mrs Menon, who, 
when discussing proposals for the refugee definition, succinctly added that:  
The immigration policy of many countries was based on racial prejudice…The whole 
problem of refugees could never be solved, however, until it became evident that the 
humanitarian sentiments expressed by representatives were an accurate reflection of 
their governments’ intentions and that the United Nations had the same concern for all 
peoples, regardless of race.175 
Her echoing message had indeed been the essence of the international politics of refugees 
from which UNHCR had to manage and adapt to, and from which we come to understand the 
origins of the IDP Regime.  
                                                          
172 Pugh and Cunliffe (1997), pp. 20-25. 
173 Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
174 Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Session, Third Committee, 329th 
Meeting, 29 November (1950), p. 363. 
175 Official Records of the UN General Assembly, Third Committee, 332nd Meeting, 1st December 
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Conclusion 
 
We have observed how the IDP Regime was an outcome of the international politics of 
refugees through the formal and informal connections between actors, institutions, and the 
fluctuating global environments over a sixty year period. This chapter has chronicled how a 
small, weak and unstable organisation that was created to protect refugees, evolved to become 
a large, powerful, and dominant UN player for the protection of all people displaced within 
their sovereign borders. The IDP Regime was, in reality, an initiative for calming the fears 
and harmonising the interests of powerful Western states and international organisations. The 
next chapter will historicise the evolution of the IDP Regime through a deeper exploration 
into the international politics of refugees, that charts the development of norms, laws, 
policies, frameworks, and discourses that facilitated and cemented refugee containment.  
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Chapter Two 
The Evolution of the Internal Displacement Regime 
Refugee Containment through Norm Creation   
 
Introduction 
 
Norms are said to play a vital role in the maintenance of international peace and security, for 
they are not only created by states and institutions in order to govern and condition state and 
institutional behaviour, but they have themselves been employed to create states, 
organisations, and academic discourse176. However, it is important to always keep in mind 
that global norms are  not constant, which ultimately reflects the prevailing power politics of 
a given age. This was the case with the evolution of IDP norms, which were widely attributed 
as a charitable act of humanity as stated by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 
September 2005: 
 
For over a decade, the humanitarian crises posed by the scope of internal displacement 
have engaged the attention of the international community. The appointment in 1992 of 
a Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Francis 
Deng, marked the commencement of a decade of sustained attention to developing 
solutions to the challenge of internal displacement. The Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2) emerged as a basic normative framework, 
applying the provisions of international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as 
refugee law by analogy, to victims of internal displacement. At the same time, the 
Representative was pivotal in advocating for the rights of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), particularly through country missions and other visits, and in advancing the 
institutional ‘collaborative response’ of the United Nations and its specialised agencies 
as the only possible answer to the broad spectrum of IDPs’ needs.177 
 
                                                          
176 Checkel (1998),Johnston (2007), Legro (1997), Klotz (1995). 
177 UN Secretary General Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons, Note by the 
Secretary-General, 7th September (2005). 
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However the purpose of this chapter is to pick up the story of chapter one; to further 
illuminate how such norms were designed to house and harmonise the interests of the 
powerful. It will trace the contestation, emergence, and stabilisation of norms pertaining to 
the IDP Regime to expose how its ascendency has been a complete recycling and 
restructuring of the previously ‘unwanted’ and ‘anachronistic’ 1951 Refugee Convention, 
which now engenders ‘new’ and ‘acceptable’ labels and values from states, international 
institutions, and NGOs. Through a careful unpacking of the legal and institutional norms for 
IDP protection and reflection upon their inherent contradictions, ambiguities and tensions, we 
will begin to appreciate how, rather than being an expression of international concern for 
suffering masses, it was purely a subterfuge for the containment of refugee flows by calming 
the xenophobic storms raging beneath containment policies.  
 
The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will document norm contestation 
through an investigation of the manner in which a normative lacuna was manufactured to 
challenge the 1951 Convention on the basis that IDPs were a new category of people 
requiring protection through the creation of new legal and institutional frameworks. The 
second will observe norm emergence through the strategic roots of the IDP Regime by the 
way actors emulated the evolution of the Refugee Regime. The third will detail norm 
stabilisation through the development of an academic discourse and the final creation of the 
new African Union IDP Convention. The chapter will commence with a clarifying light on 
the many characteristics of refugee containment. Throughout this chapter, like the former, we 
will observe how every stage of this norm cycle to supposedly ‘assist’ people trapped within 
their own borders and uphold the ‘right to remain’, conveniently paralleled and absorbed the 
intentions and motives of broader policy frameworks and strategies aimed at containing 
refugee flows by the Global North. Indeed, the overall strategy of norm creation lay in the 
evolution of the IDP Regime from a soft to hard law instrument by capturing all the norms of 
the Refugee Regime. This is to award it greater global relevance and adherence, while 
simultaneous attempting to dilute and circumvent the significance of the 1951 Refugee 
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Convention by its re-interpretation as a political concept that could be interpreted on an ad 
hoc basis to suit the interests of states, even though it was still legally binding and functioning 
with states obligated to ameliorate the plight of refugees (see Figure 5 below). 
 
 
Figure 5. Evolutionary Framework of the IDP Regime 
                                                                             
Defining IDP Norms 
IDP norms can be divided into three broad categories: legal protection, physical protection, 
and academic discourses (see Table 3 below), with each containing institutions and 
conceptual frameworks that have been the product of heated debates, UN General Assembly 
Resolutions, conferences, workshops, and humanitarian interventions.  
Table 3. IDP Norms 
Legal Protection Physical Protection Academic 
 
The IDP Category 
 
Sovereignty as 
Responsibility  
 
The Guiding Principles 
 
The UN Special 
Representative to the 
Secretary General on the 
Human Rights of IDPs 
 
The Cluster Approach 
 
Forced Migration Discourse 
 
Brookings/Bern Project 
 
Georgetown/ Bern Project 
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The IDP Convention 
NRC Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 
  
To understand the evolution of these norms I will employ the framework devised by Park & 
Vetterlein (see Figure 6 below) which argues that ‘a historical/temporal element such [as] a 
norm is not just ‘born’ and at some point ‘dies’. Rather, a norm emerges at a specific point in 
time and is based on its own historical antecedents. That the process is circular also frees us 
from merely examining a norm in the emergence to stabilisation phase: norms can be 
examined at every stage of the norm circle (from emerging to stabilising to declining, 
declining to r-emerging). There is no beginning and end as such; norm change is on-going’.178 
Given this norm cycle, we will come to appreciate in the following sections that the IDP 
norms are simply a recycling of refugee norms. 
 
 
 Assumptions and Clarifications of Refugee Containment 
Before plunging into a detailed analysis of how the evolution of IDP norms facilitated refugee 
containment, we have to understand that attempting to comprehensively define refugee 
                                                          
178 Park and Vetterlein (ed) 2010, p. 20. 
 
Norm 
Emergence  
Norm 
Stabilisation 
Norm 
Contestation 
Figure 6. Stages of the Norm Cycle 
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containment is akin to describing the aroma of coffee, as while people may know ‘exactly’ 
what it is, it is virtually impossible to articulate in its entirety. This is because refugee 
containment is not an officially articulated or candid policy, but instead a nebulous series of 
both actions and inactions by governments and international institutions with several 
paradoxes and grey areas, which can only be deciphered by reading between the lines of state 
interests and behaviour towards refugee across time and space. Indeed, for the sake of 
political correctness and legitimacy in an era of globalisation that purports to uphold universal 
values of humanity and equality, states are continuously forced to mask and distort their true 
intentions while maintaining a façade of unfailing adherence to human rights principles and 
membership of the club of global civil society, amid the watchful eye of unfettered IOs, 
NGOs, and global media, and who can expose and embarrass racist and xenophobic 
governments.179 Such subtleties will be fully explored through the IDP Regime as the new 
instrument for upholding this international public relations game.   
 
Challenges in Identifying and Analysing Containment 
 
The first challenge is the tendency to conflate the practice of refugee containment with that of 
refugee deterrence. The purpose of containment is to prevent people from arriving at Western 
borders by physically preventing them from leaving their countries of origin through the 
application of visa restrictions, carrier sanctions, safe third country, and safe country of origin 
legislation.180 This is different from deterrence, which is practiced within countries of asylum 
through a mixture of restrictive and punitive measures, which include detention, denial of 
state benefits, reduced access to appeal procedures, and negative propaganda and rhetoric.181 
As we saw in the previous chapter, in the last 30 years there has been a rise in the 
                                                          
179 Amnesty International in February 2004 published: Get It Right: How Home Office Decision 
Making Fails Refugees and June 2005 it launched another campaign titled: Seeking Asylum Is Not A 
Crime: Detention of People who Have Sought Asylum.  
Still Human Still Here is a coalition of over 50 organisations that are campaigning to end the 
destitution of thousands of refused asylum seekers in the UK. The coalition believes that the current 
policy is inhumane and ineffective.  
180 Hassan (2000), p. 185. 
181 Ibid, p. 186. 
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containment of refugees arriving from the Global South ‘who had less in common culturally 
with Europeans than previous asylum movements; and they arrived, often illegally, through 
the use of smugglers and/ or false documentation’.182 Western European nations thus 
employed a range of policies and practices including ‘safe’ third countries and ‘safe’ origin 
countries to which refugees could be sent back to, visa restrictions, and airline sanctions, all 
with the overarching argument, according to the European Council, that ‘a rising number of 
applicants for asylum (…) are not in genuine need of protection’.183 Such developments 
received considerable scholarly attention in attempting to identify the underlying factors 
which have ranged from the shifting geo-political relations at the end of the Cold War184, to 
intra-state socio-economic issues of identity and the fear of the ‘other’185, to critical debates 
about international migration.186  
 
There are two examples that shed light on this first issue. The first is the paradox of US 
refugee policy which is both designed to contain and maintain the flow of refugees. While the 
US has overtly and forcefully curbed the flow of boat people from Haiti in the early 90s with 
the Four D Policy (Detect, Deport, Detain & Deter), from 1959 to 1995, it simultaneously 
maintained an open door policy to Cuban refugees under the 1962 Migration and Refugee 
Assistance Act, who were instrumental in the American strategy of destabilising the Cuban 
economy by draining all human and economic capital, and winning the wider propaganda war 
against Communism.187 The media was thus very supportive of refugee arrivals, with Fortune 
claiming that “Those Amazing Cuban Emigres…A lot of talented refugees from Castro’s 
Cuba are rapidly becoming an important American asset”.188 Business Week proclaimed how 
                                                          
182 Hansen and King (2000), p. 400. 
183 European Council, (1992), p. 1. 
184 Chimni (1998). 
185 Givens, Freeman and Leal Ed. (2009), Geddes (2000), Luedtke (2009), Guiraudon (2000), 
Huysmans (2000), Lavenex (2001). 
186 Messina and Lahav ed. (2006). 
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“The Cubans who fled Castro have become the city’s affluent new middle class”.189 Thus for 
Washington the removal of the 1951 Convention in favour of the IDP Regime would have 
been beneficial for Haiti, while upholding the 1951 Convention and downplaying the IDP 
Regime would have suited Cuba. This open door policy of extended asylum to all refugees 
fleeing governments that the US directly opposed was encapsulated in President Truman’s 
1953 Commission titled Whom Shall We Welcome which advocated ‘that effective measures 
should be taken and adequately appropriations be made to provide reasonable reception, care 
and migration opportunities for escapees from Communism’.190 This was visible in a number 
of cases, notably that of Vietnamese and Indochinese refugees after 1975 with the US 
departure and fall of Saigon. In the late 1970s the Justice Department’s creation of ‘extended 
voluntary was departure’ granted to nationals from Iran, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Uganda. It 
was later extended to thousands of Poles in 1981 after martial law was declared. The 
justification for such a status lay in the claim that non-immigrants visiting the US would be 
persecuted if they returned home.191 All these cases would challenge the absolutist claim that 
the US sought to contain all refugees.  
 
The second case is the well documented Australian opposition towards refugees, dating back 
to the turn of the century with the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901. This began the White 
Australia Policy that fuelled insecurity and an invasion complex which set the tone for future 
debates and policy making.192 The most high profile was the August 2001 incident, when the 
Howard government denied entry into Christmas Island to the Norwegian freighter MV 
Tampa, which was carrying 438 Afghan refugees rescued from a distressed fishing boat.193 
More recently was in July 2011 when the Gillard government announced the ‘Malaysian 
Solution’ which involved a bipartisan agreement between Australia, Malaysia and UNHCR to 
                                                          
189 Ibid, p. 167. 
190 Ibid, p. 159. 
191 Ibid, pp. 197-198. 
192 McMaster (2002), p. 279. 
193 Peter Shadbolt, ‘Australians Bar Ship laded with Afghan Refugees’, The Telegraph, 28th August 
(2001). 
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‘legitimately’ contain refugees by transferring up to 800 offshore asylum seekers for 
processing in Malaysia which was not a signatory to the 1951 Convention, in return for 
accepting up to 1000 ‘legitimate’ refugees per year for a period of four consecutive years.194 
This new measure would have involved UNHCR ‘processing’ en-route claimants in Malaysia 
before they could be resettled in Australia after meeting certain ‘criteria’. Such a practice 
presented an interesting dynamic because Australia was sub-contracting its international 
obligations under the 1951 Convention to a subsidiary of the UN whose primary function was 
to provide international protection to refugees, by, among other things, promoting their 
admission into the territory of states, and not engaging in offshore processing of refugees for 
state parties. By cleverly employing UNHCR Australia did not appear to be containing 
refugees because on the surface the organisation was ‘performing’ its mandate of providing 
international protection. As Pickering and Lambert note: 
 
No other country maintains this zero sum game between offshore and onshore 
applicants. As a consequence of this approach the rhetoric of queue jumping is easily 
invoked against those coming as part of the offshore system; and it obscures the 
reasons as to why many make the hazardous journey. Onshore asylum seekers are 
considered less deserving because they have usually paid people smugglers to reach 
Australia. Genuine refugees are considered those that wait within camps in places like 
Pakistan and Thailand to be processed by UNHCR. Deterrence, as it has been 
positioned within refugee policy, is aimed at onshore asylum seekers. It is aimed at 
preventing them from embarking on the journey to Australia.195 
 
However, following a landmark trial in the Australian High Court in August 2011 involving 
42 asylum claimants, six of whom were unaccompanied minors 196, the Malaysian Solution 
was ruled unlawful on the basis that Australia could not legally send asylum seekers for 
‘protection’ and ‘processing’ to a country that was not legally bound by the Refugee 
                                                          
194 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Australia). ‘Agreement between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of Malaysia on transfer and resettlement’, 25th July (2011). 
195 Pickering and Lambert (2002), p. 66. 
196 Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; and Plaintiff 106 of 2011 v. 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. (Australian High Court, 31 August 2011) HCA 32. 
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Convention, nor recognised refugees in its domestic law, all of which had been conveniently 
whitewashed by UNHCR rhetoric which oddly maintained that:  
 
…the Arrangements and its implementing guidelines contain important protection 
safeguards including the respect for the principle of non-refoulement, the rights to 
asylum, the principle of the family unit, and best interests of the child; humane 
reception conditions including protection against arbitrary detention, lawful status to 
remain in Malaysia until a durable solution is found, and the ability to receive 
education, access to healthcare, and a right to employment.197 [emphasis added] 
 
 
Refugee Containment within the Global South 
 
A second assumption seldom addressed is the belief that refugee containment is an exclusive 
practice of advanced Western states against masses arriving from Third World countries. 
However, as Keely, writing in the early 80s noted, over 95% of the world’s 13 to 16 million 
refugees resided in the Third world alone.198 Similarly, their presence often threatened 
interests and populations of host states, and resulted in South-South containment with less 
economically developed states seeking to curb refugee flows from other less economically 
developed states. Indeed, a prime case arose from the low intensity conflicts in Central 
America between the military and Marxist insurgents in the 1980s which led to the 
unprecedented exodus of peasants into Mexico. For Mexico, the arrival tens of thousands of 
Guatemalans created concerns, as many arrived through Chiapas which escalated fears that 
the presence of already landless Guatemalans would reignite the existing unrest. Secondly, 
they compounded problems, as Mexico was seeking to establish good relations with the 
Guatemalan state, which would have been damaged if Mexico had recognised and protected 
refugees fleeing the oppressive state in Guatemala, that had not only labelled those refugees 
as ‘guerrillas’, but had even demanded their return, and even launched incursions into Mexico 
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against refugee settlements.199  Thirdly, the Mexican state was going through economic 
turmoil due to falling oil prices and the increasing debt burden which meant that it could not 
meet the basic needs of its own citizens let alone fleeing foreigners. The Mexican solution 
began with large scale deportations from Chiapas on the official claim that many had failed to 
request asylum and not met refugee criteria. However, this changed in the late 80s when 
Mexico, through UNHCR, began protecting and settling 5,000 Guatemalans which contained 
and depoliticised refugees in camps that allowed the state to save face and maintain its 
relations with Guatemala while also receiving much needed funds from UNHCR.   
 
The Migration-Asylum Nexus 
  
A third clarification is that while a number of scholars have identified the internal fears and 
anxieties of the ‘other’ as the quintessential theme in determining the emerging discourses, 
mechanisms and policies of refugee containment, as Norman Myers commented regarding the 
flow of environmental refugees from Africa to Europe: ‘[this] will surely come to be regarded 
as a trickle when compared with the floods that will ensue in decades ahead’.200 Such 
analyses have to be approached with a high degree of caution because they are premised on 
the rhetoric that there once existed a perfect state that held a right balance between citizens 
and immigrants, which suddenly became threatened by the large influx of foreign hoards. 
However, this is not the full picture because asylum represents only one galaxy within the 
wider universe of migration, which cannot be neatly disentangled, as state immigration 
policies can fluctuate from being open and inclusive in some decades, to being closed and 
discriminatory in others, depending entirely on the socio-economic realities it confronts.  
 
Indeed, Castles and Miller show us that in order to understand refugee flows, we must 
appreciate that the contemporary era is defined by the globalisation of migration (both forced 
and voluntary), interacting with transnational social transformations. They show us that 
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‘migration is a process which affects every dimension of social existence, and which develops 
its own complex dynamics. The great majority of people in the world (97% in 2000) 
(UNDESA, 2005) are not international migrants, yet their communities and way of life are 
changed by migration’.201 These governments attempting to contain refugees at times ‘tacitly 
use asylum and undocumented migration as a way of meeting labour needs without publicly 
admitting the need for unskilled migration’.202 Even the Australian government after the 
Second World War, despite its anti-asylum rhetoric, engaged in a large scale immigration 
program to strengthen national security and economic development through an increased 
population after the post war labour shortages under the slogan ‘populate or perish’ under 
Minister Arthur Calwell.203  
 
1. Norm Contestation: Manufacturing a Normative Lacuna 
 
Having established the various mediums of refugee containment and the challenges in 
articulating them, I will now add to the existing repertoire of containment practices. 
According to Park and Vetterlein,  
 
…orms are not independent of actors and their interests. On the contrary, if relevant 
actors are not convinced that a norm is (still) appropriate, it will change. To explain, 
norms change if relevant actors give new meaning to the situation in which the norm 
usually applies. As a result something quite powerful must happen for a norm to 
change since according to our definition norms are not external to actors but are 
constitutive of actors’ identity, which determines their dispositions.204  
 
It should be noted that, for Park and Vetterlein, contestation implies contending 
understandings of what norms mean, with clashes from several actors that results in one 
emerging victorious. However, in the context of the IDP Regime, what happens is slightly 
different in that there was no battleground per se of competing norms, but instead a direct 
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attack on refugee norms by several actors. This is significant for comprehending the present 
study as already observed in chapter one. The dependence of the founders and proponents of 
the IDP Regime on powerful states for funds and influence meant many had to dance to the 
piper’s tune, thus the evolution of norms had to be envisaged as an organic process deriving 
from the unfailing conscience of a dedicated international community, rather than as a 
manufactured strategy of paranoid and xenophobic states, seeking to counter the threat posed 
by asylum seekers to their supposedly homogenous national identities and depleting treasures. 
To achieve such a feat the existing norms of the 1951 Convention had to be subtly and 
smoothly contested by NGOs, IOs, academic institutions, and legal scholars in a ‘legitimate’ 
and transitory manner through the fair use of numbers, labels, and the redefining of 
sovereignty. These were all necessary in creating a normative lacuna that could motivate 
actors to seek ‘new’ alternatives,  that created the perception of an adaptive transformation of 
the 1951 Convention and not of its complete extinction. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
refugee norms were being contested by UNHCR itself through Preventative Protection, which 
while on the surface appeared unusual coming from the very institution that protected 
refugees, was absolutely necessary to guaranteeing its survival. Indeed, High Commissioner 
Ogata summed up the true nature of this norm contestation when she endorsed the right to 
remain employing rights language, but which ultimately neutralised the 1951 Convention:  
 
Today displacement is as much a problem within borders as across them…the political 
and strategic value of granting asylum diminishes….The cost of processing asylum 
applications has skyrocketed, while public acceptance of refugees has plummeted….At 
the heart of….a preventative and solution-oriented strategy must be the clear 
recognition of the right to remain…the basic right of the individual not to be forced 
into exile….I am convinced that preventative activities can help to contain the 
dimensions of human catastrophe by creating time and space for the political 
process.205  
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While we saw the overarching politics behind the contestation of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention in the late 1980s, there existed other more overt and seemingly ‘normal’ 
mechanisms set in place to gradually bring IDPs to the centre stage in order to overshadow 
and render irrelevant the 1951 Convention. Best makes us aware that, 
 
…some of the most useful statistics track changes over time….When people use this 
sort of data to depict a trend, they must choose a time frame: which years’ data will 
they report? When advocates are trying to make a particular point, the time frame can 
be part of the packaging. It may be possible, by judiciously choosing their time frame, 
to make the data seem to support their claims more strongly [emphasis added].206  
 
As already noted, the ‘discovery’ of the IDP ‘problem’ coincided with the large scale flow of 
refugees to the global north and the creation of multiple barrier restrictions to asylum from the 
late 1980s onwards, which becomes the key time frame for all advocates in devising new 
norms. This led the General Assembly in 1989 to request ‘the Secretary-General to initiate a 
United Nations system-wide review to assess the experience and capacity of various 
organisations in the co-ordination of assistance to all refugees, displaced persons and 
returnees, and the full spectrum of their needs, in supporting the efforts of the affected 
countries’.207 This reticence of Western states towards refugees and the huge clamp downs on 
asylum flows was further evident in this period, as in May 1987 when the British government 
chartered the MV Earl William from the Sealink Company to moor at Harwich and become a 
makeshift detention centre for 100 asylum seekers. The government had been criticised for 
tasking private security company Securicor to handle all on-board operations, which was 
further troubling when the ship in the aftermath of a storm broke from its mooring and ran 
aground.208Similarly, across the Atlantic in 1988, the US government, in an attempt to 
comprehensively avert refugees from Central America, unveiled the ‘Enhancement Plan for 
the Southern Border’ which included increased border controls, rapid processing of claims, 
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detention, and deportation. The Southern Border Plan was justified by the INS on the basis 
that: 
 
We intend to send a strong signal to those people who have the mistaken idea that by 
merely filing a frivolous asylum claim, they may stay in the United States. This wilful 
manipulation of America’s generosity must stop.209    
 
In Canada following the incident in July 1987 when 174 Sikhs arrived in Nova Scotia by boat 
after having been refused asylum in Europe, the government enacted Bill C-84, The Refugee 
Deterrents & Detention Act which awarded greater powers to detain and turn back 
undocumented refugees and clamp down on anybody within Canada attempting to assist the 
entrance of refugees.210 It was from this point onwards that like in most European nations  
xenophobic sentiments determine containment policies within Canadian asylum discourse. To 
understand the norm contestation further we have to observe what Finnemore and Sikkink 
recognise in that ‘networks of norm entrepreneurs and international organisations also act as 
agents of socialisation by pressing targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify 
treaties and by monitoring compliance with international standards’.211 Francis Deng and 
Roberta Cohen became the intellectual flag bearers of the Internal Displacement Regime, who 
pulled the legitimacy of international law pertaining to refugees to make the international 
community feel guilty for its inaction which catapulted IDPs into the spot light with claims 
such as,  
 
…identifying these needs are not intended to confer on IDPs a privileged status but to 
ensure that in a given situation their unique concerns are addressed along with those of 
others. Moreover, identifying the internally displaced as a specific group is a good 
advocacy tool and one that can motivate the donor community and international 
organisations to integrate the issue into their programs.212  
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211 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p. 902. 
212 Cohen (1992),p. 89. 
100 
 
Indeed what Cohen and Deng had done was reminiscent of Barbara Harrell-Bond who in the 
1980s challenged the relief policies and operations of the Refugee Convention by exposing 
the manner in which funds were eaten up at bureaucratic level, how refugees in camp based 
settings were subject to horrific conditions and treatment, and more importantly how crucial 
intellectual contribution could rupture the moral complacency of the international 
community.213  
 
Weiss and Korn’s claim that ‘the momentum began in the early 1990s with Francis Deng’s 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’, formulated to help internally displaced persons by finessing 
sovereignty and then expanded to reflect the clear need for international protection’214, which 
was in no way a nuanced approach. Indeed, Deng had simply seized upon the changing times 
and jumped on the popular bandwagon of the New World Order, neo-liberalism, 
humanitarianism and human security approach discussed in chapter 1. The moral authority 
Deng and Cohen brought eased tensions and created a conducive environment for UNHCR to 
assume responsibility for IDPs by revealing all their inherent similarities with refugees which 
was akin to killing two birds with one stone, or, as they argued, that to ‘resolve the problems 
of inequity that often arise between the level of attention given to refugees and to internally 
displaced persons in the same country. It would further encourage service providers to treat 
refugees and internally displaced persons ‘as two sides of one problem in regional 
situations’.215 
 
1.1 The Politics of Numbers 
 
Understanding the politics of numbers provides a significant backdrop for this first section as 
‘measures imply a need for action, because we do not measure things except when we want to 
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change them’.216 The starting point for the evolution of the IDP Regime was the apparent 
existence of large numbers of displaced men, women and children, which was attributed to 
civil conflicts, with many actors claiming that statistics about civilians in war had rapidly 
increased. The June 1991 Cuenod Report on Refugees, Displaced Persons & Returnees was a 
product of the UN General Assembly Economic & Social Council Resolution 1990/78 which 
claimed that ‘the time where the potential and actual number of persons leaving their habitual 
place of residence with the hope to settle somewhere else, whether temporary or for good, has 
reached unprecedented proportions’.217 Refugee containment loomed large over the analysis 
with the claim that ‘internal disturbances and gross violations of human rights can as well be 
the cause of forced and often large displacement of persons who may be classified either as 
refugees when they cross a national border or internally displaced persons when they remain 
within the boundaries of their country’.218 First was by the shock of numbers, with the claim 
that there were now 24 million IDPs to 17 million refugees. Secondly there was a dilution of 
the refugee definition. Thirdly there was the continual reference to UNHCR which hinted at 
the proposed role it could play in protecting IDPs who were claimed to be ‘identical’ to 
refugees.  
 
Within the United Nations system there is no entity entrusted with the responsibility of 
ensuring that aid is provided to needy internally displaced persons. Material assistance 
to this group has been provided on an ad hoc basis. Various arrangements have been 
taken by the General Assembly or the Secretary General. For instance, UNHCR is 
responsible for assisting internally displaced persons within Cyprus. In several 
situations, the High Commissioner’s Office assists former refugees returning to their 
village of origin and UNHCR includes in its programmes internally displaced persons 
going back to the same places.219 [emphasis added]  
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This report was swiftly followed by the February 1992 Analytical Report of the Secretary-
General on Internally Displaced Persons which set the tone for the creation of IDP norms and 
institutional structures on the basis that: 
 
…the situation in which they [IDPs] themselves differs significantly from that of the 
general population. Internally displaced persons typically have suffered from a series of 
human rights violation which add up to a characteristic and distinctive syndrome. The 
cumulative effect of these violations, together with the fact of having been forced to 
flee their home and the difficulties, risks and deprivations invariably associated with 
their new situation, make their needs qualitatively different from those of other 
persons.220  
 
According to UNHCR, ‘The high ratio of civilian to military casualties [is] more than 9:1 in 
some cases…In the Post-Cold War period, civil wars and communal conflicts have involved 
wide-scale, deliberate targeting of civilian populations. The violence of these wars is often 
viciously gender-specific. Women are systematically raped and young men are the targets of 
mass murder or forcible conscription’.221 These reports created interesting ambiguities and 
tensions because the central theme in all deliberations surrounding IDPs were always 
attributed to the changing pattern of warfare in the Post-Cold War era. While this claim will 
be investigated at great length in the next chapter, it is worth just outlining its structure 
because it became instrumental in the claims that there existed large numbers of desperate 
IDPs who outnumbered refugees. This then solidified the arguments that refugee numbers 
were on the decline, therefore making the 1951 Convention obsolete and in need of a new 
more congruent and robust legal mechanism. The base of their inquiry relied simply on the 
discovery of existence of high figures, as the guiding argument for the creation of a new IDP 
Regime. However, such an act of ‘discovery’ remained suspect, because the same arguments 
could be derived from any social context, for example by counting the total number of all 
people affected by diabetes in any given country (which would certainly produce staggering 
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figures) the results could very easily become the justifications for the creation of an 
international legal and humanitarian regime to intervene and alleviate the pain and suffering 
of diabetes.222  
 
There was further ambiguity in the rhetoric of the rise of IDPs now outnumbering that of 
refugees as 223 according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) there are 
over 26 million IDPs displaced by war in some fifty countries (13 million in Africa, 3 million 
in Asia, 2.5 million in Europe, 3.5 million in the Middle East, and 4 million in the Americas). 
Similarly a greater number have been displaced by natural disasters and development 
projects.224 Weiss maintained that when IDP data was first gathered in 1982, there was one 
IDP for every 10 refugees; at present the ratio is approximately 2.5:1.225 However, such 
claims demanded a closer investigation because it was essentially discussing the same people 
but under two different bureaucratic labels. Let me qualify. If citizens of a state failed to cross 
an internationally recognised border they would not qualify for the status of refugees, and so 
would remain within their borders and therefore be counted under the new label of IDP. 
Therefore, the rejection of admittance into states of refuge, and the physical and economic 
inability of many to depart from a warring state, was the reality behind this so called ‘rise’ of 
internal displacement and the decline of refugee numbers, which became the backbone of all 
justifications for the creation of an IDP Regime. In reality the IDP was always present, 
However, the creation of a bureaucratic category applied to citizens suddenly made them a 
visible international ‘concern’. Following on from this was the obvious intention of refugee 
containment inherent in claims of the rise of IDP numbers. For the claim that refugee 
numbers had declined and IDP numbers had suddenly risen, could not be sustained by the 
glaring fact that many Western states from the 1990s onwards were intensely constructing 
barrier restrictions to asylum on the proclaimed basis that large numbers of refugees were 
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now breaching their borders, as we witnessed in the previous chapter and which UNHCR 
confirmed (see Table 4 below).226 
 
 
Table 4. Number of Asylum Applicants in Developed Countries (in 1000s) 
 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 1980-1999 
Total 
Western 
Europe                      
France 
Germany          
UK 
N. America 
233.6 
 
215.2 
40.4 
121.7 
3.3 
18.1 
793.8 
 
570.6 
106.3 
249.6 
17.4 
201.1 
1,495.6 
 
1,105.7 
178.6 
455.2 
28.5 
368.9 
3,373.3 
 
2,586.0 
184.5 
1,337.1 
150.8 
637.6 
2,751.7 
 
1,783.9 
112.2 
542.4 
223.2 
773.2 
8,414.55 
 
6,301.59 
581.86 
2,584.51 
420.13 
2,017.08 
 
Finally, the overall claim that IDPs were a new phenomenon was based on widely 
disseminated statistics that they were a direct product of the rise of civilian casualties in civil 
wars. However, as Andreas and Greenhill uncovered in their investigation of the origins of 
these momentous numbers that as a direct result of armed conflict in the last decade 2 million 
children have been killed, 4-5 million disabled, 12 million left homeless, and over 1 million 
orphaned victims featured in a myriad of NGO, IO, and IGO reports, speeches, and press 
releases as well as a multitude of books and journals227, were indeed fabricated. While Graca 
Machel in her work The Machel Review 1996-2000: A Critical Analysis of Progress Made 
and Obstacles Encountered in Increasing Protection for War-Affected Children, and Olara 
Otunnu the former UN Under-Secretary General and Special Representative for War-Affected 
Children & Armed Conflict, have been widely credited as the original sources of such 
statistics, both had referred to the UNICEF report titled the State of the World’s Children 
1996: Children in War as the true origin. However, UNICEF itself rested this claim on the 
declaration that it had compiled those statistics from a variety of sources, with no mention of 
who they were or the method it had used to identify and obtain such information. In addition 
to this, the report dated from 1996 and so the statistics it mentioned were from 1986-1996 and 
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not 1990 to 2000 which was the period cited by many as the ‘last decade’. Even more 
startling was that UNICEF finally declared that: 
 
…the increasing number of child victims is primarily explained by the higher 
proportion of civilian deaths in recent conflicts…In the later decades of this century the 
proportion of civilian victims has been rising steadily: in World War II it was two 
thirds, and by the end of the 1980s it was almost 90%.228   
 
However, this unfounded but seemingly gospel claim originated first from a 1991 report by 
Christa Ahlstrom & Kjell-Ake Nordquist, titled Casualties of Conflict, which claimed that 9 
out of 10 victims (dead and uprooted) were civilians. However, the ‘uprooted’ included 
displaced and refugees who were living. This was in addition to the fact that the words “dead 
and uprooted” were not included in the cover title, which just left the statement “nine out of 
ten victims of war and armed conflict today are civilians” which ultimately gave birth to the 
new social truth, with victim automatically equaties fatality.229 Similarly, Ruth Sivard’s 
World Military & Social Expenditures was the other UNICEF source which maintained that 
‘in 1990 [the proportion of civilian to combat deaths] appears to have been close to 90%’.230 
However, Sivard had included war related famine deaths which had been dismissed as a myth 
in the 2005 Human Security Report, which argued that no global data existed to ascertain 
such a gigantic figure.231 This whole statistical circus was even more worrying as a number of 
actors embroidered or added greater specificity to these already shocking figures. In some 
cases,  the “estimate” became the low-end assessment with claims that “in the last decade”, 
“at least” or “more than” two million were killed, five million disabled, and so on.232 
 
1.2 The Politics of Labels.  
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With numbers came the imposition of labels, as the Guiding Principles defined the internally 
displaced as:  
 
…persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalised violence, violation of human rights, or natural or 
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state 
border.233  
 
According to Wood, ‘labelling is a way of referring to the process by which policy agendas 
are established and more particularly the way in which people, conceived as objects of policy 
are defined in convenient images’.234 This was critical because carefully chosen labels can 
have strong emotional reactions that make statistics seem particularly worrying.235 Thus the 
normative lacuna was carefully founded on the strength of a bureaucratic label which had the 
power to demand the creation of new protection structures by utilising norms involving bodily 
integration. Indeed the inviolability of the body for vulnerable groups such as women and 
children which carried a transnational and cross-cultural potency because they adhered to 
basic ideas of human dignity.236 This was fully evident in the Compilation and Analysis of 
Legal Norms submitted by the Special Representative in 1995. The report examined the 
existing international legal standards of the UN which were applicable to the needs of IDPs 
and whether or not they afforded protection. Human Rights, Humanitarian, and Refugee Laws 
were all examined to this end. The Representative concluded that in all three cases 
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international legal standards did exist for the protection of IDPs, however they did not 
specifically mention internally displaced persons: 
 
It can be concluded that, in situations of tensions and disturbances, or disasters, 
internally displaced persons are fully protected by prohibitions of discrimination and 
guarantees of equal protection. However, an international instrument should explicitly 
state that the term ‘other status’ in non-discrimination clauses includes the status of 
internally displaced persons. In addition, fundamental provisions of humanitarian law 
apply to all civilians and, therefore, afford full protection for internally displaced 
persons against discrimination. However, it could be useful to state this principle 
explicitly in a future international instrument relating to the legal status of internally 
displaced persons.237 [emphasis added] 
 
Although it can be concluded that present international law, in principle, affords 
adequate protection from gender-specific violence against internally displaced persons, 
many of these guarantees, especially their bearing on internally displaced person, need 
to be highlighted and further detailed in a future international instrument.238[emphasis 
added] 
 
What was even more interesting was that the analysis of legal norms in 1995 was a carbon 
copy of a previous attempt in 1949 by the Economic & Social Council to the Secretary-
General for a Study on Statelessness, through UN Resolution 116 D (VI) on 2nd March 1948. 
For the UN, stateless persons fell under two categories, as ‘persons who are not nationals of 
any State, either because of birth or subsequently they were not given any nationality, or 
because during their lifetime they lost their own nationality and did not acquire a new one’.239  
The Secretary General at the time employed the same approach of reviewing policy and 
existing legal frameworks which drew the same conclusions that revolved around the 
existence of high numbers and a UN system, which only ‘partially’ recognised stateless 
people, with many falling through the cracks of existing legal mechanisms: 
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The number of stateless persons is at present very large, and to improve their status is 
an urgent necessity. It is true that the international conventions exist which have 
determined the states of certain categories of stateless persons in a fairly satisfactory 
manner. But there are many stateless persons who do not benefit from these 
conventions which apply only to certain categories and to which only a small number 
of States are parties.240 [emphasis added] 
 
This was paradoxical because of the contemporary manner in which refugees had been 
employed to understand IDPs, was reminiscent of the analogous use of refugees forty years 
earlier to understand and cement the study of statelessness as: 
 
In fact, a considerable majority of stateless persons are at present refugees. These 
refugees are de jure stateless persons if they have been deprived of their nationality by 
their country of origin. They are de facto stateless persons if without having been 
deprived of their nationality they no longer enjoy the protection and assistance of their 
national authorities. The measures taken since the end of the first and world war in 
order to improve the legal status of refugees and to ensure them international legal 
protection will therefore have an important place in the present study.241  
  
Deng’s overall findings while greeted with jubilation however begged the question as to why 
IDPs were to be considered as a specific legal category in need of new international 
protection instruments? Indeed, how were the experiences of displacement unique to other 
forms of suffering during civil war and conditions of social breakdown? For as Best warns:  
 
…advocates prefer to define social problems as broadly as possible. There are at least 
two reasons for this. First advocates often claim that they are drawing attention to 
neglected problems, to subjects that have been ignored instead of being given the close 
attention they deserve…a second advantage of broad definitions is that they allow 
advocates to count more cases. That is, broad definitions justify larger statistical 
estimates. Bigger numbers make it clear that these are big problems.242  
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The IDP definition was descriptive and not legal, further adding to the magnitude of the crisis 
by now encompassing everyone and anyone displaced by conflict, natural disaster and 
development projects. Cohen attempted to allay these concerns when she oddly claimed that 
‘identifying these needs is not intended to confer on IDPs a privileged status but to ensure that 
in a given situation their unique concerns are addressed along with those of others’.243 This 
was contradictory because if IDPs did not require a ‘privileged’ status,  why were their 
circumstances deemed by so many to be ‘unique’. Similarly, Mooney in reaction to these 
objections for the need for a separate categorisation, simply relayed the statement of the 
Secretary General that  
 
What distinguishes the internally displaced are the unique needs and heightened 
vulnerabilities that arise as a result of forced displacement, including their need for a 
durable solution. To be sure, IDPs often are a part of a much larger group of persons in 
need, whether it be civilians caught up in armed conflict or populations affected by a 
natural disaster. Nevertheless, the objective fact or being displaced implies particular 
needs and exposes those affected to additional risks.244  
 
Thus for all the proponents ‘movement’ became the quintessential feature of internal 
displacement, which further complicated matters. Firstly, because movement was not unique 
or unprecedented but a natural consequence of panicked communities in all situations of 
instability. Secondly, what would then be the metric for displacement? How far and for how 
long would a person(s) have to move from their home to be considered displaced? Thirdly, 
there existed extra-territorial forms of displacement, as in the case of Mayan Indians on 
Guatemala whose culture and community structures were deliberately targeted in the low 
intensity war. For many, the real displacement was not physical but spiritual due to the 
inability to worship deities associated with a specific geographical feature (lakes, streams, 
hills), or from the arson of maize and food stuffs deemed sacred245. These criticisms, while 
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important in exposing the overall inconsistencies and consequences such categorisations 
created, however failed to recognise the real strategy at play, for as Zetter explained:  
 
 
The discourse on the refugee label transcends the world of institutional practices and 
statutory processes. It relays anxieties about the fear of the ‘other’ and social relations 
between newcomers and settled communities. It reflects a growing preoccupation with 
culturalism, as apparently secure national ‘identities’ of the past are perceived to 
diminish in a global era. Migrants are a potent representation of these concerns, whilst 
the specific label ‘refugee’, conveying undesirable images of destitution and an 
unwelcome burden, is a powerful synonym for these apprehensions. The concept of 
labelling shows how political agendas about identity become incorporated in ostensibly 
neutral bureaucratic categories, such as ‘refugee’.246  
 
The refugee label had simply become too sensitive and thus required a replacement that could 
instantly calm and assuage the fears and anxieties it projected. Indeed, social problems cannot 
be properly articulated unless they are given a name that can convey a particular impression 
of the problem.247 For to re-label internally displaced persons as ‘citizens residing within their 
borders’ or as ‘non-combatant persons’ (which is what they essentially are) requiring the 
creation of new UN protection mechanism, would automatically raise questions and protests 
due to the existence of long established UN human rights treaties and humanitarian 
organisations to that end. More fundamentally, the defining feature of ‘movement’ to form an 
analogous connection to refugees would instantly vanish with a clear distinction remaining 
between people living in a foreign land and citizens residing within their states. This would 
have allowed the 1951 Convention to remain intact and binding to the bane of powerful and 
xenophobic states seeking its demise. The IDP label was thus welcomed and successful 
because it extinguished the subliminal fears of the ‘other’ and the imminent threat of 
multitudes arriving at Western borders. The label itself aptly ‘contained’ the problem by 
evoking the picture of people trapped in far distant lands who had no recourse to escape or 
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travel overseas, and therefore posed no danger to the perceived cultural homogeneity of the 
West or as a burden to already overstretched treasuries.  In sum, the real irony of this exercise 
was that before a myth of difference was created to serve barrier restrictions and contain 
refugees from the Global South journeying to the Global North, a new myth of similarity was 
now constructed between IDPs and refugees to create a normative framework for protecting 
people within their borders that could finally nullify the Refugee Regime: 
 
Despite the fact that internally displaced persons remain in their own countries, they 
like refugees, have been forced to leave their homes and find themselves in refugee-like 
situations. Consequently, refugee law, by analogy, can be useful in proposing rules and 
establishing guidelines to protect the needs of the internally displaced.248 
 
1.3 The Politics of Sovereignty 
 
Numbers and labels were alone insufficient to herald systemic change as the evolution of the 
IDP Regime faced the formidable barrier of sovereignty for which the proponents carefully 
re-conceptualised and mobilised to fill the normative lacuna and therefore gain access to 
citizens ‘trapped’ within their borders. This was critical to neutralising the 1951 Convention 
by removing its essence, which was the crossing of an international border and the protection 
subsequently required to overcome the legal limbo of people living in a foreign land. This 
was the only way to silence the critics of the IDP Regime, most notably Barutciski who hit 
hard at the logic of suddenly giving citizens within their own borders the rights of refugees: 
 
Thus, the idea of expanding the refugee definition to include IDPs simply does not 
make sense because the term ‘refugee’ addresses a particular situation that is 
characterised by being a foreigner in a host country. There is not one specific right 
found in the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees that could 
logically be applied to displaced persons who have escaped their own country. The 
whole Convention is based on the notion of having fled one’s country. That is the 
condition or situation that is being addressed: not displacement or human rights 
                                                          
248 United Nations, E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2, 5th December (1995),  p. 11. 
112 
 
violations per se, but rather the fact of being stranded outside one’s country without the 
formal protection that comes from being the national of a particular state.249 
 
For as High Commissioner Ogata declared in 1997 as to why the UN had not been able to 
assist IDPs,: ‘the problem is sovereignty’, of which the legal basis stems from the Westphalia 
understanding where states are equal, independent and sovereign, as enshrined in Article 2 (1) 
of the UN Charter. This was further safeguarded by the principle of non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of states. Therefore, to establish an international treaty codifying the rights of 
citizens displaced within their own territories would be a direct violation of its sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence. Such a herculean task required the assistance 
and power of human rights norms to deflect criticism with the famous mantra ‘rights have no 
borders’. Such a grand strategy was embedded in benevolent propositions such as that of 
Hathaway, who, commenting on the Draft Declaration of Principles of International Law on 
Internally Displaced Persons in 1996, argued that: 
 
If we are serious that we are now in a position to enter behind the wall of sovereignty, 
we ought not privilege those who are displaced, effectively doing a disservice to those 
who are trapped in their own homes, and we ought simply to get about the business of 
enforcing international human rights law internally if we honestly believe that is a 
possibility.250 
 
To understand how this barrier was finally overcome, it is important to historicise the concept 
of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in order to understand how its content and scope was 
not new or revolutionary but instead an old concept plucked from UN archives and 
extrapolated for addressing new interests and concerns. R2P can be traced back to the 
emergence of the Refugee Regime which flowed from UN Resolution 319/A (IV) of 1949, 
with the General Assembly mentioning two fundamental principles: 
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Considering that the problem of refugees is international in scope and nature and that 
its final solution can only be provided by the voluntary repatriation of the refugees or 
their assimilation within new national communities. 
 
Recognising the responsibility of the United Nations for the international protection of 
refugees.251 
 
Thus R2P was already promulgated as the basis for all UN action at the end of the Second 
World War for the protection of refugees. It was necessarily upheld in an ‘external’ 
dimension to protect citizens of states that had fled because of ideological differences. People 
who fled from Communist systems were regarded as allies because they did not enjoy the 
rights of ‘free’ citizens within the Soviet Union, and therefore became an effective way to 
embarrass and discredit adversary nations while simultaneously portraying the superiority of 
Western liberal ideals.252 R2P lacked an internalist orientation for the protection of millions of 
displaced persons within their territories, as the strategic calculations of the nuclear stand-off 
dwarfed any benefits or attempts at humanitarian intervention by the UN into the USSR. 
Indeed, the only possible internalist attempts of R2P were the unilateral measures by states at 
regime change to install governments that shared their ideological cleavages through proxy 
engagements in Central & South America, Africa, and South East Asia, which all utilised the 
language and rhetoric of R2P. However, once the global threat of Communism evaporated in 
1990, and there witnessed a resurgence of the threat of people fleeing civil war, genocide and 
state collapse from the developing world, a new grammar of R2P emerged which engendered 
an internalist orientation that gave license for powerful actors threatened by the alleged waves 
of people fleeing to halt them within their borders. Indeed, as the Executive Director of 
UNICEF commented in 1993, ‘the world has established a minimum safety net for refugees, 
but this is not yet the case with respect to internally displaced populations’.253 The 1990s 
witnessed a number of high profile debates and ‘re-formulations’ of sovereignty to fit the 
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‘changing’ and ‘unprecedented’ circumstances, many of which utilised the guilt of the 
international community for ignoring and failing to repel the gross human rights violations 
witnessed in places like Cambodia, Rwanda and Srebrenica. Beginning in 1992 was Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali’s report Agenda for Peace, already mentioned in the previous chapter, where 
he affirmed that: 
 
We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. 
Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen 
cooperation and ease some of the contentions characteristics of sovereign and 
nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced communication and 
global commerce, and by the decision of States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to 
larger, common political associations.254  
 
Next came Francis Deng’s formulation of Sovereignty as Responsibility which according to 
him stemmed from the fact that IDPs fell ‘into a vacuum of the responsibility normally 
associated with sovereignty. Given the extent of the human suffering involved, the 
international community is often called upon to step in an meet the humanitarian challenges 
posed by the absence of national responsibility’.255 For Deng, accountability, protection, and 
the provision of basic needs to domestic constituencies ensured state legitimacy, which if 
broken or were incapacitated to discharge would ‘force’ the international community to act.256 
Building on this was Kofi Annan’s Two Concepts of Sovereignty which in 1999 illuminated 
that:  
 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined-not least by the forces of 
globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be 
instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time 
individual sovereignty –by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, 
enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequently international treaties-has been 
enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we 
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read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect 
individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.257 
 
Following on from this, Annan, again in 2003 in an address to the General Assembly, stated 
that the international community had reached a ‘fork in the road’ necessitating difficult 
questions ‘about the adequacy, and effectiveness, of the rules and instruments at our 
disposal’.258 He then established The High Level Panel in September 2003 to examine the 
challenges to peace and security, which then produced a report in December 2004 entitled A 
More Secure World that identified six clusters of threats, among them ‘internal conflict, 
including civil war, genocide and other large scale atrocities’.259 Finally, there was the 
International Commission on Intervention & State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001 led 
by former Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans who shifted the terms of the 
debate first by arguing that sovereignty did still matter as an effective tool in 
internationalising trade, investment, technology and communication. However, when it came 
to the debates concerning the right to intervene it was unhelpful in three ways because  
 
…it focuses attention on the claims, rights and prerogatives of the potential intervening 
states much more so than on the urgent needs of the potential beneficiaries of the 
action…does not adequately take into account the need for either prior preventative 
effort or subsequent follow-up assistance…the familiar language does effectively 
operate to trump sovereignty with intervention at the outset of the debate: it loads the 
dice in favour of intervention before the argument has even begun.260  
 
The change in terminology to the Responsibility to Protect would first encompass a bottom-
up approach that evaluated the issues ‘from the point of view of those seeking or needing 
support, rather than those who may be considering intervention’261 which protect 
communities from systematic violations of human rights. Secondly, it would be a ‘linking 
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concept that bridges the divide between intervention and sovereignty’262 with the international 
community stepping in to fulfil the responsibilities of unable and unwilling states. Finally, 
there is the responsibility to rebuild with ‘conceptual, normative and operational linkages 
between assistance, intervention and reconstruction’.263 
 
While R2P propagated positive and seemingly revolutionary ideas for achieving global order, 
it nevertheless came under increasing attack with accusations that it merely amounted to the 
responsibility of rich Western powers to interfere in the affairs of poor countries264, and was 
nothing more than an exercise of ‘disciplining mice while freeing lions’ by its double 
standards which authorised aggression, witnessed with Israel’s heavy handed assaults on 
Gaza 2006, US invasion of Iraq 2003, and the US & Canadian deposition of Haitian President 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2006.265 Nevertheless, R2P had a far greater purpose which 
involved redesigning the global arena by transforming sovereignty from a hard legal concept 
into a soft political one, which could fulfil whatever fluid interpretation, criteria or agenda 
one suited. This made it feasible for actors to now engage IDPs on the international stage 
through a ‘new’ normative framework which allowed the integration of all the disparate 
previous attempts at IDP protection (Preventative Protection, Cross Border Operations, Quick 
Impact Projects, Internal Flight Alternatives) into one umbrella concept that boasted a 
seemingly legitimate and dedicated response to the needs of vulnerable citizens. 
 
2. Norm Emergence: The Strategic Roots of IDP Norms 
 
After a period of norm contestation comes norm emergence, which, according to Park and 
Vetterlein, occurs when ‘actors (re) construct the world by projecting their understanding of 
reality through their actions, or in other words by externalising their interests through 
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action’.266 This was achieved by emulating the key steps in the evolution of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, so as to capture the legitimacy and sympathetic grip it once held, by making 
internally displaced persons analogous to refugees in order to gradually eclipse them, but now 
in a ‘new’ and changing global environment, precisely because ‘legitimation produces new 
meaning that serve to integrate already existing meanings and practices and justifies them 
through cognitive and normative elements’.267 
 
2.1 The Evolution of the Legal Mechanisms  
 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (see Table 5 below) were created in 1998 as 
an outgrowth of the Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms through a need to codify 
international rules as a set of soft law arrangements based on the concept of ‘Sovereignty as 
Responsibility’ to guide states in bringing ‘their policies and legislation into line with 
them’.268 They were not designed as a draft declaration or as a binding instrument but were 
simply consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law.269 Principle 3:25 
affirmed that primary responsibility for IDPs rested with their governments. However, if 
governments were unable to protect their populace they would be expected to request 
assistance from the international community. The Principles further emphasised that in 
providing assistance, international humanitarian organisations should pay attention to the 
‘protection needs and human rights’ of IDPs and take ‘measures’ in this regard (Principle 27).  
 
The legal protection discourse from the outset was premised on the argument that the 
distinction between refugees and IDPs based on sovereignty through the crossing of an 
international border was both arbitrary and unjustifiable because the realities and conditions 
of forced migration were the same for both groups.270 The legal dimension thus attempted to 
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sensitise and reconcile both international law and domestic law to the plight of the IDP by 
overcoming the limitations of protection which could arise from governments limiting 
protection to only the victims of insurgents or aid agencies only working to save lives in 
emergency situations. Roberta Cohen thus extolled the Guiding Principles on the basis that 
they: 
…consolidate into one document all the international norms relevant to IDPs, otherwise 
dispersed in many different instruments. Although not a legally binding document, the 
principles reflect and are consistent with existing international human rights and 
humanitarian law. In re-stating existing norms, they also seek to address grey areas and 
gaps.271 
 
Table 5. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
 
The Guiding Principles are not binding but are based on, and consistent with, existing 
international legal instruments. The 30 principles are divided into 5 sections: 
 
Section I          General Principles: Assert that national governments and other authorities  
                         must ensure that displaced persons enjoy the same rights as other citizens of  
                         the same country. 
 
Section II         Principles Relating to Protection from Displacement: Particularly urge  
                          protection from arbitrary displacement and from violent treatment. 
 
Section III       Principles Relating to Protection During Displacement: Emphasise that  
                          universal  rights (e.g., to family life, livelihood and free association) apply 
                          equally to the displaced. 
 
Section IV       Principles Relating to Humanitarian Assistance: Provides an overview of the  
                         responsibilities of national governments working in collaboration with 
                         humanitarian agencies and statutory protection bodies. 
 
Section V        Principles Relating to Return, Resettlement and Reintegration: Provides an  
                        overview of  the rights of IDPs to return voluntarily and in safety, not be  
                        discriminated against and be helped to recover or be compensated for property 
                         left behind. 
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For IDP proponents they were the magnum opus of IDP protection which was further 
endorsed at the UN General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document as an 
‘important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons’.272  
However, on closer inspection their evolution and structure raised questions and doubts 
because the creation of the Guiding Principles directly mimicked the strategy taken by 
Nansen & the League of Nations to address the problem of the anomalous status of refugees 
arising from both the 1917 Russian Revolution and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 
through the exact measure of designing ‘soft law’ Arrangements which were simply 
recommendations with no binding force of law. Five Arrangements were framed between 
1922 and 1936, which laid down the initial groundwork for the creation of a legally binding 
Convention, by establishing definitions, circumstances, statuses, and rights of refugees. I will 
briefly outline them.   
 
The 1922 Arrangement: Russian Refugees  
 
The lack of identity and travel documents for Russian refugees was a huge challenge which 
was presented by Nansen to the Council and the League of Nation members. At the 
intergovernmental conference, Geneva, July 1922, participants ‘unanimously agreed 
upon…certified of identity, and recommend its adoption and the adoption of the present 
arrangement of the States represented at the Conference, to the  Members of the League of 
Nations and to States which are not Members of the League’.273  
 
The 1924 Arrangement: Armenian Refugees 
 
Similarly to the previous 1922 Arrangement, Nansen invited Governments to consider the 
introduction of identity certificates for Armenian refugees with the right to return. Nansen 
justified introducing a right of return on the grounds that ‘experience gained in connection 
with the Russian refugee problem has convinced me of the great importance of facilitating as 
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far as possible, free movement by refugees’.274 It recommended that governments should 
‘grant such authorisation in all cases where there are no special reasons to the contrary, in 
order to facilitate  much as possible free movement on the part of the refugees and to enable 
them to improve their economic situation’.275 
 
The 1926 Arrangement: Russian & Armenian Refugees 
 
The lack of a formal definition in the previous two Arrangements of who was a refugee or the 
right of return and freedom of movement for refugees once they had travelled abroad was 
addressed. But on 12 May 1926, the ‘Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity 
Certificates to Russian & Armenian Refugees, Supplementing and Amending the Previous 
Arrangement dated July 5th, 1922 and May 31st, 1924 was adopted. For the first time, it 
defined persons eligible to the protection services of the League.276  
 
The 1928 Arrangement: Legal Status of Russian & Armenian Refugees 
 
While the Arrangements of 1922, 1924, and 1926 eased some of the legal challenges faced by 
refugees, they were far from fully stabilising their legal and personal status as regards 
employment and movement within host States or abroad. As a result, Nansen and the inter-
governmental Advisory Commission for Refugees (IACR) appealed to the Assembly for 
measures to be taken to ‘provide refugees with a clearly defined legal and personal status’. 
The 1928 ‘Arrangement Concerning the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees’ 
adopted on 30 June 1928 attempted to address these. The Arrangements also allowed these 
refugees to enjoy certain rights, benefits, and privileges previously reserved for foreigners on 
condition of reciprocity. The Arrangement further defined the competence of the HCR and 
authorised him to appoint representatives ‘in the greatest possible number of countries’, in 
order to provide refuges services entrusted to him by the League.277  
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The 1928 Arrangement: Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean & Assimilated Refugees 
 
The conference of 28th June 1928 in addition to adopting an Arrangement of the legal status 
of Russian and Armenian refugees, also framed an Arrangement that extended earlier 
measures taken on behalf of the Russian and Armenian refugees by the Arrangements of 5th 
July 1922, 31st May 1924, and 12 May 1926 to Turkish Assyrian Assyro-Chaldean and 
assimilated refugees.278 While Arrangements may be considered as ‘mere recommendations’ 
because they do not create binding obligations, the 1926 Arrangement was the first non-
binding agreement by States on refugees that defined who was entitled to international 
protection. It formulated eligibility criteria for international protection: first, loss of the 
protection of the government of one’s country and, second, not acquiring the nationality of 
another country- two elements that remain central to the conceptualisation of refugee status 
today. A third element, not explicitly articulated in the definition but significant, is that the 
person is outside his or her country of origin. Albeit not in absolute terms, the 1926 
Arrangement also provided for the rights of return.279  
 
These five soft law Arrangements were appropriate for the international environment of the 
1920s, because they were primarily designed to afford refugees protection in the legal lacuna 
that existed at the time due to the absence of any customary or treaty law, for the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights were not in existence until 1948; the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide came into force in 1948; the Four 
Geneva Conventions entered in 1949 and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
in 1977; the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was signed in 1951; and finally 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women was 
ratified in 1979. Therefore, the anomalous refugees from Russia, Armenia, and Assyria had 
no international protection and therefore truly existed in a state of legal limbo. This was 
alarming because the Guiding Principles were created as a soft law instrument in a global 
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environment where customary and treaty law were already long in existence and fully 
functioning. Furthermore, the Guiding Principles became in essence a cut and paste exercise 
of those existing treaties, as they ‘do not really fill any legal gap; they simply state and 
interpret existing norms’.280 This created a serious conundrum because many of the 
proponents had argued that the existing UN system was insufficient to afford IDPs protection. 
However, the proponents then took those very ‘insufficient’ structures of hard law and 
converted them into soft law for the protection of a specific category of people, who were 
already covered under that hard law in all but name. In sum, binding treaties were now co-
existing alongside non-binding versions of themselves in the form of the Guiding Principles.  
 
Furthermore, there was a critical design error in that it was advocating the notion that the key 
to protecting IDPs was not to have IDPs, as the application of all the 30 principles promoted 
protection through the virtual re-establishment of the social contract that would have 
transformed displaced masses into citizens once more. The Principles were mistakenly 
understood to be the pre-requisites to protection, when in actuality they were the outcomes of 
protection by a centralised authority. These inconsistencies highlighted a key tactic in the 
containment of refugees by first seeking to ground and legitimise IDPs through a similar path 
of applying soft law that slowly accustomed the international community to accepting the 
need to protect a ‘new’ category of people, who were completely identical to the anomalous 
status once held by refugees in the 1920s and 30s. As Barutciski foresaw in 1998: 
 
The implicit and dangerous logic is that if a new category called ‘IDPs’ is granted 
supposedly new protection under international law, then there is no reason to allow 
those displaced to become cross-border refugees. Even if the protection does not 
contain anything substantively new, its formal expression can reduce commitments 
regarding the availability of temporary refuge across borders. Put bluntly: if the 
development of IDP norms does not substantively advance the international 
community’s attempts to deal with humanitarian crises and intervene in troubled 
countries, then the current debate and re-focus on internal displacement would 
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represent little more than capitulation to non-entrée and containment strategies to the 
extent that it de-emphasises the external asylum option.281 
 
This was indeed fully evident as the introduction of the Guiding Principles in 1998 paralleled 
attempts by the EU to introduce new, sustained, and more coordinated policies of 
containment, which shifted away from the legal and normative notions to more politicised 
conceptions of asylum that awarded states greater autonomy. According to Zetter, this was a 
reflection of the invasion complex and subsequent discourse of Fortress Europe, in which the 
belief in an existential threat posed by both migration and asylum to the sovereignty and 
nation states was the reality behind the push for a ‘common’ immigration and asylum policy 
framework that could ‘harmonise’ and keep Europe ‘integral’.282 Thus the Treaties of 
Maastricht (1993) Amsterdam (1997) all shared this undercurrent. Similarly, in 1998, the 
strategy paper by the Austrian government which at the time held the EU presidency 
commented that migration pressures could be reduced by ‘coordinated policy which extends 
far beyond the narrow field of policy on aliens, asylum, immigration and border controls and 
also covers international relations and development aid’.283 It went on to state that the 
Refugee Convention had become ‘less applicable to the problem situations actually 
existing’284 and that the solutions required not only asylum law but cooperative transnational 
and cooperative approaches. The new protection for refugees involved ‘reform of the asylum 
application procedure and transition from protection concepts based only on the rule of law to 
include politically orientated concepts’.285 In 1999 EU member states began the drive for a 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) through an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) which was the ideation basis of European governance, for integrating ‘shared 
factual knowledge on the causes and consequences of the underlying social problems and 
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normative-orientations with which to evaluate the desirability of political action’.286  
However, while there was an underlying strategy of refugee containment it was quickly and 
carefully glossed over a year later in the 1999 Tampere Conclusions which re-established an 
atmosphere of solidarity and humanity by outlining the European Union’s full commitment to 
the obligations of the 1951 Convention and were able to respond to the needs of those 
suffering.287   
 
2.3 The Evolution of Protection Mechanisms  
 
The legal mechanisms were redundant without the creation of a physical in-country protection 
structure that could tangibly house and justify them, by warding off any criticism of being a 
purely symbolic gesture without any practical application to the daily lives of IDPs. The 
solution was a collaborative mechanism entitled the Cluster Approach (see Table 6 below) 
which originated from the UN reform programme proposed by the Secretary General in 1997; 
where greater collaboration was needed to overcome unsatisfactory institutional 
arrangements; with specific reference made to address the needs of internally displaced 
persons so that ‘all humanitarian issues, including those which fall in gaps of existing 
mandates of agencies such as protection and assistance for internally displaced persons, are 
addressed’.288 The endorsement by the General Assembly in the same year set the stage for 
the evolution of new bureaucracies and institutional structures, first in January 2000 with the 
establishment of the Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement designed to 
assess the operational responses of the UN in situations of displacement. Following this was 
the Internal Displacement Unit in January 2002 which was a small non-operational unit 
within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). After a further 
restructuring in July 2004 it was renamed the Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division 
                                                          
286 Lavenex (2001), p. 855. 
287 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 15th and 16th October (1999). 
288 Secretary General’s report to General Assembly: Renewing the United Nations: a Programme for 
Reform, A/51/950, July (1997). 
125 
 
after a 2003 review with a new focus on identifying and addressing gaps in eight specific 
countries.289     
 
This final phase came in December 2005 when the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
endorsed the creation of the IDP camp into a flagship humanitarian model for all UN relief 
agencies that came into force on 1stJanuary 2006 with pilot cases in Uganda, Liberia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). According to the Under Secretary, General John 
Holmes, it centred around ‘raising standards and ensuring greater predictability, 
accountability and partnership in all sectors…more structured approach should enable 
international actors to be a better partner for governments, who have primary responsibility 
for leading humanitarian responses in their countries’.290  
Table 6. Cluster Approach Framework 
CLUSTER CLUSTER LEAD 
Logistics 
Emergency Telecommunications 
Camp Coordination & Management 
 
Emergency Shelter 
Health 
Nutrition 
Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH) 
Early Recovery 
Protection 
World Food Program 
OCHA, UNICEF, WFP 
UNHCR for conflict induced IDPs 
IOM for natural disaster induced IDPs 
International Federation of Red Cross 
(IFRC) 
World Health Organisation 
UNICEF 
UNICEF 
UNDP 
UNHCR for conflict induced IDPs 
UNHCR, UNICEF & OHCHR for natural 
disaster induced IDPs 
 
 
1) Protection Cluster 
More should be done to assist Governments to strengthen their own protection and 
response capacities. Field partnerships must also be strengthened, and NGOs in 
particular need to be fully involved for the cluster’s response to be effective.291  
2) Camp Co-ordination and Camp Management Cluster (CCCM)   
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There was no existing network of experts. The overriding objective of the cluster, as 
agreed by its members, is to provide better protection and assistance to camp-based 
populations…The CCCM Cluster worked to ensure that IDP operations had adequate 
capacity and tools, standards and technical guidance through training, the deployment 
of experts to country teams and the provision of technical advice to field operations.292  
3) Emergency Shelter Cluster  
The agreed aim is to increase the effectiveness and predictability of service provision 
by (i) expanding the number of qualified professionals available for rapid deployment. 
(ii) Developing an emergency shelter strategy and guidelines and tools for assessments, 
intervention and monitoring alongside training; and (iii) strengthening stockpiles of 
shelter and related non-food items (NFIs).293 
To thus argue that the Cluster Approach was designed to enable refugee containment may 
have seemed completely unfounded on the surface, as actors constantly argued that the 
creation of new and effective co-ordination and accountability structures was paramount with 
the argument that ‘the humanitarian system must work to fill protection gaps…’294 Roberta 
Cohen praised the Cluster Approach stating that it ‘has the potential to bring predictability 
and clarity to an area regularly described as the biggest gap in the international response to 
IDPs’.295 This was also confirmed by Assistant High Commissioner Erika Feller who 
affirmed ‘a clear commitment to be a more predictable partner among humanitarian actors in 
its response to the protection, assistance and solutions needs of the IDPs’.296 However, for 
Goodwin-Gill, in a 2006 workshop on the theme Refugee Protection in International Law: 
Contemporary Challenges, alluded to this when he questioned the UN Reform and the Cluster 
Approach for being very selective in detecting and attempting to remedy gaps. The IASC 
decided it was not necessary to apply the cluster approach to the four sectors of food (WFP), 
education (UNICEF), agriculture (FAO) and more importantly refugees (UNHCR). Indeed  
…he primary intention was in fact to preserve established mandates and turf, 
irrespective of system efficiency. For it is not difficult to envisage a situation of, say 
external displacement, in which the essential needs of the refugees could be met most 
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effectively by agencies other than UNHCR. To what extent, then is an operational 
UNHCR required for the purposes of 1) ensuring protection and/or 2) ensuring efficient 
and effective assistance delivery, in the context of a system-wide coordinated 
response?297 [emphasis added] 
 
By not providing a rigorous attempt to better reform refugee protection and instead push for 
UN agencies who all at the time had no legal authority to ‘protect’ persons within their own 
country, raised alarm bells, as it first conformed to the internalist bias outlined in chapter one 
by a number of eminent legal scholars who proclaimed a new era of refugee protection. As 
Goodwin-Gill commented:  
 
Assuming that the protection of refugees will continue to be valued by the international 
community, and assuming further that the UN’s emergency response system will 
continue to improve (food, shelter and service delivery, communications, health care 
etc.), then it may be reasonable to ask whether and to what extent the provision of 
assistance to refugees should or needs to continue to be a particular operational 
responsibility for UNHCR.298 [emphasis added] 
 
Secondly, the Cluster Approach following pilot cases in Somalia, Chad, DRC, Uganda, and 
Liberia in 2006 was claimed to have ‘brought tangible dividends in forging a common vision 
amongst humanitarian actors and in targeting resources more effectively on the basis of 
jointly identified needs’.299 However, it was important to distinguish between appearance and 
essence because what was in principle happening was the reorganisation and repackaging of 
refugee protection mechanisms. Indeed, UNHCR’s refugee camp operations were always 
built upon allocated and shared responsibility among implementing partners.300 The Cluster 
Approach thus employed the same agencies, conducting the same tasks, in the same settings, 
with the same mandates under a seeming new framework but now within the borders of 
states. Indeed a cursory comparison shows how the refugee dynamic was employed to steer 
                                                          
297 Goodwin-Gill, ‘International Protection and Assistance for Refugees and the Displaced: Institutional 
Challenges and United Nations Reform’, Paper presented to the RSC Workshop: Refugee Protection in 
International Law: Contemporary Challenges, 24th April (2006), p. 15. 
298 Ibid, p. 16. 
299 Crisp, Kiragu, and Tennant (2007), p. 13. 
300 Harrell-Bond (1989). 
128 
 
the development of IDP protection with identical terminology (Durable Solutions, Return, 
Reintegration, Resettlement, Camp Management) and use of structures which became a 
simple reincarnation of the refugee camp mechanism which re-designed and re-applied the 
earlier UNHCR concepts of the Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and the Cross Border 
Operations (CBOs). An undiscussed danger of the Cluster Approach which will be unpacked 
at length in chapter 5, was that the inherent problems commonly associated with the refugee 
camp structures (militarisation, NGO exploitation, refugee manipulation, erroneous counting, 
breakdown of social structures, and gender inequalities) that were witnessed in Goma, Kenya, 
Palestine, Burma, and Nepal to name a few, were now being directly transplanted into IDP 
camps for the ‘effective’ management of citizens within their own territories.   
 
Overall refugee mechanisms thus became efficient for gaining access and control of citizens 
under a new legal category, otherwise under the 1949 Geneva Convention of the Laws of 
War, they would possibly have been under the oversight of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) which is mandated and has a long history of handling the needs of citizens 
displaced by war and fighting.301 This move would, however, have allowed the 1951 
Convention to remain intact with flight continuing to be a valid option as the ICRC’s role was 
not to contain but to protect civilians, treat the wounded, and ensure belligerents adhere to the 
laws of war. This would not have suited the containment strategies of the Global North as IDP 
protection reduced the need for flight and justified barrier restrictions on the assumption that 
the mere presence of these humanitarian actors in the Cluster Approach sufficiently 
constituted ‘protection’. More importantly, what was occurring was a ‘complete blurring of 
legal categories, principles, and institutional roles. These practices are threatening legitimate 
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boundaries between international refugee law, human rights law and humanitarian law. [With] 
their distinctive and separate spaces increasingly being transgressed’.302  
 
The evolution of IDP protection norms paralleled and complemented three seemingly 
‘legitimate’ containment policy solutions devised by the Global North to externalise their 
asylum problems from 1999 to 2006, which were summed up in this statement by the 
Tampere European Council in October 1999: 
 
The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing 
political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and 
transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job 
opportunities, preventing conflict and consolidating democratic states and ensuring 
respect for human rights….To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited 
to contribute….to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union.303  
 
The first was offshore extraterritorial processing designed to ‘de-territorialise the provision of 
protection to refugees in such a way that temporary protection and the processing of asylum 
claims take place outside of the given nation-state’.304 The British government in June 2003 at 
the EU Thessaloniki Summit attempted to emulate Australia by proposing the creation of a 
transit processing centre in Croatia but was deemed non-viable by EU members and 
humanitarian agencies.305 In June 2004 the rescue of 37 people in the Mediterranean by the 
German ship Cap Anamur resulted in a standoff between Italy, Germany and Malta over 
claims that the duty to process rested with Malta, which was the country of first arrival. As 
UNHCR impotently noted in 2006, ‘interception measures that effectively deny refugees 
access to international protection, or which result in them being returned to the countries 
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where their security is at risk, do not conform to prevailing international guidelines and many 
even amount to violation of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention’.306  
 
The second wider policy solution was the Regional Protection Programmes of 2005 which 
were designed to ensure durable solutions and capacity building. It marked the development 
of what Samers identified as ‘the gradual implementation of a system of migration 
management aligned with development assistance in third countries’.307 This mirrored the 
Cluster Approach in order to promote socio-economic development that removed the need to 
migrate. The European Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) was signed between 
1998 and 2005 between the EU and all North African states except Libya for the 
establishment of a free trade area and a conducive environment for social, cultural co-
ordination with the EU.308 This would deprive human smugglers of ‘customers’ that would 
then reduce pressure on asylum systems in western nations, which would further ease the 
political tensions surrounding asylum debates. The reductions in the costs of asylum, 
repatriation, and reintegration would then be channelled to development programmes in 
countries of refugee origin.309 The third strategy was the 2004 creation of European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of Member States of 
the EU also known under the acronym FRONTEX. This was a Warsaw based intelligence 
driven EU agency that aimed to improve information coordination and dissemination efforts 
for border security. Comprising of several centres310, this agency represented the concluding 
measure in the securitisation of migration as the Hague Programme adopted in 2004 declared 
that: 
 
The management of migration flows (…) should be strengthened by establishing a 
continuum of security measures that effectively links visa application procedures and 
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entry and exit procedures at external border crossings. Such measures are also of 
importance for the prevention and control of crime, in particular terrorism.311  
 
In spite of this challenge UNHCR in June 2008 signed an agreement with FRONTEX to have 
‘regular consultations, exchanges in information, expertise and experience, and inputs into 
training, with the aim of ensuring that border management is fully compliant with Member 
States’ international obligations’312, which had been written into Article 13 of the FRONTEX 
Regulation providing that FRONTEX “may cooperate with (…) the international 
organisations competent in matters covered by this Regulation in the framework of working 
arrangements (…)”.313 However, this partnership was short lived with rifts emerging in 2010 
when UNHCR urged EU member states to ensure that the tighter policing of external borders 
did not threaten asylum. They noted that the ‘stemming of sea arrivals is not solving the 
problem but shifting it elsewhere. This can be seen in the corresponding sharp rise there has 
been in overland arrivals in the Evros region of Greece. Evros recorded 38,992 arrivals in the 
first 10 months of this year compared to 7,574 in the same period in 2009- a 415% 
increase’.314 UNHCR noted that the concept of ‘risk analysis’ which was the core task of 
FRONTEX was unhelpful because ‘people seeking protection do not necessarily represent a 
‘risk’ or threat to the European Union. Rather, they are seeking protection from threats 
including persecution or serious harm’.315 However, the organisation from the onset was 
fighting a losing battle because it was trying to partner with an EU initiative to respect the 
fundamental human rights of asylum seekers, when that very initiative was designed to 
specifically restrict and curb the flow of asylum.   
 
3. Norm Stabilisation: Creating an IDP Convention  
                                                          
311 The Hague Programme, Strengthening Freedom, Security, and Justice in the European Union, 
Official Journal of the EU, 3/3/2005, 1.7.2. 
312 UNHCR Agreement with FRONTEX, briefing notes, 17th June (2008). 
313 FRONTEX Regulation, Op.Cit. 
314 UNHCR urges EU and FRONTEX to ensure access to asylum procedures, amid sharp drop in 
arrivals via the Mediterranean, UNHCR Briefing notes, 10th  December (2010). 
315 UNHCR’s observation on the European Commission’s proposals for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union (FRONTEX), COM (2010) 61. 
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The final stage in the norm cycle according to Park & Vetterlein is norm stabilisation, 
characterised by the legitimacy of the emergent norm whereby ‘through repeated habitualised 
action certain behaviour turns into patterns that can be reproduced. If these patterns are 
reciprocally reproduced through interaction they become institutionalised whereby policies 
are acted upon. Once policy norms have been institutionalised they guide and constrain 
action. Norms are re-projected into actors’ consciousness during this process, leading to 
socialisation and internalisation’.316 This section will document the strategy that was 
employed by actors to institutionalise the norms so as to stabilise and legitimise the IDP 
Regime, in order for it to be taken for granted as the dominant standard of appropriateness. 
This was observed in the final and most important phase in the evolution of the IDP Regime, 
which was the move to binding law in the creation of an IDP Convention.   
 
3.1 The Evolution of an Academic Discourse 
 
Part of norm stabilisation is the intellectualisation of basic known ideas and their elevation to 
new thresholds so as to give meaning to policy. This was critical in the evolution of the IDP 
regime which first began with the creation of the intellectual discourse of Refugee Studies as 
a field of academic inquiry in the early 80s through the establishment of the Refugee Studies  
Centre at Oxford University in 1982, the publication of the Journal of Refugee Studies in 
1988, the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University in 1982, and the International 
Research and Advisory Panel (IRAP) to facilitate information exchange on refugee policy and 
practice in 1989. The alignment of refugee studies with governmental policymaking 
developed a knowledge-power relationship, which legitimised the asylum barriers and non-
entrée regime in the Global North through a distinction of ‘past’ and ‘present’ refugees, 
arising from the ‘new’ political circumstances in the Global South. From the mid- 90s 
onwards there was, however, a further academic transformation with Refugee Studies 
morphing into Forced Migration Studies, with the creation of the International Association for 
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the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM), a plethora of university degrees in Forced Migration 
Studies from various educational institutions, and the creation of the Forced Migration 
Review publication. As Chimni observed, 
 
The themes addressed by Forced Migration Studies include the world of IDPs, the 
smuggling and trafficking of persons, armed humanitarian intervention, and the 
construction of a post conflict state, revealing that the concept of forced migration has 
been reconfigured to primarily reflect the geopolitical and strategic concerns of western 
states.317 
 
This was echoed by Fearon & Laitin who recognised the development of a ‘neo-trusteeship’ 
or ‘post-modern imperialism’ in the 1990s, with huge relief aid annually directed 
predominantly towards a small number of high profile cases: Iraq, Sudan, Former Yugoslavia, 
and Afghanistan318, which reflected the shifts in major power foreign policies with 
‘internationally mandated interventions in conflict ridden states by consortia…motivated fears 
of refugees flows, regional wars, terrorism, or other ‘spill-over’ effects’.319 Such scholarly 
structures and developments paved the way for the IDP Regime as the Brookings and Bern 
partnership established in 1993 made Francis Deng, Roberta Cohen, David Korn, and Walter 
Kalin the leading intellectual authorities on IDP issues, which allowed them to sit at high 
tables and make prescriptions directly to the UN and governments. They would frequently 
reinforce UNHCR’s involvement with IDPs commented in their assessment of the UN 
machinery how: 
 
Of all the UN agencies, UNHCR plays the broadest role in addressing the problem of 
the internally displaced: it offers protection, assistance and initial support for 
reintegration. Although UNHCR’s statute does not include internally displaced 
persons, the organisation has increasingly become involved in the situation they face at 
the request of the secretary or the General Assembly.320 
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In November 2008 they produced a handbook titled Protecting Internally Displaced Persons: 
A Manual for Law and Policy Makers that provided ‘guidance to national authorities seeking 
to prepare and enact domestic legislation and policies’.321 The Forced Migration discourse 
thus made internal displacement the new global fashion as Zetter confirmed that ‘the 
existence and plight of internal displaced persons (IDPs) was hardly recognised in 1988, still 
less the impact of development-induced displacement (DID).322 This lead to the creation of 
other academic arrangements which further assembled evidence to secure the legitimacy of 
proposed norms through the construction of debates and narratives that validated IDPs. Most 
notably was the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(IDMC) established in 1998 and tasked with counting and updating global displacement 
figures and patterns. Since 1998 it produced the Global IDP Database with the hope that: 
 
The need to let the fate of internally displaced populations be known is both a major 
practical and methodological challenge that must be given higher priority by 
humanitarian actors. It is the hope of the Global IDP Project that its information 
services may trigger new thinking about how best to approach the protection and 
assistance of the growing number of people around the world who find themselves 
internally displaced.323 
 
However, this programme became an extension of the politics of numbers and labels 
discussed earlier, in which the simple tabulation of IDPs around the world distinguished them 
as a specific category and cradled the humanitarian arguments. Secondly, the partnership 
between the Brookings Institute and Institute for the Study of International Migration at 
University of Georgetown, which has since spearheaded research and consultations between 
governments, civil society, and UN organisations into identifying When Does Displacement 
                                                          
321 Kalin, et al, Incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into Domestic Law: 
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Displacement, No.41. 
322 Zetter (2000), p. 352. 
323 Norwegian Refugee Council, Internal Displaced People: A Global Survey, Global IDP Project 
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End? This initiative was not revolutionary but unsurprisingly founded on the same academic 
debates and themes concerning refugee return and resettlement324. It concluded with the 
development of a Framework for Durable Solutions presented to the IASC Working Group in 
March 2010.325 All of this effectively cut the cloth for UNHCR to transition into a ‘new’ area 
of responsibility, which provided breathing space to relax and not be seen to be perpetuating 
itself, but instead respond to a ‘pressing need’ that was objectively identified by scholars of 
impeccable intellectual standing.  
 
All of this comes at a critical historic juncture for UNHCR, as Deng & Cohen presented the 
organisation to be the reluctant hero ‘whose greater involvement remained a viable option’ 
but which had turned down several UN calls to assume responsibility for IDPs throughout the 
90s on the basis that the resources required far exceeded those it possessed; the need for a 
collaborative venture; and ultimately the glaring concern that it would divert its attention 
away from its primary duties to refugees.326 As already noted, such claims were a mere 
sideshow to an organisation already harbouring greater aspirations to ensure its’ survival. This 
was also linked to the changing notions of sovereignty, as the focus on all types of displaced 
encouraged new systems of governance and control which created legitimised Western 
intrusion into the non-Western world. Indeed, as Nadig stated, ‘truth can help produce 
knowledge, experts, and a discipline, to legitimise hegemonic practices. The role of IDP 
numbers is crucial to the transition to a new regime in which the category ‘refugee’ continues 
to exist but shares space with the category IDP’.327  
 
3.2 Forging the Kampala Convention 
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With an established academic discourse now in place to legitimise the IDP Regime, the move 
to translate the Guiding Principles into binding law through a new Convention was paved 
through four consecutive international conferences. This was again similar to the root taken 
by the League of Nations seventy years earlier, which convened an inter-governmental 
conference to frame a new Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees in 
October 1933.328 The signed Protocol of November 2006 culminated in the Pact on Security, 
Stabilisation, & Development in Great Lakes Region in 2008 which committed its 11 member 
states to incorporate the Guiding Principles into their domestic laws. This paved the way for 
the creation of The Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced 
Persons in Africa known commonly as the Kampala Convention in 2009.  
 
For many proponents, the AU Convention broadened the scope as an ‘important achievement 
for the AU329, which ‘represents the will and determination of African States & People to 
address and resolve the problem of internal displacement in Africa’.330 However, similar to 
the evolution of all the other IDP norms, the new Convention raised more concerns than 
solutions, because the initial binding international treaties that fashioned the non-binding 
Guiding Principles in 1998, were now converted back into binding treaties within the guise of 
a ‘new’ IDP Convention (see Table 7 below). Now a further legal transformation took place 
with binding customary and treaty law co-existing alongside binding copies of themselves. 
So, for example, while IHL already prohibits forced and arbitrary displacement331, it was now 
suddenly aped by ‘new’ Convention which provides that state parties “shall declare as 
offences punishable by laws acts of arbitrary displacement that amount to genocide, war 
crimes or crimes against humanity”.332 
                                                          
328 Official Journal of the League of Nations, February (1934), p. 109. 
329 Abebe (2010), p. 56. 
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331 GC IV, Article. 147; AP 1, Article .85. 
332 Kampala Convention, Art. 4(6). 
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Table 7. Transition of Binding International Treaties 
BINDING NON-BINDING (1998) BINDING (2009) 
1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 
 
1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide 
 
1949 Four Geneva 
Conventions  1977Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions 
 
1951 UN Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees 
 
1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against 
Women  
 
 
 
30 GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Interpret existing 
international treaties for IDP 
protection. 
 
 
AU IDP CONVENTION 
The codification of the 
Convention was based on the 
Guiding Principles.  
 
The Convention now 
endorses all the international 
instruments within the 
Preamble. 
 
Secondly, while the Convention was finally ratified by the required 15 African member states 
on December 6th 2012333, and was hailed by many as a historic development334, it created a 
further ambiguous parallel legal structure within those very states. For while Ojeda 
acknowledged that the Kampala Convention reflected existing IHL rules, he argued that it 
went beyond them in the aspects of IDP return, repatriation, and documentation which were 
not specifically mentioned.335 In addition to this was a rallying cry by IDP proponents for the 
incorporation of the Convention into national laws.336 However, in the case of Uganda, which 
staged and championed the whole IDP Convention, the rights and protection of all citizens 
displaced or non-displaced was already fully enshrined in its Constitution in Articles 20, 21, 
                                                          
333 Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Benin, Chad, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea 
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and Assistance of IDPs in Africa’, AU, IDMC, NRC, July (2010).  
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44, & 45 within Chapter Four: Protection and Protection of Fundamental and Other Human 
Rights and Freedoms337: 
 
20. Fundamental and other human rights and freedoms. 
(1) Fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual are inherent and not granted by 
the State.  
(2) The rights and freedoms of the individual and groups enshrined in this Chapter shall 
be respected, upheld and promoted by all organs and agencies of Government and by 
all persons.  
 
21. Equality and Freedom from discrimination. 
(1) All persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic, 
social and cultural life and in every other respect and shall enjoy equal protection of the 
law. 
(2) Without prejudice to cause (1) of this article, a person shall not be discriminated 
against on the ground of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, creed, or religion, social 
or economic standing, political opinion or disability. 
 
44. Prohibition of derogation from particular human rights and freedoms. 
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, there shall be no derogation from the 
enjoyment of the following rights and freedoms- 
(a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment; 
(b) freedom from slavery or servitude; 
(c) the right to fair hearing; 
(d) the right to an order of habeas corpus. 
 
45. Human rights and freedoms additional to other rights. 
The rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the fundamental and other 
human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter shall not be 
regarded as excluding others not specifically mentioned. [emphasis added] 
 
This begged the questions as to why a state now needed to create and ratify a new set of 
external laws for a specific category of citizen who were already in theory under its 
                                                          
337 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, Chapter Four: Protection and Protection of 
Fundamental and Other Human Rights and Freedoms, Article 20, 21, 44, and 45, pp. 39-52. 
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protection. Secondly, what was a new Convention going to achieve that national laws had 
ignored or had completely floundered in doing? Indeed, it was comical to expect a fragile 
state to suddenly adhere to a new set of legal principles when the state in question had already 
reneged or was unable to fulfil its primary duty to protect its populace (which in many cases 
had been the original cause of the conflict). This enigma was identified by Lomo during the 
ICGLR when he commented how the real problem facing IDPs was not the absence of laws 
but rather “the absence of strong national systems and local and international commitment to 
enforce existing international standards”.338 The good intentions of the international 
community were hampered by political imperatives and the complexities of state societal 
relations within those fragile states. Indeed, what was the benefit of identifying legal solutions 
when the very issue was a clash of social values underlying the fundamental questions, 
namely how we should live together? No matter how efficient a Convention might have 
claimed to be, if it failed to confront the basic values that framed our understandings of the 
problem it was bound to become nothing more than a symbolic gesture. Thus the Convention 
simply danced around the real issue pertaining to internal displacement by failing to grasp the 
core issue, which was the contested nature of the social contract between the state and its 
people in neo-patrimonial environments of scarcity. 
 
More importantly, any robust analysis of these inconsistencies and ambiguities however 
detracted from the real goal of the IDP Convention which was the mutation of the 1951 
Convention and the official demise of sovereignty for fragile states, with the international 
community now authorised to intervene to assist displaced sections of a populace through a 
new binding treaty that shifted all concerns and responsibility for displaced people within the 
borders of states as an ‘international’ matter. The evolution of both the ‘new’ Convention that 
made IDPs a hard legal concept and ‘new’ academic discourse that had collapsed a whole 
range of issues of development, human trafficking, humanitarian intervention into ‘Forced 
Migration Studies’, paralleled wider policies by Western states to silence, dilute, and virtually 
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expunge the significance and presence of the refugee from the mid-2000s onwards. The most 
significant was the European Union Qualification Directive of April 2004 which was the first 
supranational instrument designed to unify the concept of subsidiary protection, which seeks 
to address the legal status of persons who require protection, but do not fit within the legal 
definition of refugee (B status, de facto refugees, war refugees and humanitarian asylum).339 
This initiative which began as early as 1997 was viewed by some as circumspect because it 
was basically designed to assist EU member states in their attempts to redefine refugee status 
as they saw fit, to neutralise the Refugee Regime as McAdam illuminated: 
 
While it establishes a harmonised legal basis for complementary protection in the EU, 
it does so in a political environment that is suspicious of asylum-seekers, that seeks 
restrictive entrance policies and that is wary of large numbers of refugees. Accordingly, 
these factors have heavily influenced the scope of the Directive- who is eligible for 
protection- and the rights to which they are entitled- what that protection actually is. If 
‘complementary protection’ describes the role of human rights law in broadening the 
categories of persons to whom international protection is owed beyond article 1A(2) of 
the Refugee Convention, then ‘subsidiary protection’ is a regionally-specific political 
manifestation of the broader legal concept.340 [emphasis added] 
 
The Refugee Regime thus now became a soft legal concept through the Directive’s new 
definition of a ‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’ which stated that: 
 
A third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as refugee but in 
respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless 
person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) do 
not apply, and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of that country.341  [emphasis added] 
 
                                                          
339 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April.(2004) on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and 
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The standard of proof for subsidiary protection was ‘substantial grounds… for believing’. 
This completely reversed the Refugee Convention definition of the applicants’ ‘well-founded 
fear’ as now the ‘belief’ related not to the applicants belief, but to the judgement of the 
decision maker that substantial grounds existed for believing that the applicant would face 
harm. This gave Western states full control and autonomy to determine asylum cases without 
the yoke of the 1951 Convention.  The hidden feature of this new ‘refugee definition’ was 
identified by UNHCR and Amnesty International who protested against the restrictive 
definition which contravened Article 42 of the Refugee Convention that prohibits states from 
limiting the personal scope of Article 1 or making reservations to Article 3.342 Furthermore, as 
the UK House of Lords Select Committee on the EU alerted ‘for a major regional grouping of 
countries such as the Union to adopt a regime apparently limiting the scope of the Geneva 
Convention among themselves would set a most undesirable precedent in the wider 
internal/global context’.343 However, despite these reservations it was greeted with jubilation 
by pro-migration activists and NGOs who praised the Directive for broadening the scope of 
protection by first considering non-state actors to now be considered as actors of persecution, 
rather than purely state actors, and secondly the shift from an accountability approach that 
focussed on state persecution to a ‘protection approach’ that focused more on the lack of 
protection.344  
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, the evolution of the IDP Regime was, in practice, a duplication of the Refugee 
Regime, with each component copied into a new version of itself through the careful 
recreation of norms, values, numbers, and language (see Table 8 below). 
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Table 8. Refugee/IDP Duplication 
Refugee Regime Duplication IDP Regime 
 
1951 Refugee Convention 
 
UNHCR Protection 
 
Refugee Category 
 
Refugee Camp 
 
Duplicated as 
 
Duplicated as 
 
Duplicated as 
 
Duplicated as 
 
2009 IDP Convention 
 
Cluster Approach  
 
IDP Category 
 
IDP Camp 
 
While the previous chapter detailed the actors and political climates that gave impetus to the 
creation of an IDP Regime, this chapter has uncovered how those imperatives worked to forge 
new laws, policies and a convention that were presented as a revolutionary development in 
human rights, but ultimately fulfilled the prerogatives of the powerful. We have begun to 
notice that the true function served by the creation of IDP norms had been to extinguish 
refugees from the pages of history by eclipsing the 1951 Convention, with a ‘new’ and 
‘acceptable’ IDP Convention built on the former that boasts greater strength in upholding 
human rights principles, and which managed refugee containment through the construction of 
‘new’ legal labels, protection mechanisms, and institutional arrangements. Ultimately this 
whole game was only possible through what Finnemore and Sikkink illuminate and caution in 
their study of international norms, which is that:  
 
…instrumental rationality and strategic interaction play a significant role in highly 
politicised social construction of norms, preferences, identities, and common 
knowledge by norm entrepreneurs in world politics…In many of the most politicised 
salient strategic interactions, it is precisely the changing contours of common 
knowledge that are the object of the game. Common knowledge about who is a 
political participant (suffrage), what the rules of war are, and even who is a person 
(slavery) has been created by strategic actors in highly contested processes that are 
central to our understanding of politics.345 
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This was critical in the creation of IDP norms in order to contain refugees, with states, 
lawyers, academics, NGOs, and international organisations restructuring the common 
knowledge regarding (1) the conduct and casualties of contemporary conflict; (2) the nature 
of sovereignty; (3) the function of international human rights law and humanitarian 
intervention; and (4) the legitimacy of both asylum seekers and the institution of asylum, in 
order to pave the way for a new regime that accommodated new interests. The following 
section will conduct a critical discourse analysis of the IDP Regime to reveal the knowledge-
power complex at its centre.   
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Chapter Three 
The Nature, Logic, & Effects of the IDP Regime 
Discursive Reproductions of Power, Privilege, & Paternalism   
 
 
[T]here is no power that is extended without a series of aims and 
objectives…the rationality of power is characterised by tactics that are often 
quite explicitly at the restricted level where they are inscribed…tactics which, 
becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one 
another….end by forming comprehensive systems. 
 
Foucault 1980a, p.95 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to fully comprehend the structure of the IDP Regime we have to keep in mind that 
there is always a logic to the practices of power with a strategic objective which does not 
require us to ‘isolate a definitive agent or cause: it is rather to understand the workability of 
this particular instance of power, to grasp it lines of efficacy, to fathom something of the 
contingencies and conjunctions that have made it possible’.346 While the previous section 
provided us with the historical and socio-political contextualisations which are indispensable 
for comprehending discourse, precisely because the prevailing agendas will always reside 
within a ‘history of systems of thought’347, this chapter will now proceed by addressing the 
pressing questions: What is the IDP Regime? How does it operate? and What effects does it 
have? By employing a critical discourse analysis of how the various institutional actors and 
geopolitical objectives have come to structure systems that purport to protect thousands of 
people within their own borders, we will grapple with the primary representations of the field 
by a critique of the norms, conventions, images and practices of the IDP Regime, to unpack 
how rationalisations and humanisms promote particular types of interventions by particular 
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actors that effectively blend operations of power, privilege, and paternalism with various 
languages of truth, knowledge and human rights, with little or no objection (see Table 9 
below).  
 
The chapter will be divided into three sections that reveal the comprehensive linkage between 
power, paternalism and privilege. The first will set the stage by excavating to unearth the 
embedded belief systems and social constructions that form the nature of the IDP Regime and 
rationalise its power structures. This will then relay into the second section which will detail 
the logic and form such power structures create and through which they operate. This will 
finally relay into the third section that will observe the effects such power structures produce. 
This chapter seeks to journey away from a simple analysis of what the IDP Regime claims to 
perform, to a more ambitious undertaking of what the IDP Regime actually performs. Indeed, 
as Giddens shows, ‘new knowledge…does not simply render the social world more 
transparent, but alters its nature, spinning it off in novel directions’.348 In other words 
scientific interpretations configure the way people see the world, and thus actually change it. 
We will observe how the constructions of the IDP knowledge have thus heralded significant 
changes for fragile states, the relief industry and complex emergencies.  
Table 9. Structure of the IDP Regime 
Nature Logic Effects 
 
Third World Vulnerability 
Discourse 
 
Paternalism 
 
 
Humanitarian Governance  
 
 
Pacify & Infantilise Citizens 
  
 
Camp Based Relief & 
Bureaucratic Category 
 
Depoliticises Displacement 
Technicises State Predation 
 
Creating a Zone of Alternate 
Social Order 
 
Establishing a Humanitarian 
Economy 
 
Altering the Dynamics of 
Conflict 
 
1. The Nature of the IDP Regime 
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It is necessary to first delineate the three central elements in the genetic make-up of the IDP 
Regime in order to comprehend its operations, precisely because discourse is a vital 
component in the successful functioning of any power structure, as the exercise of power 
forms knowledge of which its application inevitably produces the effects of power. The 
nature of the IDP Regime is comprised of third world vulnerability discourse, humanitarian 
governance and paternalism (see Figure 7 below). These elements are the central components 
that provide it with the essential truth from which further structures come to be founded. This 
is to reiterate what Said aptly characterised in his understanding of discourse as:  
 
The will to exercise…control in society and history has also discovered a way to 
clothe, disguise, rarefy and wrap itself systematically in the language of truth, 
discipline, rationality, utilitarian value, and knowledge. And this language in it 
naturalness, authority, professionalism, assertiveness and anti-theoretical direction 
is…discourse.349  
 
 
Figure 7. Nature of the IDP Regime 
 
1.1 Third World Vulnerability Discourse 
Discourses are always multiple in combination with no single dominant discourse, but instead 
an ‘uneven terrain, a topography that is infinitely complex in its details, that resists division 
                                                          
349 Said (1983), p. 216. 
Third World 
Vulnerability 
Discourse 
  
Paternalism  
IDP 
REGIME  
Humanitarian 
Governance 
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into simple basic mutually exclusive categories’.350 Some discourses are seen to be ‘true’ by 
their reliance upon other discourses that make them more potent. Moreover, such potency of a 
given discourse derives from the particular narrative being propagated. Let me qualify this 
claim. For discourse to be effective it has to be regarded as knowledge; as a sustained 
reference to social, historical and political conditions that render statements as true or false.351 
Closely linked to this is narrative theory, which holds that people employ narratives to 
connect together fragmented observations so as to construct meaning and reality. For Leach & 
Mearns narratives inherit pervasive and persistent methods and ideas which form their 
bedrock to become the very ‘received wisdom’ embedded within institutional structures.352 
Thus Western constructions of knowledge ‘form part of one and the same essentialising and 
generalising cultural discourse: one that denigrates large regions of the world as dangerous – 
disease-ridden, poverty-stricken and disaster- prone; one that depicts the inhabitants of these 
regions as inferior- untutored, incapable, victims; and that it reposes in Western medicine, 
investment and preventative systems the expertise required to remedy these ills’.353 This 
division of the world into the rich West of Europe and North America and the poor equatorial 
South ultimately translated into the demarcation of us and them.  
The constructed weakness of third world/developing/poor countries first began between the 
seventeenth and early twentieth century with the conceptualisation of ‘tropicality’, that 
equated warm climates with disease, and facilitated intervention in the form of colonialism 
with education and medicine to overcome their primitivism. Post- 1945, the discourse shifted 
to ‘development’ with intervention manifested as aid. Finally, in the 1990s, the discourse 
became ‘vulnerability’, and Western intervention known as relief. All of these helped 
maintain the influence and power that Western nations held over other societies and 
resources. The narratives of the IDP Regime now came to share this pedigree of discursive 
frameworks, whereby hazard fashions the way certain global regions are imagined, which 
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further provides a staple for interventions. The IDP Regime is justified and formed upon this 
vulnerability discourse that becomes the structural knowledge which makes all the facets of 
displacement and protection as expected; common sense truths that would render any denial 
or scrutiny as politically incorrect and even inhumane.  
The story-tellers are invariably NGOs. International organisations, lawyers and academics 
would thus use these social, historical and political belief systems to attribute the causes and 
experience of internal displacement to the ‘nature’ of fragile and failed states, ‘riddled’ with 
ethnic cleavages, and which disregard the rights and liberty of their suffering populace. Such 
narratives were always linked to the formation of values and value systems which reflect 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of Western states. In the same way that tropicality, 
development and vulnerability discourses helped to cushion imperialism, contain 
Communism, and reduce the dangers emanating from the Third world, the IDP Regime was 
ultimately a response by the paranoid and xenophobic West for the containment of refugees 
from the Global South, who were ‘different’ from the once preferred and homogenous Cold 
War refugees, precisely because they brought these constructed vulnerabilities to Western 
borders. This underlying ‘truth’ was first displayed in the mainstream history of internal 
displacement by proponents of the regime who assumed a very lineal cause and effect pattern 
as Korn promulgated in the late 90s:  
The reader might well ask why Africa should have become afflicted by so many civil 
wars driving such large numbers of people from their homes. One cause has been 
examined already: crises of national identity, often manipulated by governments and by 
opposition groups. The European great powers that divided Africa among themselves 
in the nineteenth century drew borders for their own convenience. These rarely if ever 
took cognizance of African ethnic, linguistic, or tribal realities. The leaders of newly 
independent African states of the second half of the twentieth century were left with the 
herculean task of infusing a sense of national unity into a hodgepodge of diverse, 
competing, and sometimes warring linguistic, tribal, and clan groups. Many did not 
even try; those few who did have yet to succeed in any substantial measure.354  
Such a history is reliant upon Nietzche’s notion of ‘effective history’. This is functional for 
two reasons. Firstly it confines displacement to the past making it a natural, unintended, 
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knock- on effect of history, which is out of the range and control of contemporary states, 
institutions and actors. However, this raises alarm bells, as historical analyses emphasising 
continuity run the risk of projecting backwards from the present the factors that their studies 
will ultimately ‘reveal’.355 Secondly, it worked to completely bypass the geo-politics of 
refugees and mechanisms of population control exposed in chapters 1 and 2, that brought it 
into existence. Such histories, peppered with xenophobia, racism, informal wrangles and 
hidden agendas, would instantly ‘disturb what was previously considered 
immobile…fragments what was thought unified…[and] shows the heterogeneity of what had 
been considered consistent’356and so have to be rapidly calmed with a generally ‘accepted’ 
and ‘simple’ apolitical explanation.   
1.2 Paternalism  
The vulnerability discourse heralds the arrival of a paternalism discourse which is an 
admixture of care and control famously defined by Dworkin as ‘the interference with a 
person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, 
happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced’.357 Such vulnerabilities gave 
the IDP story meaning with the ‘cure’ for such menacing conditions once again resting upon 
the transfer and application of unquestioned Western expertise. Paternalism underpins all 
rhetoric, labels, tools and legitimacy of emergency relief because it ‘presumes that an 
individual is incompetent or inferior. Worryingly, the powerful often believe that they know 
what is best for everyone. We should be worried whenever actors become convinced of their 
generosity’.358 Such was the essence of the previously discussed Refugee Regime which now 
came to imprint itself upon the new IDP Regime.  
The paternalism of the IDP Regime is of a strong nature which has three distinctive 
characteristics inherited from the Refugee Regime. The first is the willingness to exert force 
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which is observed through the movement of displaced people into regimented camp structures 
supervised by a host of relief specialists, with areas of control that extend over a broad 
spectrum of life (shelter, food, hygiene, water, health, livelihoods, and security). The second 
is the unshakable conviction in the knowledge and abilities of NGOs who rationalise their 
activities upon universal and eternal ideals, as well as experience based on unimpeachable 
technical operations, scientific data, and academic studies. Many easily dismiss criticism or 
the failures of such practices as attempts to subvert moral ideals or belittle the transcendental 
commitment that in the face of war, rape, hunger, epidemics, destitution, and displacement 
‘something must be done’. The third is the reduction in accountability mechanisms for local 
actors to check and balance the actions of their paternalisers. This is the case with legitimate 
protest, criticism, non-compliance, and resistance by displaced masses automatically branded 
as deviant behaviour and dismissed, leaving many voiceless and incapable of freeing 
themselves from structural violence which will become evident in chapter 5.   
1.3 Humanitarian Governance     
Paternalism naturally gives birth to humanitarian governance, which is defined as ‘the 
administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle that sees the 
preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action’.359 Such 
governance has meant a transformation in the 1990s, with humanitarians now becoming 
political actors through their engagement in a plethora of operations (see Table 10 below)360.  
Table 10. Humanitarian Governance 
Operations of Humanitarian Governance 
Disarming Warring Factions 
Separating Armed Groups 
Decommissioning Weapons 
Reintegrating Soldiers into civilian life 
Professionalising Militaries, Civilian Police & Entire public security apparatus 
Assembling the foundations for economic development 
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Promoting democracy through election monitoring and building institutions 
Advancing Human Rights and Rule of Law by developing independent media 
 
Thus under the IDP Regime, the humanitarian community is now tasked to intervene and 
remedy suffering through the establishment of large-scale protection structures for indefinite 
periods. However, for many, the ideology of humanitarianism has to be approached with 
extreme caution because it sustains global relations of dominance by mobilising meaning and 
practices that manipulate human rights language to justify the use of force in order to alleviate 
the local consequences of globalisation that culminate in rationalising the neo-liberal political 
agenda, which further reinforces the grip of transnational capital.361  
This forces us to consider the deeper realities of such organisations which are neatly 
concealed behind the universal truths of charity and compassion that can neutralise any 
attempt to scrutinise or challenge such enterprises. Such strategies were well known to 
Foucault who, in his work ‘What is an author?’, asserted that the author-function was not 
simply a creative or originating, but rather a complex discursive function which unearthed 
certain groups of discourse associated with the author. By asking ‘What matter who’s 
speaking?’ the causal assumption that authors generate discourse is turned on its head to show 
that discourse can give rise to subjects (like authors) with privileged positions. For Foucault 
instead of questioning what authors reveal in their texts, he suggests we ask what subject-
positions are made possible within such texts. Such a point is critical for understanding the 
R2P discourse, which, when invoked, acts as a discursive warrant immediately creating 
authors that sit in positions of power by the sole fact that protection can ‘only’ be guaranteed 
by external specialists and not fragile or failed states.  The blueprints for IDP protection 
echoes a fairy tale story whereby crisis summons forth a hero that has to battle to then emerge 
triumphantly with everybody living happily ever after. We thus have to engage the core 
practices and informal arrangements that govern all humanitarian work but which are absent 
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from egalitarian visions and beliefs encompassed in ambitious mission statements as seen 
here:  
 
We seek a world of hope, tolerance and social justice, where poverty has been 
overcome and people live in dignity and security. CARE International will be a global 
force and partner of choice within a worldwide movement dedicated to ending poverty. 
We will be known everywhere for our unshakable commitment to the dignity of 
people.362 
 
Oxfam’s vision is a just world without poverty. We envision a world in which people 
can influence decisions which affect their lives, enjoy their rights, and assume their 
responsibilities as full citizens of a world in which all human beings are valued and 
treated equally.363 
 
To grasp this, we must consider what Foucault termed Societies of Discourse, which ‘function 
to preserve or produce discourse, in order to make them circulate in a closed space, 
distributing them only according to certain rules’.364 Such a facet revolves around 
institutionally bound networks that operate their own mechanism of exclusion and discretion 
through the application of technical or scientific jargon, which can guarantee a series of 
entitlements and prerogatives. We have noticed that the humanitarian community has come to 
constitute the first and last line of defence for IDPs through the Cluster Approach system 
which, de jure, made them the given authority on the ground. As we saw in Chapter 2, this 
was an outcome of humanitarian contributions to conferences, consultations, and publications 
on all IDP protection related matters which positioned them as the bastions of knowledge and 
further allowed them to make ‘prescriptions’ that invariably bolstered their own interests. In 
addition to this was the reformulation of refugee camp protection, which utilised the same 
agencies and practices. However, it is first necessary to place the ‘humanitarian governors’ 
into their proper context. Now, while the blanket labelling of humanitarianism as an industry 
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may be viewed by many as a facetious judgement that denies and disparages the charitable 
motives and gains of agencies working in extreme circumstances, it should be considered 
more as a natural corollary of the New Policy Agenda of the 1990s. This reflected the market-
centred approach to social organisation and economic development, which was vindicated by 
the collapse of Communism. The reductions in state capacity and public services ran 
alongside the increasing volume of donor support channelled through NGOs in the form of 
contracts. This had astronomical implications for NGOs, as Commins affirmed,  
One challenge for NGOs is to determine whether their receipt and utilisation of public 
funds will enable them to have greater impact in their operational work and to better 
influence donor policies, or whether they will become domesticated by their 
dependence on public sector monies. In many cases, NGOs are in effect being asked to 
substitute for work that has been carried out by state agencies and to act more as public 
service contractors rather than independent agencies.365 
As a result, the global proliferation of NGOs to this end made development aid, and disaster 
relief a boom industry, with voluntary organisations morphing from shared value driven 
entities that catalysed development initiatives and provided support services, into Public 
Service Contractors (PSCs) who sold their services to donors and government agencies to 
implement projects and programmes.366 This brought into question the prevailing 
presentations of relief actors as simply selfless charitable organisations, by the fact that 
competition eroded collective action and the conditionalities of sub-contracting created 
conflict of interests with agencies unable to maintain independent profiles or be critical 
witnesses.367  Even though many PSCs claim to have shared humanitarian aspirations, ‘the 
market driven PSC starts with an assessment of prospective funding sources and defines its 
program on that basis’.368 This shift completely transformed humanitarian actors in several 
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ways (1) the skills and qualifications required from employees with a strong emphasis on 
business administration; (2) the rapid rotation of employees moving from agency to agency 
with varied and interchangeable skillsets; and (3) the commoditisation and agency branding 
of relief aid, which is more akin to a large scale logistical operation directly replicable in 
virtually any humanitarian situation around the world.369 Therefore, while the underlying 
rhetoric and practice of humanitarian governance for vulnerable people displaced within their 
borders through the Cluster Approach is justified under R2P, and widely acclaimed, in reality 
it becomes more akin to a business venture by organisations attempting to win clients and 
maximise profits. We will observe the impact of this in Uganda in chapter 5.  
2. The Logic of the IDP Regime 
Having established the DNA of the IDP Regime, it is now prudent to observe how such 
embedded formations of knowledge and truth operate to create objects, narratives, and 
systems that can sustain particular structures of power behind seemingly benevolent and 
logical facades. Indeed, knowledge to power works to establish highly specialised 
institutional mechanisms and procedures which are the target of analysis. As Said emphasises, 
the importance of re-relating discourse to a wider network of power relations by stripping it of 
its ‘esoteric or hermetic elements and to do this by making [it] assume its affiliations with 
institutions, agencies, classes, academies, corporations, groups, ideologically defined parties 
and professions…[These critical engagements]…forcibly redefine and re-identify the 
particular interests that all [discourses] serve’.370 By re-emphasising this re-affiliation he 
notes that ‘[e]ach discourse is to some degree a jargon…a language of control and a set of 
institutions within the culture over what it constitutes as its special domain’.371  
 
2.2 Creating Passive, Voiceless, Victims 
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The Third World Vulnerability discourse directly shapes the identity of IDPs through the 
visual humanitarian representations (see Figures 8-25 below). All images convey IDPs as 
passive, voiceless, victims desperately in need of aid. The use of women, children, camps, 
and displacement thus symbolically transform the IDP from a human being into a commodity 
for donor consumption. This is because the inexpressibility of pain and suffering requires 
visual portrayals which lead to a politics of representation with iconic and universal symbols 
as a substitute for pain. Thus images of children with distended stomachs automatically speak 
the language of famine and starvation which drown out any uniqueness to the person’s 
experience of suffering.372 Their most economically marketable characteristics, which will 
generate sympathy and funds, are marketed and emphasised in order to create system of 
‘automation’, whereby characters can think, speak, and behave as you would expect them 
to.373 For such a strategy to work it requires effective visual aids that embody in Western 
imagination ‘a special kind of powerlessness; perhaps that they do not tend to look as if they 
could be ‘dangerous aliens’.374 This powerlessness opens up avenues to easy access and 
control by aid agencies and directly replicates the refugee image as noted by Rajaram: 
Refugees are confined to their body. That is, they are rendered speechless and without 
agency, a physical entity, or rather a physical mass within which the individuality is 
subsumed. Corporeal, refugees are speechless and consigned to visuality: to the 
pictorial representation of suffering and need. One of the central effects of this 
consignment is commodification of refugee experience.375 
Children are portrayed as being idle or engaged in heavy manual work, again in contrast to 
Western children studying in school, and emphasising the illegality of child labour. The 
images of displaced children play on Western constructions of childhood, as people in the 
process of ‘becoming’, who are entirely dependent on adults. However, while the 
misconception of these portrayals rests in their lack of appreciation of the meaning of 
‘childhood’ in developing countries-with children acquiring multiple responsibilities in the 
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home at an early age, which in the West would be unthinkable and only undertaken by adults- 
they have particular value as, according to Holland, ‘paradoxically, while we are moved by 
the image of a sorrowful child, we also welcome it, for it can arouse pleasurable emotions of 
tenderness, which in themselves confirm adult power’.376  
All aid agency images (see Figures 9-20) of women and children purposefully omit the causes 
of displacement; with war, violence, and destruction not shown, but instead implied by the 
large congregation of people lumped in one space and the sombre facial expressions that 
create an atmosphere of emergency. This is powerful because it is taken as a given, which 
eliminates all political explanations by collapsing their unique complexities into that of 
general crisis, which forms the initial point of departure for humanitarian assistance.377 
Images of camps show no presence of military personnel or state officials carrying out 
counter-insurgency screening or engaging in torture and rape. There are no pictures of ethnic 
violence and rebel recruitment in camps or of disease, death, malnutrition, or morbidity 
caused by the dense concentration of people. This works to purposefully exclude all themes 
and subjects, which can lead viewers to thinking and discussing the ‘political’, as images of 
soldiers and rebels, would directly lead the audience to question why belligerents are not 
being held to account. This could open up debates and arguments about the futility and 
dangers of relief aid, by not only failing to address structural causes, but also by fuelling the 
violence.     
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IDP Related Publications 
 
Figure 8  
UNHCR Handbook for the Protection of IDPs 
Global Protection Cluster Working Group 
(2008) 
 
Figure 9  
Protecting Internally Displaced Persons 
      A Manual for Law & Policymakers 
Brookings Institute (October 2008) 
  
  
Figure 13  
Exodus Within Borders  
David Korn (1999) 
Figure 12  
USAID IDP Policy (October 
2004) 
Figure 11 
Forced Migration Review 
(January 2009) 
Figure 10 
Internally Displaced Persons  
A Global Survey  
Jamie Hampton (2002) 
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NGO Images of IDPs 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 19  
IOM 
www.iom.int 
 
Figure 18  
Brookings Institute 
brookings.edu 
 
 
Figure 17  
OXFAM 
oxfam.org.uk 
 
Figure 16  
World Vision 
worldvision.com.au 
 
 
Figure 15  
UNOCHA 
unocha.org 
Figure 14  
ICRC 
icrc.org 
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Figure 24 
WAR CHILD  
warchild.org.uk 
 
Figure 22  
CARE International 
care-caucasus.org 
 
Figure 20  
Human Rights Watch 
hrw.org 
 
Figure 23  
Caritas 
caritas.org 
 
Figure 21 
 UNHCR 
www.unhcr.org 
 
Figure 25 
 MSF 
doctorswithoutborders.org 
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Vulnerability is the key message in all images, with the pictures showing infant children 
either on the move or carrying heavy loads. Images display a lack of action, with people 
simply waiting eagerly for an unknown and unseen response. Time appears to have ceased, 
with people in a state of limbo, with physical and facial expressions that denote anxiety 
through long, endless and blank stares. There is a recurring feeling of abandonment and 
estrangement continually arising with the IDP locations, which appear to be in remote, distant 
rural localities surrounded by endless land, desert, or forest, and far away from any large 
populated urban settlements. Such a theme strengthens the argument of vulnerability, and the 
great need for essential provisions of water, healthcare, sanitation, food and shelter. In sum, 
they reinforce the ‘humanitarian narrative’ consisting of three components: first, with the 
destitute victim in distress, second, the non-Western regime that represents the villain who 
causes destruction; and finally, the aid agencies who are the saviours fighting for the survival 
of victims.378   
2.5 Camp Based Relief 
The infantilisation of IDPs is closely linked to the practice of camp based relief as 
‘interpretations of compassion seem to define those in need as helpless, and then work in 
ways which makes sure that they are useless’.379 This uselessness rationalises humanitarian 
regulation which forms the underlying logic of most if not every relief operation involving 
camp structures. Firstly, through a language of emergency that promotes a technical approach 
to translate disaster, violence, and displacement into statistical terms (number of displaced, 
size of camps, and nutrition and health status) that agencies can then act upon to improve. 
This has the effect of first legitimating humanitarians as the only experts possessing the sound 
knowledge required to rectify such deficiencies and therefore maximise survival of vulnerable 
masses. Secondly, it requires the creation of an expansive surveillance system needed to 
identify the first instances of a crisis and track the movement of populations so as to 
determine the scope of international action, the required funding, and the requisite logistical 
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infrastructure.380 Both practices, however, are riddled with power, because the insertion of 
relief agencies into disaster zones automatically attracts displaced people which re-
territorialises them into zones as ‘target groups’ for ‘needs assessment’ exercises;  secondly, 
the need to quantify requires a passive, voiceless, and regimented population divested of all 
and any political agency, in what Malkki, through her study of refugee camps in Tanzania, 
termed as a ‘technology of power’, in which people are reconstituted and regularised as 
objects of knowledge and control. Thus in practice women and children become the principle 
targets of humanitarian assistance with multiple programs and workshops designed around 
their perceived needs. Such interventions are then hailed as success stories to donors and 
Western audiences.  
 
The IDP Camp, however, goes even further than the known delivery of aid. Indeed, critical 
discourse analysis forces us to consider how ‘the things being said’ work as solutions to a 
problem. How is speaking a kind of intervention? By comparing the crisis of internal 
displacement to the refugee crisis, the solution becomes ever more apparent and self-
explanatory. As we saw in earlier chapters, the refugees are recognised under international 
law, with UNHCR mandated to protect them. By juxtaposing and likening the plight of IDPs 
with that of the refugee, and identifying the shortfalls in protection, the ‘solution’ thus 
becomes the creation of similar bureaucracies, agencies, and mandates to assist IDPs. The 
essence of the IDP camp resides in the fact that the privileged notions discussed come to be 
utilised as rationales for particular implementations of force, which purport to be honest and 
unique under the Cluster Approach. These imperatives work to extend relations of authority 
and control in three ways. First, the Camp Management Toolkit presents the IDP camp as a 
neutral, benevolent, safe haven for all suffering people to inhabit, with the emphasis on 
creating an organised, planned space to ensure effective relief operations. However, on closer 
inspection, the features of the toolkit become the model for the development of an ‘ideal’ 
state, with the benefits and services offered replicating state institutions and practices (see 
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Table 11 below) which can logically transform, modernise, and urbanise ‘traditional’ 
societies.   
 
 
 
Table 11. Camp Management Operations 
IDP Camp Management Operations 
 
Education                           
Health Care & Health Education            
Shelter 
Livelihoods                             
Environment                                           
Food Distribution 
Registration & Profiling       
Water Sanitation & Hygiene                      
Protection in Camp 
Camp Security  
 
 
 
Secondly, linked to this is the idea that camp based relief practices can perform highly 
political operations. The humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and humanity 
which are widely trumpeted by agencies as the bedrock of their protection activities, alter the 
dynamics of fragile state politics. Indeed by elevating people to a higher set of global values 
that supersede the realm of sovereignty by ascribing the universal rights of freedom and the 
inviolability of the human person. These can, however, clash with the very systems of 
oppression, marginalisation, and control which may have caused, and even sustained, 
violence in a given state381.  Thirdly, the paternal attitude manifested in the prevailing 
representations of displaced people and the camp services they receive, culminate in 
entrapping people in conditions of aid dependency that can create a permanent state of relief, 
as Edelman proclaims: 
 
When ‘help’ is given to the poor or the unconventional, a wholly different set of role 
relationships and benefits appears. Now it is the beneficiaries who are sharply 
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personified and brought into focus…What they personify is poverty, delinquency, 
dependency, or other forms of deviance. That they are in need of help, but help in 
money, in status and in autonomy must be sharply limited so as to avoid malingering. 
One of the consistent characteristics of the ‘helping’ institutions is their care to limit 
forms of help that would make clients autonomous…The limit is enforced in practice 
while denied in rhetoric.382 
 
2.1 Bureaucratic Category  
A regimented system of camp based relief structures thus requires an official bureaucratic 
category to legitimise its custodial operations. Such a category is a ‘spatial, temporal, or 
spatio-temporal segmentation of the world…A ‘classification system’ is a set of boxes into 
which things can be put to then do some kind of work- bureaucratic or knowledge 
production’.383 While we saw how the creation of the IDP label was instrumental in 
diminishing the subliminal fears of refugee flows, it was performed in a subtle way by the 
creation of an alternate bureaucratic category that attached the same rights of refugees in 
order to replace the refugee category while retaining all its key features. This parallel 
cognitive convention was essential to the survival of the IDP Regime as, 
Before it can perform its entropy-reducing work, the incipient institution needs some 
stabilising principle to stop its premature demise. That stabilising principle is the 
naturalisation of social classifications. There needs to be an analogy by which the 
formal structure of a crucial set of social relations is found in the physical world, or in 
the supernatural world, or in eternity, anywhere, so long as it is not seen as a socially 
contrived arrangement. [emphasis added] When the analogy is applied back and forth 
from one set of social relations to another, and from these back to nature, its recurring 
formal structure become easily recognisable and endowed with self-validating truth.384  
 
The stabilising principle, as already noted, was the 1951 Convention and the strong analogies 
it produced, which justified the shift to in-country protection. The first was that IDPs now 
came to assume a legal category entitling them to rights and privileges of refugees, which 
made them visible and worked to make a strategic distinction between refugees and citizens, 
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so as to then create the necessary justifications for policies and operations that contained 
refugees. Indeed, many legal scholars would often ask broad questions that automatically 
railroaded responses into to the creation of similar refugee protection structures (see Table 12 
below). For example, Korn in his work, Exodus Within Borders, confirmed such a strategy 
when he attempted to classify and conceptualise the IDP problem: 
 
Table 12. IDP Conceptual Framework 
Question? Answer Response 
 
Who are the internally 
displaced? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People who are similar to 
refugees but who have not 
crossed an internationally 
recognised border 
 
Few would disagree that 
persons forced from their 
homes by armed conflict, 
internal strife, and systematic 
abuses of human rights and 
freedoms warrant the 
sympathetic attention of the 
international community. 
After all, that and more is 
given to those who escape the 
borders of their country-
refugees. Why should it be 
denied to those caught within 
the borders of their 
country385[emphasis added] 
 
Who helps the IDPs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most internally displaced 
find themselves without 
adequate shelter, food, 
medical care, and sanitation 
and with little or no 
protection from abuse by 
government or insurgent 
groups. 
 
Today most UN and other 
major international 
humanitarian organisations 
take some part in assisting 
and protecting the internally 
displaced even though none 
has a specific, legally 
recognised mandate to do 
so.386 
 
Can the UN do a better 
job? 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Creation of newer and more 
effective structures 387 
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Such a move shifted all the international legal and humanitarian rights of the refugee to 
people residing within their own states, which created a state of both physical and legal limbo 
with IDP’s existing somewhere along the continuum between citizen and refugee. While this 
may have seemed completely irrational, as we saw, it silently suppressed the 1951 
Convention by attempting to nullify the ‘refugee’ as an international object of concern with 
its reconceptualization as an internal ‘root cause’ issue of fragile soil. The alternate category 
of citizens meant that rather than assume the label of refugee on foreign sole and the political 
problems it entailed, citizens could simply be contained in a state of limbo on ‘home’ soil as 
‘displaced people’ but with the rights of refugees.  
This shift had three consequences; firstly with IDPs now coming under the same structures of 
objectification associated with the refugee label, as refugees are constructed essentially as 
people to be acted upon rather than as actors themselves. Indeed, refugees are objectified as 
populations whose function is to be counted, registered, studied, surveyed and one day 
returned to become ‘normal’ people.388 Secondly, through the control it awarded relief actors, 
it subjected IDPs to the same imbalances that emerged between refugees and UNHCR which 
will be detailed in the IDP camps in Uganda in chapter 5. These included petty abuses, 
systematic humiliations, and punishments inflicted at the behest of the organisation in order to 
reinforce the message of control.389 Thirdly, such an ambiguous category opened the flood 
gates to multiple impositions of value, as what we thus incurred was a bureaucratic label that 
could absorb different meanings to identical circumstances and behaviours. For the 
humanitarian community, the suffering IDPs that require protection may be to the army of a 
fragile state the subversive population interned in camps for aiding and abetting insurgent 
groups. For UNHCR the ‘potential’ refugees unable to flee persecution and civil war may be 
considered by Western states to be IDPs who must be assisted so as to prevent them from 
becoming refugees.   
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2.4 Depoliticised & Technicised Protection 
The combination of a bureaucratic category within camp based relief operation thus has the 
logic of depoliticising and technicising protection.390 While protection is today a ubiquitously 
revealed truth within development and humanitarian discourse, it became an essential 
ingredient within the IDP Regime first with the construction of displacement as an apolitical 
crisis coupled with the creation of an IDP category that pacified people, and secondly in 
justifying mechanisms of power that cemented the supremacy and privileges of institutions 
and foreign intervention under R2P.  
The explanation for such a manoeuvre resided in the fact that power politics is perceived to be 
an almost evil and corruptible element, incompatible with development and humanitarian 
values, precisely because it does not respect human rights and opens up contestations that 
result in winners and losers and festering iniquities and systems of oppression. As a 
consequence, its presence, which cannot be eradicated, is instead continuously hidden, 
denied, downplayed and ignored by practitioners, academics, and policy makers, to simply 
allow it to flourish unchecked below radar. The recourse to power politics only unearths past 
wrongs, which now shape the present, and ultimately reveals the world’s true colours, as a 
zero sum contest filled with a few powerful and entrenched winners, and many weak and 
discontented losers. This is fully displayed in the UNHCR Handbook for the Protection of 
Internally Displaced Persons which lists a number of distinct protection risks that remove and 
bypass any traces of the ‘political’: 
IDPs have been compelled to leave their homes and often cannot return because they 
face risks at their places of origin from which State authorities are unable or unwilling 
to protect them, because they might have been specifically prohibited to return, or 
because their homes have been destroyed or are being occupied by someone else. They 
also may face the risk of forced return to an area that is unsafe.391 [emphasis added] 
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The language of displacement appears to be vague, ambiguous and virtually blameless, 
omitting any trace of the identity or motivations of perpetrators. The highlighted areas are 
simply euphemisms that beg the imminent questions by whom and why? In the following 
section titled the particular factors of internal displacement that tend to heighten protection 
risks, the handbook creates a surreal and innocuous atmosphere of quick and easy solutions to 
simple technical problems (see Table 13 below).392  
Table 13. IDP Protection 
Problem Solution 
 
IDPs have lost their homes and, as a result, 
may be in need of shelter. 
 
They have lost access to their land and other 
property and are cut off from their normal 
livelihoods and sources of income.  
 
Access to adequate food, safe, water and 
public services, such as education and health 
care becomes difficult. 
 
Identity documents often are lost, destroyed 
or confiscated in the course of displacement.  
As a result, IDPs often face difficulties in 
accessing public services, such as education, 
and health care, limits on freedom of 
movement and heightened risk of harassment, 
exploitation or arbitrary arrest and detention. 
 
In many cases, IDPs are displaced into areas 
where they face marginalisation, 
discrimination and hostility, are exposed to 
landmines or explosive remnants of war, or 
are targeted for abuse and attack 
 
 
Shelter 
 
 
Livelihoods 
 
 
 
Relief Delivery 
 
 
 
Registration & Monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Camp Based Relief 
 
There is no mention of how the camp is supposed to protect inhabitants from the real 
imminent threats of direct armed conflict in the form of kidnappings, rape, raiding of relief 
stocks, rebel recruitment, all of which require a significant military presence in camps, which 
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may unsettle aid agencies and donors not wishing to remove or conflate the civil-military 
divide and which has made many NGOs the targets to factions of a conflict. The power 
politics existing at the IDP, State, and NGO/Donor level is virtually absent from the 
displacement discourse, which is purely an international response to suffering people. The 
language of humanitarianism ultimately delinks citizens from their state. By labelling them as 
internally displaced, that morphs them into sanitised, static and technical objects of charity. 
This is in contrast to the label of ‘citizen’, which is an active word that forces people to hold 
governments to account for not providing services and rights. Such discussions would 
automatically plunge us into a murky, complex, and unnavigable political ocean, well beyond 
the scope of any humanitarian actor to resolve. 
This indeed has been a major critique of humanitarian protection by organisations in the 
growing literature which has become somewhat of a cottage industry in itself.393 Nearly all 
recognise the gulf between rhetoric and reality of assistance with the struggle to prevent what 
all acknowledge as the ‘well fed dead’ or the ‘well fed harassed, intimidated, and raped’. As a 
counter weight to these criticisms and arguments levelled against humanitarian intervention 
Hugo Slim has sought to defend relief aid on the basis that: 
It should never be forgotten that relief agencies are always responding to the violence 
of others. The difficult moral choices faced by relief agencies usually come about as a 
result of the immoral choices already made by political leaders and other individuals 
and groups. In most situations, relief agencies inherit an already uneven moral playing 
field.394 
 
However, to mount a critique or defence of humanitarian protection may be to completely 
miss the point, because, in earnest, protection is a consensual ideal, which while impossible to 
entirely define, measure, and operationalize, reveals a number of unspoken practices that 
cement a series of power structures, which may be the real object of the game. Firstly on the 
ground, protection simply equates to the presence of large numbers of Westerners, which is 
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predicated on the experience and perception that suffering civilians are less likely to be killed 
or harassed in the presence of civilised and advanced ‘white people’, who can expose, 
embarrass, and have greater leverage over backward and corrupt Third World states.395 
Secondly, the perceived fruitless and perilous endeavours of protection may in actuality 
adhere to the ‘normal’ working practices of the UN system, as Hancock recounts: 
An important part of this in the United Nations is that the accepted indicators of a job 
well done have ceased to be, for example, material benefits delivered to the poor; 
rather, ‘success’ is defined by bureaucratic or ceremonial factors like the number of 
conferences, studies and meetings that take place to discuss the subject of global 
poverty, the number of Days, Weeks, Years or Decades of ‘solidarity’ with the 
disadvantaged that are celebrated, the number of ‘keynote’ publications prepared, the 
sophistication of the language in which ‘back-to-office reports’ are couched-and so on. 
In such a fashion, as Maurice Bertrand puts it: The way in which the mill operates 
becomes more important than the quality of the flour it produces.396 [emphasis added] 
 
This is fully evident with the IDP Regime today, which has prompted the hyper growth of 
‘new’ protection initiatives (offices, working groups, partnerships, training, and monitoring 
structures) for ‘unprecedented’, ‘specific’, and ‘unaddressed’ protection concerns, that once 
again maintains the flow of salaries, livelihoods, benefits and the all important aura of liberal 
internationalism.397 Since 1999, the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has developed 
several policies and tools relevant to IDP protection.398 However, none can effectively end 
displacement or confront or hold a predatory state or belligerent actor to account. Instead, 
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they all become polite and commendable attempts at problem solving but which justify 
inaction.399 Indeed, as will be exposed in chapter 5, humanitarian protection is, in essence, a 
game that is played with actors constantly attempting to reduce the cognitive dissonance 
arising from their failed neutrality, professionalism, and ethics, as Marriage notes,  
      Assistance is delivered alongside rules based on human rights and humanitarian 
principles. These rules are not constantly adhered to by any party, but are 
inconsistently referred to, and rarely fulfilled or enforced. When the rules are 
invoked, their function is to claim legitimacy for interventions, and to discredit 
people who obstruct them. On other occasions, violations are overlooked, and when 
assistance is inadequate, its discourse ignores, excuses or disguises weaknesses in 
implementation. This has two consequences: no change for people suffering from 
destitution caused by violence and no impact on the description of suffering or the 
formulation of assistance.400 
3. The Effects of the IDP Regime 
Having established the nature and logic of the IDP Regime, it is now important to observe 
what it does in practice. This requires us to jettison purely textual analyses which define 
discourse as ‘a system of statements that construct...an object’401 or as ‘forms of spoken 
interaction’402, or ‘sets of meanings representations, images stories and statements’403. Indeed, 
Foucault’s primary concern was that discourses were, in essence, forms of practice in, what 
he termed, matrices of transformation that qualify and condition such processes. Indeed, 
speaking and the use of words is in itself a force that brings about effects.404   
 
3.1Creating a Space of Alternate Social Ordering  
 
The first major effect is the creation of an alternate bureaucratic category of citizens, residing 
in an alternate territorial space, governed by an alternate set of actors who intervene to imbue 
those in their care with the de facto ‘rights of refugees’. This has the principle effect of 
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creating a space of alternate social ordering within the borders of a fragile state. Such an 
exercise can open, justify, and sustain a series of controls and privileges due to the fact that it 
is a zone of limbo with inhabitants residing within an ambiguous status of existing within 
their state territory through a legal category that can become anything and everything to its 
custodians (see Figure 26 below).  
 
As refugee camps are all too familiar with the complexities of exploitation, militarisation, and 
morbidity, and the fact that IDP Regime mirrors such practices, we notice that embedded and 
enacted within the discrete spatiality of IDP camps will be several of the same characteristics. 
In Somalian refugee camps in Kenya, there was a tension with the need to marry the cultural 
needs of the inhabitants with the universality of UN protocols in that ‘the spaces of refugee 
camps are in policy and practice structured accordingly to supra-local understandings of local 
needs. That is to say, the UNHCR organised camps, ostensibly with the shelter, provision, and 
protection needs of refugees in mind. But on the ground their organisation looks quite 
different. Once inside the camps, it appears that they meet the security and logistical needs of 
the humanitarian organisations’.405 In many camps, inhumane treatment by relief agencies is 
often justified as ‘needs assessments’, 
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Figure 26. Space of Alternate Social Order 
Refugee         
Rights 
Citizens 
within 
their 
borders 
IDPs 
173 
 
Because numbers are essential for appeals for international funding extraordinary 
efforts are taken by UNHCR and NGO partners to conduct ‘accurate’ censuses. 
Methods involve herding refugees into enclosures and night swoops on camps. As one 
manual on registration advises: Spot checks involve an actual head count and are best 
carried out at unsocial hours like midnight or dawn when the majority of people will be 
in their houses. You will need a large number of staff to go round counting every 
person.406  
 
Camps have been the site of continued unrest, as in the Somali refugees in camps in Kenya at 
Kakuma and Dadaab, where multiple occurrences of violence at the intra and inter group 
levels persisted, with armed robbery, domestic and community violence, and sexual abuse 
becoming a norm for which UNHCR had to navigate.407 The militarisation of camps was 
documented in Nepal among the Bhutanese Lhotshampas refugees who were subject to 
propaganda and recruitment activities of Maoist insurgents to the alarm of the government in 
Kathmandu. Similarly in Tanzania, Burundian refugee camps have been the sites of the 
proliferation of arms which caused the Burundian military in January 2002 to commence 
bombing Tanzanian villages close to the border. This crisis led to the employment of 300 
Tanzanian police officers to ensure law and order.408 Refugee camps in Liberia witnessed the 
accumulation of ration cards and the duplication of names as a survival strategy. In the Laine 
camp the UNHCR would count 28,000 inhabitants in 2003, while the MSF count produced 
21,000.409 In sum, the reformulation of the refugee camp now within state borders as IDP 
camps, re-establishes all these power structures, but under a new internationally acclaimed 
regime. All of these known features and pathologies are now transported and fixed into the 
new structures of IDP camps with the same effects. The impact of this will be explored in 
greater depth in chapter 5.  
 
3.2 Altering the Dynamics of Conflict  
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The second effect of this emanates from the depoliticisation, in that the multiple political 
agendas which forged the new regime continue to silently linger with displacement now 
becoming a hybrid that amalgamates three opposed agendas (population control, refugee 
containment, and humanitarian protection) which results in a comfortable co-existence of 
interests for a given number of actors over a given period. So, for example, a state engaging 
in a counter-insurgency operation that has displaced sections of its populace into 
concentration camps can, in effect, claim that it is suffering a crisis of internal displacement 
and call for humanitarian assistance to ‘protect’ its destitute citizens. Secondly, Western states 
wanting to curb the flow of asylum seekers can thus now intervene in fragile states for 
indefinite periods by claiming to address the root causes of flight through reconstruction and 
development. These are both matched by the protection mechanisms of humanitarian actors 
who have transformed the concentration camp from a once temporary, artificial, and visceral 
structure, into a permanent and ‘benevolent’ one. Through the United Nations Cluster 
Approach and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Camp Management Tool Kit, 
sovereign territory can be sectioned and citizens quarantined on the basis that they are 
working for their welfare. Ultimately, it becomes difficult to ascertain just where along this 
spectrum of the IDP Regime each of these agendas reside, as they share similar characteristics 
to each other (see Table 14 below).  
 
Table 14. IDP Spectrum 
CONTROL 
Counter-Insurgency 
Villagisation 
Extermination 
Internal Security 
CONTAINMENT 
UNHCR 
CBOs/QIPs 
Internal Flight Alternative 
Xenophobia & Racism 
PROTECTION 
R2P 
Humanitarianism 
Development 
IDP Convention 
 
 
IDP REGIME 
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A prime example of this effect was in the wake of the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 
Sri Lanka in May 2009, in which the Sri Lankan military became the lead authority on post-
conflict reconstruction, with claims from senior military officials that ‘security forces in 
North will be engaged in a new role of developing the region’.410 Under the Project for 
Confidence Building and Stabilisation Measures for IDPs’ over 100,000 Tamil IDPs were 
interned into militarised concentration camps officially defined as ‘High Security Zones’ for 
security vetting. The government introduced strict controls on information with no media or 
humanitarian presence allowed in camps. Intelligence personnel were also embedded in 
camps among IDPs, monitoring and reporting, all with the purpose of preventing the Tamil 
Tigers from regrouping and resuming hostilities. The Defence Secretary commented how, 
‘Once this terrorism problem which lasted for 30 years is completed, we have to enter the 
next episode of it. The war is like a cancer. Even after curing cancer, there is a period of 
radiation treatment. It is the same with the war on terrorism’.411 The aid community while 
criticising the Sri-Lankan Government for the violent way it concluded the conflict, became 
complicit through their construction of the concentration camps, which was reflected in the 
casual and technical approach documented in this United Nations briefing report to the 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in 2009 that whitewashed state predation. 
 
In the camp Manik Farm Zone 2, government authorities have agreed to prioritise basic 
drainage so that agencies can start implementing shelter construction. Shelter agencies 
will provide tents to accommodate the latest influx of IDPs in Manik Farm 2 and 5 
additional sites identified by the authorities. As of yesterday, almost 6000 emergency 
shelters were completed at the Zone 3 transit site of Manik Farm…In Jaffna, a new site 
has been identified by authorities for temporary shelters. Shelter agencies are in the 
process of assessing the site…The UN Population (UNFPA) is collaborating with 
district health authorities to provide hygiene packs to IDPs in Vavuniya. A total of 
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25,000 packs will be distributed, of which 13,000 have already been handed over to the 
Regional Director of Health Services in Vavuniya.412 
 
By July 2009, Manik Farm in Vavuniya was housing 210,000 ethnic Tamils, complete with 
banks, post-offices, schools and supermarkets. This camp was built by the international aid 
community who put up 43,000 shelters and tents, 8,761 latrines, 339 places to wash, 12 
nutrition centres and 132 temporary learning spaces for students413. The government claimed 
that IDPs would be returned to their homes by the end of the year in 2009. In July 2010, after 
receiving Indian assistance for the reconstruction of the KKS Harbour, cement factory and 
Palaali airstrip, the Media Minister Keheliya Rambukwella rejected proposals to close the 
High Security Zones commenting that the military would be tightening its grip along the 
north east coast with the construction of new military bases for the Sinhalicisation of strategic 
Tamil areas.414  
 
3.3 Establishing a Lucrative Humanitarian Economy 
Finally, the presence of the relief industry coupled with the technicisation of camp based 
relief structures, has the effect of sustaining the privileges of NGOs through the humanitarian 
funding appeal processes that can instrumentalise visual portrayal of chronic human suffering 
to generate a sizable flow of funds with relatively little oversight for actors wishing to operate 
within complex emergencies. Indeed, through the marketability of disaster appeals this has 
led many inexperienced and unqualified organisations to advertise and tender for relief work. 
In July 1994, following the Rwandan genocide, and the mass exodus to Zaire, Match 
International, a small Canadian women’s development organisation assumed humanitarian 
credentials and competed against Canadian branches of the Red Cross, CARE, Oxfam and 
World Vision to ‘supply kerosene stoves to stop the destruction of forests by refugees seeking 
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fuel’.415 Secondly, it raised the concern about the transparency of funding, which is virtually 
impossible to identify, trace, and monitor. This is due to multiple identifiable and 
unidentifiable sources (donors, governments, and private contributions), the continuous stages 
of sub-contracting of relief projects, and the bribery of unwilling governments and belligerent 
factions to guarantee relief presence and delivery. Funds are easily subject to mismanagement 
due to the absence of rigorous mechanisms of accountability and the independence of NGOs. 
Thirdly, as Dawes explains, in analysing humanitarian work, ‘it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish the desire to help others from the desire to amplify the self, to distinguish altruism 
from narcissism’.416 In many emergencies, the primary objective of disaster relief, as a 
number of practitioners have candidly admitted, is the creation of a lucrative humanitarian 
economy through the implementation of a vast myriad of independent projects that absorb 
immense resources and manpower expenses, and which are all sustained by the continuous 
flow of donor funds: 
My job is to assure AICF’s survival. If we are out of Sudan [and other agencies replace 
us], then the hard truth is we are less likely to get funding…That’s the reality. An NGO 
simply must be in certain areas that the donors are paying attention to.417 
The main reason that people accept a job in a place like this is so they can stash away 
money- and I’m stashing away a small fortune. Because it’s classified as a hardship 
post, I’m automatically on 25% above the basic salary for my grade. In addition it’s a 
Muslim country, which means we work on Sundays- and that gets me another 25%. My 
housing’s paid, food is cheap and there’s really nothing much else to spend money on, 
so I’m building up a nest-egg.418  
Ultimately, it is imperative to recalibrate the lenses we use to observe and understand relief 
actors by remaining conscious of the power dynamics many bring to bear upon complex 
emergencies through the ‘NGO Scramble’ that can easily side-line ethics, project efficiency, 
and accountability419. The security and wellbeing of displaced masses which are initially 
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trumpeted as primary goals, can thus, in practice, become tertiary objectives when aid agency 
survival is paramount. This has usually meant agencies taking on greater risks, which 
culminate in the incorporation of relief aid into the political economy of war and disaster. For 
example, the civil war in Nigeria in 1968 saw the Nigerian military besiege the separatist state 
of Biafra. However, continuous delivery of aid by air from Oxfam, Catholic agencies and the 
ICRC who defied the siege with 7800 relief flights which was praised as a heroic 
achievement, was widely believed to have prolonged the crisis for 18 months and contributed 
to over 180,000 deaths.420 Similarly, in Somalia in 1992, the ICRC through UNISOM 1, 
Operation Restore Hope intensified both the famine and civil war through its delivery of food 
aid. The location of distribution sites in rebel territory pushed many people away from their 
farms and cultivation into the direct influence and recruitment of warlords. The need to recruit 
and secure aid convoys with armed guards created a premium for weapons as a prerequisite 
for employment for many unemployed young men. Ultimately, the injection of food aid into a 
highly charged environment of lawlessness and scarcity resulted in it becoming a spoil of war 
with mass looting of warehouses, redirection of relief by rebel factions and the kidnapping 
and ransoming of aid workers.421 Finally, in Goma in 1994, the humanitarian relief industry 
was held responsible for the cholera epidemic which killed over 50,000 Rwandan refugees 
through their dense concentration in squalid camps. This became a media spectacle for many 
agencies seeking to maintain a relief presence and generate emergency funds. This was in 
addition to directly aiding the Interehamwe militia who were escaping the RPF invasion and 
had been regrouping and rebuilding their forces within the camps for future incursions.422  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has interrogated the conventionalised thought introduced by the IDP Regime, to 
show how such formalisations not only carry a series of reductions but, more importantly, a 
set of characteristic pre-occupations which detract attention from the continuous minutiae of 
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power’s everyday operations. More importantly, as Shapiro cautions, when textualising global 
politics: 
 
It is the dominant, surviving textual practices that give rise to the systems of meaning 
and value from which actions and policies are directed and legitimated. A critical 
political perspective is, accordingly, one that questions the privileged forms of 
representation whose dominance has led to the unproblematic acceptance of subjects, 
objects, acts, and themes through which the political world is constructed.423 
 
Put clearly, the IDP Regime is a social construction that allows powerful northern states to 
sanction the relief industry to intervene in fragile and warring states, in order to transform 
citizens into a bureaucratic category of passive, voiceless, victims through the application of 
the custodial institution of concentration camps as a space of alternate social ordering for 
effectively reforming the domestic social and political environment. This is all designed to 
address and manage the root causes of refugee flows to the Global North. The forthcoming 
section will discuss the impact of the IDP Regime by observing how all these discursive 
reproductions of power, privilege, and paternalism operated within the fragile state of 
Uganda.  
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Chapter Four 
Uganda & the IDP Regime 
The Political Economy of War & Displacement   
 
Introduction 
For the IDP Regime, all attempts to mitigate and reverse the physical suffering of IDPs are 
located within the boundaries of fragile states. Thus policies revolve around either 
humanitarian relief interventions or campaigns to build and incorporate the IDP Convention 
into domestic legal systems for such states to respond rapidly and efficiently. This was in 
addition to the work of the Special Representative who since 1992 was tasked with making 
country visits to assess situations of displacement and offer advice to officials on disaster 
mitigation. The Republic of Uganda provides a perfect setting for an empirical evaluation of 
the impact of the IDP Regime, for it was one of its poster children, being one of the first to 
develop a national policy for internally displaced persons in 2004; one of the first to 
implement the UNHCR Cluster Approach mechanism in 2005; and the country which 
launched the IDP Kampala Convention in 2009. It is therefore important to document the 
underlying conditions within this fragile state, in order to understand the history, actors and 
politics of conflict resolution for which the IDP Regime came to be immersed in.  
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first provides ahistoric overview of the violence 
in northern Uganda. The second outlines the five phases of displacement as a result of the 
social breakdown and international attention. The third documents the political economy of 
war to expose the functions that the violence served. The final section details the ways in 
which Uganda was able to retain power by manipulating the IDP Regime to maintain a 
lucrative war while guaranteeing international public acclaim.      
 
1. Brief History of Violence 1980-1996 
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Since independence in 1966, the Republic of Uganda has endured a turbulent existence 
characterised by political unrest, economic collapse, coup d’etats, and violence.424 Colonial 
masters deliberately selected soldiers from indigenous minority ethnic groups, or from areas 
that co-operated and accepted colonialism. Howe argues that ‘ethnic selection works against a 
common identity by placing and supporting an exclusive sub-nationalism above an inclusive 
nationalism. It also lowers political acceptance of the state by groups excluded from the 
military, and raises their fears of state-sponsored repression’.425 In Uganda, the British 
Protectorate recruited exclusively from the Acholi in the Northern regions. This policy arose 
from three considerations. First, when deploying colonial troops, soldiers should not be of the 
same race, religion, or ethnicity as the local population in the areas planned for deployment, 
‘since the army was engaged primarily in southern Uganda and not in the north, Acholi 
recruits would be stationed among alien tribes in accordance with colonial principles’.426 
Second, the Baganda having been exposed to British rule were more familiar and assertive in 
their interaction with them and it was hoped that the Acholi would be more amenable to the 
authority of the British, unlike the Baganda who were perceived by military officers to be 
arrogant and insubordinate.427 Third, the Acholi were loosely organised which made large-
scale military mobilisation very difficult under a single political leadership to confront the 
British administration, if conflict were to arise between the two.428 
This militarization of society through ethnic recruitment had detrimental effects on civil-
military relations in Uganda throughout the 1960s post-independence era in two ways. 
Military intervention and conflict thus became the only effective means to changing the 
political destiny of the state.  Acker notes how, ‘security forces acquired lives and identities 
of their own, with civilian control non-existent, while competition concerning which ethnic 
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groups would form the constituent core of the security forces drove a history of violent 
political change’.429  
This began following Idi Amin’s seizure of power in 1971, in which he consolidated his base 
in the army by employing his own ethnic group from West Nile and exterminated many 
Acholi and Langi soldiers.430 Second with the military being the main source of employment 
in Northern Uganda, the later overthrow of Acholi by the National Resistance Army (NRA) in 
1986, meant many Acholis lost employment and subsequent livelihoods which compelled 
them to rebel. After the National Resistance Movement defeated the Uganda National 
Liberation Army (UNLA) and entered government, a series of reprisals against the Acholi 
including massive retrenchment of Acholi from the military and government departments 
ensued. Acholi civilians were evicted from government-allocated houses; Acholi businessmen 
were harassed by security services with their wealth confiscated as a form of revenge. 
Negative propaganda was issued against the Acholi blaming them for the Luwero atrocities 
calling them ‘Anyanyas’, (a derogative phrase coined during Amin’s era as an insult to the 
Sudanese from whom the Acholi are perceived to have originated). 431 The worst occurred 
when the NRA pursued defeated Acholi-UNLA remnants deep into the villages of Gulu and 
Kitgum, with unarmed civilians tortured, raped and killed with unlawful arrests, looting of 
properties and the burning of houses and granaries. Nyeko & Lucima note how ‘the 
government ordered all former soldiers to turn themselves in with their weapons. Ex-soldiers 
who responded to the order were severely mistreated, many detained and some killed’432. 
These conditions of fear or repraisals led to the emergence of more than one insurgent group 
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attempting to resist government.433 The most prominent was the Lord’s Resistance Army led 
by the spiritual leader Alice Lakwena and then subsequently by her cousin Joseph Kony who 
since 1986 attempted to transform Uganda into a theocracy governed by the biblical 10 
Commandments. 
2 .The Phases of Internal Displacement 1994-2008 
While the violence brought mass social breakdown, fear and cultural dislocation which 
displaced over 2 million people, the internal displacement in northern Uganda was not a 
single event but rather a gradual five level process that progressed and mutated according to 
the escalating violence, disorder, government priorities and international attention. The first 
phase was the psychological displacement from security and livelihoods experienced by many 
during the early years of the insurgency and counter-insurgency from 1986. This phase was 
characterised by fear, uncertainty and desperation, which necessitated the initial need for 
flight. The government in 1991 conducted an aggressive counter-insurgency operation 
codenamed Operation North, which saw large number of the Acholi population summarily 
imprisoned, screened, and interrogated by the army as part of a drive to uncover remnants of 
the UNLA hiding amid the population and supporting the LRA.  
The second phase was the sporadic voluntary movement of large numbers of panic-stricken 
communities away from villages and homesteads into towns and larger trading centres closer 
to government forces and perceived security. There was also a backward movement to 
homesteads for cultivation amid the fluctuating security conditions. The third phase was the 
coercive displacement by the military as a solution to guerrilla warfare, which arose from the 
direct rebel targeting of the civilian population. The Acholi populations were displaced into 
established camps termed ‘protected villages’ or into trading centres under army control with 
a 48 hour notice period. This was carried out through UPDF formal radio announcements. 
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The fourth phase arose from the heightened suffering within the protected villages due to 
malnutrition, disease and congestion, which forced the government to invite a humanitarian 
relief intervention in 1998 in order to save face both globally and domestically. This move 
changed the face of the war and displacement as the conflict which was politically and 
economically functional could endure with camps now becoming semi-permanent structures 
through the co-opting of the relief industry to reduce any collateral damage. The fifth phase of 
displacement was the introduction of the IDP Regime with Uganda becoming one of the first 
test cases alongside Liberia and Congo for the Cluster Approach framework. The statement in 
2003 by Jan Egeland, the United Nations Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, which 
described Uganda as ‘the most forgotten humanitarian catastrophes’, transformed the region 
into a complex emergency with the consolidation appeal by over 100 relief agencies 
amounting to US$148.1 million, which also brought  unprecedented global media attention.434 
The government intensified the forced displacement across the whole of northern Uganda and 
the creation of the IDP policy in 2004 resulted in IDPs becoming a formal state bureaucratic 
category, with enshrined rights and services. The IDP camps thus mutated from a counter-
insurgency practice to a recognised humanitarian structure with NGOs forming a basic civil 
administrative structure through a camp management strategy. Thisdemarcated and 
dividedthe three Acholi sub-counties (Gulu, Kitgum & Pader) between themselves, in order to 
render camps more ‘sustainable’, but which made the total of 99 camps more permanent (see 
Figures 27-29 below).  
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Figure 27  
Gulu District IDP Camps 
Figure 28  
Kitgum District IDP Camps 
Figure 29  
Pader District IDP Camps 
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This last phase internationalised the violence and created an interesting dynamic which was 
similarly observed in the case of Sierra Leone with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 
who only caught the international spotlight when they captured hostages, began 
dismembering people, and using child soldiers. This was primarily because,  
…the normative approach of assistance operates within the political environment. It 
supports victims of the ‘other’-the opposite and barbaric, particularly by appealing to 
abused rights and the principle of impartiality….The political morality formalises 
condemnation…certain forms of violence are abhorred, and assistance is bestowed 
symbolically on its victims. Other forms of violence are ignored, depending on how the 
morality activity reflects on the aid provider.435  
Throughout the early 1990s the LRA were virtually unheard of, attracting scant global 
attention, nor neither presenting territorial claims, or even a coherent political agenda. 
However in the early 2000s, the moral titillation produced by the media spectacle of violent 
abuse, rape, abduction, child soldiers, mutilation, and the great numbers languishing in 
camps, combined with the enigmatic cult figure of Joseph Kony gave the IDP Regime and the 
humanitarian industry all the energy they required for maximum impact, as will be revealed in 
the next chapter.       
3. The Political Economy of War    
The violence in northern Uganda raised many questions, ambiguities, and doubts for political 
leaders, war victims, scholars, journalists, and the wider international community.436 The 
puzzle of seemingly endless war was openly discussed because it featured in the annual 
Presidential State of the Nation Address. Indeed, for over a decade President Museveni had 
told Ugandans that the war in northern Uganda was in its concluding phases with the LRA 
weak and on the brink of absolute military defeat. However such statements became a 
continuous and predictable comical gesture because they were always instantly disproved 
through intense LRA incursions against civilians, appeals by government for rebels to accept 
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amnesty, and protests from civil society at the army’s abuses and inability to protect civilians. 
Nevertheless, Museveni would continuously reassure his citizens that the Uganda People’s 
Defence Force (UPDF) was capable of engaging in decisive operations that would soon bring 
lasting peace (see Table 15 below).   
Table 15  
President Yoweri Museveni State of the Nation Address (1995-2010) 
 
Date Statement Solution to Violence 
 
 
 
 
1995 
‘In the North, Government efforts in 
eliminating armed thuggery are 
taking a bit longer because of the 
external factor but I wish to assure 
this August House that the security 
of the North is on top of our agenda 
and we shall soon bring peace to 
these areas infected by thuggery437 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 
The remnants of Kony’s group have 
now broken into small groups that 
are being picked one by one, or they 
are surrendering in droves. 
 
Kony is not fighting for political 
ends, but for a style of living that he 
cannot afford through legal toil. 
Kony is not fighting for politics, he 
wants to have free chicken, if I may 
summarise it like that. He wants to 
remain in the Sudan or in the 
mountains if we do not chase him, 
taking chicken from the villagers. 
Because sitting down to work until 
you get chicken for yourself is 
laborious, it takes time, it takes 
discipline. Now, there are people 
who do not want to work but they 
want to take from others, and if they 
happen to have the gun, until you 
control them, they will use that 
method.  
Is it wise to allow such bad example 
to go unpunished? What if it 
encourages others to similarly loot 
as a form of fund-raising or capital 
accumulation? When will our 
society ever settle down to develop? 
In any case, these criminals have not 
only looted, but have also murdered 
thousands of people. Remember the 
massacres of Atiak, Palabek, Chet 
kan and others. Do you think that 
such criminals can settle down in 
villages without reprisals from the 
relatives of the victims? 
 
There is no short cut. We must build 
a strong Army, a strong Police 
Force, a strong Intelligence service 
to defeat illegal elements, whether 
they are backed by foreigners or 
not438. 
 
 
The bandits of Kony have wreaked 
havoc on the population: cutting off 
their ears, their noses, killing 
people, raping, abducting. They 
In the last two years however, the 
UPDF has inflicted very severe 
losses of these bandits. Even some 
of the hard core bandits who have 
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1999 
have done all this in the company of 
the Sudanese Government. 
been organising this have been 
killed. That is why you hear that 
there is some peace in the North, 
because the bandits are quite 
weakened. We are also improving 
infrastructure in that area by 
reopening the roads and building 
new ones so that the area is 
accessible439  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 
In December, 1999 Uganda and 
Sudan concluded the Nairobi Peace 
Agreement. Since then, we have 
released Sudanese prisoner of war 
by unfortunately, Sudan has not 
shown much commitment to that 
agreement. No sooner had the ink 
dried on the agreement papers than 
200 bandits of Kony crossed into 
Uganda from Sudan. This particular 
group are still dispersed in Kitgum 
and Gulu areas in small groups. 
As I said recently, we shall not fold 
our arms while this group of Kony is 
still disturbing us from near Juba. 
We are working with different 
people including President Gadaffi 
to ensure that this Kony leaves Juba 
and he is taken somewhere else by 
Bashir and I am sure, we shall 
succeed one way or the other440 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 
Kony has also been weakened. 
Recently, he tried to re-enter 
Uganda; we intercepted him inside 
Sudan and gave him a thorough 
beating. He fled back towards 
Jaberain where he stays with the 
Sudanese. Jaberain is deep inside 
Sudan near Juba. We are waiting for 
Sudan to re-locate Kony bandits to 
Khartoum as we agreed in Nairobi. 
I appeal to the rebels to take 
advantage of the amnesty and come 
back to the fold441. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003 
One factor that has damaged one 
aspect of our economy, i.e. tourism, 
has been the terrorism of Kony in 
Northern Uganda. Starting exactly a 
year ago, the UPDF launched 
‘Operation Iron Fist’ to uproot Kony 
from Southern Sudan and wipe out 
that criminal terrorism. In the one 
year of continuous operations, the 
UPDF has killed 3,496 bandits, 
liberated about 6,800 children from 
Kony’s captivity, and released 
several thousands of other abductees 
who are not children. The bandits 
efforts to infiltrate into Lango, 
Karamoja, and Adjumani have been 
defeated. I have been concentrating 
on the North because the people of 
the North have suffered too much; 
the people of Acholi in particular 
The government gave some 
additional resources to the army. 
Those resources have enabled the 
Army to acquire new equipment. 
Only a small portion of the 
equipment has arrived. We do not 
yet have enough of the Mi-17s to 
supplement the Mi-24s in launching 
combined operations, although they 
are coming. In most of the 
engagements, the UPDF 
commanders have been doing a 
good job…The CO of the 11th 
Battalion along the Karuma road has 
been given the task of wiping out 
the group that killed the 14 people in 
a bus on the 28th May 2003…We 
have also deployed the 75th 
Battalion to support the 11th 
Battalion in guarding Karuma road. 
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and the people of Karamoja…It has 
taken time, and the anti-Kony war 
has taken a zigzag course, but Kony 
will be defeated and wiped out. 
So, there are now two full battalions 
on that road to guard it in enough 
density, to ensure that no other nasty 
incidents, like the one that happened 
recently, happens again442. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 
Since January 2004 up to the 1 May 
2004, the following achievements 
have been registered: 781 terrorist 
killed, 372 surrenders, 179 
prisoners, 1,565 abductees liberated, 
531 SMG rifles captured, 33 anti-
tank mines, & 19 anti-personnel 
mines.  
The remnants of the Kony terrorists 
are now fugitives trying to hide. In 
fact, many of the operations which 
are still going on in the North are no 
longer really serious fighting as 
such, it is now more like hunting 
people who are hiding; and the 
whole of Teso is peaceful; the whole 
of Lango  is peaceful. 
People were saying, ‘why has this 
problem lasted so long?’ it is 
because the Army was under 
equipped. That is all; there is no 
other reason. But now with better 
equipment, we can reach any point 
in that area, including Southern 
Sudan where the government of 
Sudan has agreed with us that we 
can operate up to 4 degrees north of 
the equator. Our core assets are 
improving even more. It would be 
almost impossible for anybody to 
hide from the security forces for any 
length of time by day or by night443. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 
This problem of Kony is really 
being resolved. We have captured so 
many of these terrorists, killed many 
of them, many have come out, and 
Kony is remaining with small 
groups of people. Two days ago, we 
killed seven of the terrorists who 
killed people in Koch-Goma; there 
was a massacre some few weeks ago 
where ten people were killed. 
Yesterday but one, we killed seven 
of those who were on the spot and 
three were captured, so that problem 
is being resolved.  
We still maintain a two-track policy; 
Betty Bigombe continues trying to 
talk to the remnants of Kony, but for 
us we are hunting them and we shall 
finish this problem. There is a lot of 
pressure; I do not know why some 
people do not want Kony to be 
defeated! There must be reasons 
why some people do not want Kony 
to be defeated. They really come 
and confuse outsiders, then they talk 
about the humanitarian 
problem. The humanitarian problem 
is there but it will not be resolved by 
begging Kony, defeating or forcing 
him to come out if he wants to save 
himself will resolve it.  
All parts of the North are now 
Our view is that the amnesty is still 
available, if he wants to come out, 
he can come out, and others can 
come out too. Banya was captured; 
Sam Kolo came out himself and 
others. Kony can come but if he 
doesn't come we shall get him- 
(Interjection)- Never mind, I will 
give him to you. Our work has been 
to degrade his capacity by capturing 
people around him and killing those 
who come in our line of fire. In the 
end we shall get him. 
The International Criminal Court is 
a good ally because it makes Kony 
untouchable as long as it has got 
indictment; anybody who touches 
him will have problems with the 
International Criminal Court, 
therefore, that is the 
advantage. Now, some people who 
went to confuse the International 
Criminal Court wanted to relieve 
Kony from that pressure. Like for 
instance, if Kony goes in the part of 
Sudan which is far away from where 
we operate and there is an 
indictment, they will be under 
pressure to follow him, but if there 
is no pressure, then he will be free. 
They wouldn't be as pressurised as 
when there is an ICC indictment.  
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totally accessible; you can take 
relief wherever you want. We have 
degraded Kony so much that he has 
no capacity to ambush roads, 
vehicles and kidnap any more. 
As part of Uganda's participation in 
post conflict Sudan, the Uganda 
People's Defence Forces are 
preparing a battalion to join other 
forces under the auspices of the 
African Union to implement the 
United Nations Security Resolution 
1590 to deploy a 10,000 United 
Nations strong force to assist in the 
implementation of the peace accord 
ending the war in Southern 
Sudan444. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 
The UPDF has defeated Kony in 
both Northern Uganda & Southern 
Sudan. Kony did not go to Garamba 
for tourism. We defeated Kony. 
Kony is now part of Congo that has 
no borders with Uganda. We are 
making contingent plans to react 
vigorously in case Kony comes to 
the part of Congo that has got a  
order with Uganda. Our forces are in 
Southern Sudan just to help our 
brothers the SPLA but Kony as of 
now is not our problem. The 
remnants who are there, even 
yesterday we killed seven in 
Latanya hills. We are finishing those 
and other are coming out.  
The NRM will continue to welcome 
those who are willing to take 
advantage of the Amnesty Act and 
give up rebellion and join other 
Ugandans in rebuilding of that part 
of our country. So those who are not 
willing to come out peacefully, my 
message is that the government will 
continue to pursue them using all 
the means at its disposal, if they 
dare to re-enter Uganda again. I can 
however, reassure Ugandans that the 
UPDF possess now the capacity to 
promptly destroy any terrorist group 
that dares to enter Ugandan 
territory. If we had this capacity in 
2002 when the Kony’s re-entered 
Uganda following Operation Iron 
Fist we could have destroyed them 
promply and our people would not 
have suffered. The UPDF will have 
an all weather capacity to guard our 
sovereignty and peace, and do so 
quickly. Therefore, those days of 
turning Uganda into a field of 
adventurers and lawless elements 
are finished445   
 
 
2007 
The effective operations by the 
UPDF led to Kony and Otti fleeing 
to Congo in 2005. They could no 
longer stay in northern Uganda or in 
Southern Sudan where we were 
allowed to operate.  
Since the Congo government did not 
allow us to operate against Kony in 
Congo, I accepted Gen. Salva Kiir’s 
proposal to initiate peace talks in 
Juba. This would be a soft landing 
for the Konys, and we would also 
save the efforts we have been 
expending on defeating the 
terrorists, for more constructive 
purposes like building schools, 
health units, roads etc. 
Unfortunately, the Konys have not 
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been making good use of these 
talks; that is their choice446. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
Since the Congo Government had 
not allowed us to pursue Kony into 
Congo, and the UN was doing 
nothing about it, I decided to accept 
His Excellency, Salva Kiir’s idea 
just in case it worked. Although I 
though that it would not work, nor 
was it really necessary or correct to 
allow impunity to continue. It has 
not worked, just as I suspected. 
Kony was fooling those who were 
trooping to Garamba to beg a 
criminal to accept forgiveness of the 
victims while it should be the other 
way round.  
Kony’s behaviour is his own 
business. Since Kony is in Congo, it 
is the responsibility of President 
Kabila and the UN to deal with him. 
However all our capacity is ready 
and available in case Congo asks for 
our assistance to go and deal with 
Kony there. We are ready, able and 
prepared to go. If Kony tries to 
come to Uganda, we shall destroy 
him more thoroughly and quickly 
than we did in Teso in 2003447. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
With respect to ending years of 
strife brought on by Kony, a joint 
force from the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Southern Sudan and 
Uganda launched an attack on Kony 
in Garamba mainly because of the 
brutality he was meting out on the 
people in some areas of the DRC 
and Southern Sudan. Although 
Kony was not captured or killed, his 
infrastructure was destroyed. A 
number of his commanders were 
decimated while others surrendered 
and many abductees were freed. 
Kony will never attack Uganda 
again if he values his own security. 
The few attacks that Kony is trying 
out in the DRC will be dealt with by 
the Congolese Army assisted by 
MONUC and the UPDF intelligence 
squads that are there continuing with 
their work under the leadership of 
the Congolese army.448 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 
It is now clear that Kony’s group 
has now been destroyed and no 
longer poses any threat to the 
Ugandan people with the on-going 
mop-up operations that the Ugandan 
Peoples Defence Force is 
undertaking together with 
neighbouring countries. This marks 
the culmination of the National 
Resistance Movement and UPDF’s 
successful war against tumultuous 
years of grief and wanton 
mismanagement.  
The havoc which Kony occasionally 
wreaks in Congo or Central African 
Republic will be stopped. The world 
should not just sit back and watch. If 
some of these countries want to 
help, they should work with us and 
we shall finish the remnants of 
Kony. The step the USA 
Government has taken recently by 
Mr Obama signing a law authorising 
the American Government to help in 
the fight against Kony is a welcome 
development449.  
 
Charles King stated that one of the major problems in resolving civil wars was that, ‘war 
creates special interests…at the extreme parties to the conflict may actually have an interest in 
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continuing the conflict’.450 Although there was no war economy per se in the Central North 
based on natural resources as was the case in Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia, Colombia, 
Cambodia and DRC, all the actors had found avenues to benefit from the continued 
hostilities. The LRA benefited significantly from the instability which provided them with a 
livelihood, through the theft of food, money, clothes, females, and livestock. Violence had 
become a modus vivendi for the hard core elements that saw no advantage of life in civil 
society. In the bush they could roam freely across borders unrestricted by any government 
legislation or regulations.451 
For Museveni’s political party the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the violence in 
Northern Uganda had become politically functional on three levels. Firstly Museveni had 
been able to consolidate popular support across Southern Uganda, particularly among the 
Baganda, the most populous and prosperous ethnic group. The Museveni government was the 
first government since independence that has enjoyed significant support from the Baganda. 
This is partly due to Museveni’s reestablishment of Baganda traditional institutions, 
especially the Kabaka (king) and partly on the President’s skill at playing on Baganda fears 
that the war in the North spreading southward if not contained.452 The UNLA defeat by the 
NRA in 1986 marked a sudden and dramatic change in Uganda’s political landscape, with 
political and military power that had been concentrated among the Acholi, Langi and West 
Nile of Northern Uganda from 1962 to 1986, shifting to the Bantu South, which has enjoyed 
all state power up to this day. The fear in the South that an LRA victory would mean a loss of 
power and return to the old system, was visually depicted in the 1996 NRM presidential 
electoral campaign poster (see Figure 28 below), which portrayed the skulls collected in the 
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wake of the Luwero Triangle battles as an iconic image of the ‘well known’ UNLA brutality 
against civilians.453  
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Figure 30  
Museveni Presidential Campaign Poster, New Vision, Friday, May 3rd 1996 
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Secondly, the instability was a means to discredit and prosecute opposition party members in 
order to strengthen the NRM grip on power. Dr Kizza Besige leader of Uganda’s Forum for 
Democratic Change (FDC) party was arrested in November 2005 and put on trial for treason, 
concealment of treason, and his ‘links’ to the LRA and People’s Liberations Army (PRA). 
The government brought former LRA fighters and abductees who had been bribed and 
coached to testify of their knowledge and dealings with Besigye in the LRA. The charges 
were designed to stop Besigye and the FDC party from challenging Museveni in the 2006 
elections. Thirdly the violence had become an integral part of patron-client relations as 
budgetary reforms gave donors closer scrutiny of Uganda’s expenditure and thereby limited 
the opportunities for using the formal budget process to finance political patronage, meaning 
Museveni was increasingly forced to rely on defence and security budgets because of their 
very large ‘classified funds’ for political finance. Procurement of heavy and therefore 
expensive military equipment created the best opportunity to cream off large funds through 
inflated costs.454 The defence budget in Uganda thus grew from US$88m in 1996 to 
US$110m in 2001. This explained why in 1990 Museveni supported the Tutsi invasion of 
Rwanda, the 1998 Uganda invasion of Congo, and why Operation Iron Fist was launched 
against the LRA in Southern Sudan in 2002 after former British International Development 
Secretary Clare Short denied President Museveni’s request to increase defence spending from 
US$110m per annum to US$157m on the premise that Rwanda planned to invade Uganda.455  
In addition to the domestic political scene, the civil war played a significant role in the global 
political arena. Between 1996 and after the September 11th attacks in the United States and 
the declaration of the global War on Terror, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea became frontline 
states in fighting the Islamic regime in Sudan which had once been a haven for Osama Bin 
Laden and supported the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. These states thus began receiving $20 
million dollars a year in military aid from the United States which aimed to contain the spread 
of Islamic extremism in the Horn of Africa. Such diplomatic manoeuvring gave the 
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Government of Uganda carte blanche to pursue military operations against the LRA under the 
banner of the ‘War on Terror’. The brutality unleashed by the LRA benefited the government, 
as with this ‘victim’ image came international sympathy whose net effect had two elements: 
first with increased foreign aid support especially given the government’s economic, 
institutional and political record in the south and secondly by whitewashing government’s 
own human rights abuses.456  
4. Uganda & the IDP Regime 
The Government of Uganda was well aware of the opportunities that the IDP Regime 
presented for its retention of power. This was first witnessed through the formulation of the 
national policy for internally displaced persons in August 2004. This was controversial from 
the outset, because it became a tool for manipulating ethnic politics. It was justified on the 
basis of a history of violence-induced displacement, which it framed as a historical problem 
exclusive to the people of northern Uganda beginning with Idi Amin’s dictatorship in 1979, 
the war in Luwero Triangle between 1981 to 1985, the Allied Democratic Forces insurgency 
(1994-2001), the present LRA violence, and the perennial problem from Karamoja cattle 
raiders.457 The policy written by Lt. General (Rtd) Moses Ali while benevolent in its policy 
objectives, completely glossed over and fostered a degree of institutional amnesia of the 
history of government practise of displacement and counter insurgency policies from 1996 
onwards in northern Uganda. 
Despite this, Uganda received praise from the Representative to the Secretary General on the 
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kalin, in July 2006: 
I welcome the adoption of a substantive policy on internal displacement and the first 
steps taken toward its implementation. As I mentioned during our conversation, in my 
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consultation with government worldwide, I often reference Uganda’s National Policy 
as an example for those seeking to develop their own laws and policies.458     
The second manipulation of the IDP Regime was in relation to the catastrophic state of affairs 
in northern Uganda with regard to the failed camp based relief and the unchecked LRA 
massacres which were met with constant calls and protests by politicians and civil society 
leaders for the declaration of a disaster zone under a formal state of emergency. In Parliament 
heated debates emerged most notably from Norbert Mao, an MP from northern Uganda.459 
MR NOBERT MAO: Mr Speaker, in the spirit of your communication from the 
Chair, which covered a number of issues, I want to let members know that we who 
represent areas in conflict are very grateful for the work Members of Parliament did 
towards the end of the last Meeting. Members then unanimously adopted a motion in 
support of peaceful means of resolving the conflict. They also contributed financially, 
from their own pockets, towards the humanitarian relief of those who are displaced and 
who are suffering.  
I stand to appreciate that, and to report that the situation has gotten worse. The number 
of displaced people has now increased to 800,000 and we have more problems in the 
camps. For instance, last week there were incidents of houses burning. As I speak now, 
over 1,000 families have no shelter in Pabo camp. Many of the roads, like the road 
between Lira and Kitgum and that between Gulu and Kitgum, are still unsafe. Despite 
the need for commerce, fuel in Kitgum is Shs 5,000 per litre, and sugar is Shs 3,000 per 
kilogram. This, I believe, is the impact that insecurity has brought. While people there 
were already poor, the situation has gotten worse, and they are being hit harder.  
I pray therefore that the Members of Parliament will continue to stand together with 
Ugandans who are suffering and not politicise humanitarian issues. I am very proud of 
the spirit in which we parted after the last Meeting. I pray that the spirit prevails, 
because we intend to bring a motion to declare that area a disaster area, in order to 
ensure that there is a focus of humanitarian assistance there. We also do hope that the 
Members of Parliament will continue to support efforts to resolve the conflict by means 
other than the military. I thank you, Mr Speaker. 
                                                          
458 Letter to President Museveni from Representative to the Secretary General on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kalin, 28th July (2006). 
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This was further compounded by the fact that government later declared a state of emergency 
on two occasions arising from natural disasters with floods in Soroti in 2007 which devastated 
crops and displaced thousands460. Such a move was authorised by the Ugandan Constitution 
under Article 110 of Chapter 5: Representation of the People461, which stated that: 
(1) The President may, in consultation with the Cabinet, by proclamation, declare 
that a state of emergency exists in Uganda or any part of Uganda if the President 
is satisfied that circumstances exist in Uganda or in that part of Uganda- 
(a) In which Uganda or that part of it is threatened by war or external aggression; 
(b) In which the security or the economic life of the country or that part is 
threatened by internal insurgency or natural disaster; or  
(c) Which render necessary the taking of measures which are required for securing 
the public safety, the defence of Uganda and the maintenance of public order 
and supplies and services essential to the life of the community. 
(2) Subject to the provision of this article, a state of emergency declared under 
clause (1) of this article shall remain in existence for not more than ninety days 
and shall then expire.  
However its enactment carried immense political consequences for the President and the 
international image of Uganda. First, it was tantamount to declaring a complete loss of control 
which was unthinkable for a fragile state already battling to retain power and guarantee the 
support of the donors. Second, it would afford Ugandans living in camps in northern Uganda 
the right to flee across borders to become refugees which was already problematic due to the 
existence of chronic instability in the states bordering northern Uganda. Third, it placed huge 
pressure on the state to urgently resolve a conflict that was producing huge political and 
economic dividends. Thus in order to avoid such a costly endeavour the IDP Regime became 
the perfect buffer because through the large humanitarian presence government could argue 
that the situation was under control as NGOs assumed control in the maintenance of 
concentration camps. Government could thus assuage international criticism by employing 
                                                          
460 Museveni Declares State of Emergency, New Vision, 19th Sept h (2007). 
461 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, Chapter 5: Representation of the People, Article 110: State 
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the relief industry that would not challenge or expose army atrocities in return for access to a 
complex emergency that secured donor funds and international status.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has delivered a brief overview of the conflict and violence in Uganda in order to 
appreciate the macro-level dynamics of internal displacement within a fragile state which was 
able to manipulate the IDP Regime to secure its interests. We saw how internal displacement 
was not simply an outcome of violence and disorder but a government--orchestrated 
mechanism of population control, which fused with the IDP Regime to create an ambiguous 
and precarious environment of protection and control. The following chapter will now 
investigate the micro-level power dynamics of this fusion within the IDP Camps in northern 
Uganda, to expose how it facilitated conditions of violence, starvation, disease, exposure, and 
morbidity. 
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Chapter Five                                                                                         
The IDP Regime as Heterotopia                                                           
Harmonising Ugandan & Relief Industry Politics 
 
 
‘Space is Fundamental in Any Exercise of Power’ 
Michel Foucault462  
 
Introduction 
Humanitarian Space is considered to be a dynamic concept that is not simply a fixed and 
unchanging spatiality but more akin to an accordion that ‘may shrink or expand in accordance 
with the policies or actions of local political and military authorities. Rather than simply 
filling existing space, outside humanitarian institutions it may expand this space through their 
presence and the international attention they attract’.463 The Global IDP Regime has today 
launched the concept and practice of humanitarian space into a new galaxy, with the IDP 
camp representing the formal handover of citizens and territory of fragile states to the 
international community for indefinite administration and relief. Up until now in this thesis 
we have become aware of the history and structure of the IDP Regime. We have also been 
introduced to the political economy of displacement within Uganda. This final chapter now 
seeks to carry on the baton by injecting the findings of chapters four and five into the case 
study of Uganda to subsequently answer the pressing question: What happens when you 
create an alternate bureaucratic category of people, who exist in an alternate territorial space 
within a sovereign state, who are governed by an alternate external set of agencies, and who 
thus employ an alternate set of laws and policies? The answer to this is Heterotopia, which is 
a zone of alternate social ordering where specific power relations are established and 
orchestrated with considerable effects.   
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My overarching contention is to show how the IDP Regime through the Cluster Approach 
intervention, in essence creates an alternate and permanent space of political and physical 
limbo that unleashes a gamut of exploitative measures and pathologies, which are themselves 
implemented and justified as the very ‘solutions’ to the problems of displacement, which 
therefore suppress any suspicion, protest or call for termination. The chapter will uncover 
how an indefinite humanitarian economy was created which buttressed and harmonised 
various interests, with the IDP Camps in northern Uganda becoming free human laboratories 
for all intervening actors to test their pseudo-experiments and operations, and for the NRM 
Government to consolidate political power, with all having little or no concern for the 
catastrophic side effects brought to bear on the 1.8 million displaced people.   
The Prevailing Narrative   
This chapter seeks to respond and contribute to two sets of literatures. The first set is the 
empirical literature on the violence and displacement in northern Uganda which while 
insightful in depicting the multiple actors and political layers, require contextualisation within 
a broader analytical lens. The first is Dolan’s model of ‘Social Torture’, in which he 
propagated the accusation of the harmony of interest that developed between the humanitarian 
community and the government of Uganda which kept 1.8 million people in a permanent state 
of relief for over 13 years. Dolan’s conceptual framework seeks to establish Social Torture as 
a continuation of warfare in which IDPs were kept in a justified state of limbo from which 
they could not work, cultivate, socialise, and live the lives they desired. Instead the conditions 
of camps facilitated structural violence in which people were debilitated, humiliated, and 
violated by constant rebel attack, disease, crime, malnutrition, exposure, congestion and 
continuous fear, all of which are central functions in the practice of torture as defined in 
international conventions but with notable differences:  
Social Torture, by contrast, rather than taking place in very restricted locations in short 
bursts, is both geographically extensive and time indifferent. The whole environment, 
in this case both ‘protected villages’ and the war zone as a whole, are the site of torture-
all the time. For most people, who have no resources with which to remove themselves 
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from the war zone, there is no ‘outside’. You are not whisked away from your daily life 
to be tortured; daily life is your torture.464 
However, while Dolan presented a credible counter narrative which penetrated through the 
veneer of human rights discourse, his analysis was floating with the events understood as  
unprecedented and outrageous. It was not grounded as the rational outcome of wider 
structural forces, which this chapter seeks to illuminate through the lens of the IDP Regime. 
Similarly Branch’s work on northern Uganda recognised the violence to be logical, with the 
IDP Regime as a contributing factor, however he only attributed significance to the IDP 
category mentioning it in passing as a neutral, non-political designation that occluded the 
reason for displacement, leaving it unquestioned, and turns displacement into something that 
is to be resolved not through a return home but through technical humanitarian intervention to 
ameliorate IDP suffering.465  
Finally is Finnstrom’s anthropological work to understanding how the Acholi people living in 
a war torn area were able to construct meaning into their daily lives amid on-going rebel and 
government attacks. He probed and contextualised wartime rumours as a ‘way of coping with 
the unknown and the threatening, they help people cope with lived uncertainty and stress’.466 
His purpose was to ultimately dispel the prevailing created perceptions of people as perpetual 
objects of charity, by detailing how people living in war zones are active agents in deriving 
meaning. Finnstrom discussed the forced displacement and understood it from the testimony 
and perspective of those living in camps. Like Dolan he recognised that the camps were 
structures of domination that disrupted everyday life that became intertwined with the 
government’s counter-insurgency strategy.467 He criticised the humanitarian system which 
only treated symptoms rather than understanding political crises and grievances. However 
there was no appreciation of the perceptions and processes of the history and functions of the 
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Global IDP Regime and how the creation of a bureaucratic category had astronomical 
consequences.   
The second audience I hope to address is the humanitarian community through a re-evaluation 
of the Cluster Approach, which is assessed primarily as a neutral, technical, and apolitical tool 
that originally sought to identify and fill gaps in programme areas and coverage; strengthen 
overall capacity to respond and cutting response time; improve partnerships for humanitarian 
action, including with the host state; improve standards; integrate cost cutting issues; improve 
needs assessment, prioritising and strategic planning; and above all, foster predictable and 
accountable leadership in the field. The final evaluation report by the Humanitarian Policy 
Group in 2007 vaguely concluded that: 
The subsequent summary of findings produced mixed results because while they claim 
that there despite the initial confusion there has been systemic improvement with 
clusters ‘better able to gather the necessary information on response capacities and 
gaps…helped foster stronger and more predictable leadership over sectors…468  
 
However, such findings have to be treated with caution because they detract from evaluating 
and understanding the real and important consequences of this new mechanism. The difficulty 
arising is that the report employed a one dimensional approach which assumed that 
everything apart from the process and structure of the humanitarian intervention (which was 
the target of the Cluster Approach) simply remained constant both during and after 
implementation. It completely ignores the way in which the Cluster Approach permanently 
altered the dynamics and landscape of a fragile state embroiled in a civil war. It was treated as 
a static concept that was designed to originally fulfil the challenges identified by the UN 
humanitarian reforms of the late 90s, and was simply measured against such a benchmark. 
Such a condition is akin to doctors assessing the effects of new drugs on patients by only 
focussing on whether or not they cured or alleviated the pain of given illnesses, but 
completely disregarding how such drugs altered the patients’ physical and mental state and of 
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the harmful side effects they caused thereafter. So while Cluster Evaluation reports may 
conclude, for instance, that the ‘engagement of host states has been mixed, and overall has 
suffered from insufficient emphasis and strategic focus’469, they neglect to mention how this 
particular short-coming impacted on the wider complex emergency. Instead, all that is 
mentioned is that ‘in complex emergencies, particularly those falling under the ‘forgotten 
emergencies’ label, the UN is sometimes the only player, with a longer lead time to introduce 
the Cluster Approach, the UN can play a very close and supportive role with regard to the 
government at the national, regional and local levels’.470 The following sections will attempt 
to provide deeper insights into this shortcoming.  
Chapter Structure 
This chapter will be divided into five sections in order to build a detailed conceptual and 
empirical framework. The first section will introduce readers to the prevailing theories 
surrounding the sociology of space and its significance in illuminating the diverse activities of 
discourse and power. It will define a particular conceptualisation of space; that of 
Heterotopia, with a review of its core identifying features and theoretical debates concerning 
its relevance. The second section will be a Heterotopology of the IDP camps in northern 
Uganda, in which each identifying feature will be applied to uncover the tacit operations of 
power at play. The third section will provide a critical investigation into the overt and covert 
manifestations and operations of micro politics instilled into the camp space by both the 
humanitarian industry and the Government of Uganda, which existed under the pragmatic and 
benevolent auspices of ‘protection’. The fourth section will observe the consequences of such 
power dynamics which created several vicious cycles that violated, debilitated, humiliated 1.8 
million IDPs. The camp dynamics were thus an outcome of NGOs intervening in ways that 
facilitated themselves, the Government’s retention of power, IDPs coping and adapting to the 
reality of camp existence, and rebels seizing upon the many opportunities the camp presented 
in the wake of the abdication of the state security forces. The final section will explore how 
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heterotopias not only involve the spatialisation of discourse, but also the creation of new 
meaning and power (see Figure 31 below), through the establishment of new barrier 
restrictions to refugee flows and the construction of the LRA as a violator of human rights. 
The chapter will conclude with a discussion that seeks to contribute to the grand strategy of 
rethinking the IDP Regime.  
While it may seem elementary and more important to argue that the IDP Regime simply 
recreates the refugee camp experience within states and therefore disregard the application of 
Heterotopology as an analytical lens, such an endeavour may prove ineffective in grasping the 
intricate operations of power at play. Indeed, the overall significance of employing this 
unfinished and relatively unheard of Foucauldian paradigm for comprehending the true 
impact of the IDP Regime, resides in the logic that by studying the discourses and emblematic 
practices which constitute the place of heterotopia and cement its social identity at the micro 
level within camps, we should thus be transported back to the overarching macro schema of 
political practices and discourses of fragile states, the humanitarian industry, and international 
organisations, who all seek to transpose their own rationalities of power into material practice.  
1. Space, Discourse & Power 
Inscribing Power 
HETEROTOPIA 
Creating Power 
Figure 31. Function of Heterotopia 
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Before plunging into an all-out dissection of the IDP camp, it is important to cradle the 
analysis within the wider theoretical discussions surrounding social space. In the last forty 
years social theory has stretched its tentacles into the realm of social space with the sociology 
of space becoming a fulcrum for understanding the prevailing issues of social change, 
modernism and post modernism, consumption, power, inequality and political and cultural 
resistance, to name but a few.471   
It thus follows on, that we must now consider the central role played by space in directing 
practices of subjectivity and power, because as Hook illuminates, ‘To demarcate a place is 
also to demarcate an appropriate regime of behaviour and practice, a particular order of 
materiality. The identity and functionality of a place is hence importantly tied to forms of 
social practice, to the types of knowledge it engenders, that ‘reside’ within it, and which its 
space puts into play’.472 In keeping with this a slew of human geographers have sought to 
theoretically relocate and re-substantiate the importance of space away from the hegemony of 
‘physicalist’ understandings. For Henri Lefebvre space was political and ideological as in the 
case of the state:  
Space is never produced in the sense that a kilogram of sugar or a yard of cloth is 
produced. Nor is it an aggregate of the places or locations of such products as sugar, 
wheat or cloth. Does it then come into being after the fashion of a superstructure? 
Again no! It would be more accurate to say that it is at once a precondition and a result 
of social structures. The state and each of its constituent institutions call for spaces- but 
spaces which they can then organise according to their specific requirements; so there 
is no sense in which space can be treated solely as an a priori condition of these 
institutions and the state which presides over them.473 
Following on from this is the need to disentangle notions of place from that of territory as 
what gives a place its characteristics are the many social relations, processes, experiences and 
understandings constructed and articulated within that particular locus.474 This echoes Soja’s 
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notion of ‘Spatiality’ which is particularly useful for this discussion as he directs us to 
consider a separation between space per se, space as a contextual given, and socially-based 
spatiality, which is socially organised and produced. This social creation of space requires us 
to jettison ideas of space being a simple white canvas on which actions of groups and 
institutions are inscribed, to consider ‘socially produced space as a created structure 
comparable to other social constructions’.475 Spatiality thus becomes discursive because in 
being a social construction, it is permeated by socio-political and historical relations of power. 
An interesting example of this is the common sense notion of ‘the field’ central to the work of 
donors, aid agencies, researchers and journalists. The ‘field’ which is an artificial construction 
of a physical space marked off for a period of time by ethnographers and the like, can include 
as well as exclude, the subject of which is seldom addressed.476   
2.1 Unpacking Heterotopology  
In March 1967, Michel Foucault, in a public lecture to architecture students, introduced what 
he termed as ‘Des Espace Autres’/ The Other Spaces or Heterotopia. Originating from the 
study of anatomy and used to refer to parts of the body that were either out of place, missing, 
extra or alien (tumours), Heterotopia are understood as ‘other’ spaces, that is ‘spaces of 
alternate social ordering’ which pose particular organised identities and functions within 
society (prisons, cemeteries, schools, mental asylums, museums, hospitals, libraries, 
monasteries and airports may all qualify as heterotopia). According to Foucault, the role of 
Heterotopia is either to create ‘a space of illusion exposing real spaces still more illusionary, 
or to create another space as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged, as ours is messy, ill 
constructed, and jumbled’.477 Foucault established a set of characterising features for 
describing heterotopia which act as both a criteria for identification, so as to differentiate what 
might qualify a heterotopia from what does not, and second as a means of igniting analytical 
observations regarding the micro politics of unique spatialities. It is important to first review 
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these charactering features before grafting them to a striking example of a space of alternate 
social ordering, in this case the IDP Camp.   
Heterotopia exist in two forms: one of crises which are privileged or forbidden places 
reserved for individuals or populations in a state of turmoil, fragility or collapse (refugee 
camps, concentration camps, leper colonies). The other is one of deviance where individuals 
who manifest behaviours that deviate from acceptable standards of a society reside (rest 
homes, reformatories, psychiatric clinics, prisons). These two facets further reflect their 
differential quality and otherness, which enriches the critical perspectives they offer.  
The special nature of time distinguishes and accentuates heterotopia because they do not 
conform to ‘traditional’ or ‘normal’ practices of time. For example, one only has to observe 
the nature of time in an airport where the constant knowledge and visual presence of time 
regulates all activities (check in, arrivals, departures, transit, security control, boarding, and 
air traffic control) which is at the heart of the continuous movement involved in travel. This is 
in sharp contrast to the nature of time in a cemetery where it has virtually stopped and is even 
non-existent due to the stillness and inactivity of its residents and visitors. This is further in 
sharp contrast to the nature of time in a museum, in which several time periods exist at once 
due to the principle function of a museum which is to capture in one single space multiple 
exhibits from different historical periods.  
Heterotopia contain systems of opening and closing, which both isolate them and makes them 
penetrable. They do this through the maintenance of barriers, boundaries, and gateways that 
prohibit anonymous entrance. For Foucault this is the most palpable manifestation of power, 
as access is not by will alone but includes forms of submission or numerous rites of exchange. 
For example, entry to a prison requires visitors to report to a central location where they are 
issued identification cards and are searched for contraband. Entrance to libraries, cinemas, 
and museums requires the immediate submission to specific rules and regulations, which 
210 
 
include adhering to silence and the prohibition on food consumption and use of photography 
among other things.    
Heterotopias manifest utopian qualities which essentialise their ‘alternate ordering’. Whereas 
utopias are ideal and fantastical sites that have no real tangible presence (Heaven, Garden of 
Eden), heterotopias are ‘real sites’ of ‘effectively enacted utopias’, they are ‘the potentially 
transformative spaces of society from which meaningful forms of resistance can be mounted. 
These are the places capable of a certain kind of social commentary, those sites where social 
commentary may, in a sense, be written into arrangements and relations of space’.478 
Heterotopias relate to other surrounding spaces to create contrasts and differences which work 
to construct social and cultural meanings. Such a practice is termed juxtaposed 
incompatibilities. Heterotopias never exist in and of themselves and will always have this 
external function which is not necessarily overt but which is critical to highlighting their 
‘otherness’. As Hetherington makes clear ‘It is the heterogeneous combination of the 
materiality, social practices and events that were located at this site and what they come to 
represent in contrast with other sites, that allow us to call it heterotopia’.479 Such juxtaposed 
incompatibilities also work internally within the heterotopia in their day to day functioning, 
which creates a further avenue for critical reflection.   
The last identifying component for which its analytic usefulness lies is similitude, which 
works to mirror specific aspects of society with the hope of offering alternate methods of 
ordering them that either builds, destroys or regresses back to previous norms and values. 
According to Foucault, ‘The real effective spaces which are outlined in the very institution of 
society…which constitute a sort of counter-arrangement, [an] effectively realised utopia, in 
which all the real arrangements that can be found within society, are at one and the same time 
represented, challenged and overturned’.480 This is evident in places of religious worship 
(churches, mosques, synagogues, temples and shrines) where everyday life is mirrored 
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through the religious values which attempt to elevate it to higher levels of meaning and 
existence. So the alternate ordering is observed in representing, challenging and overturning 
society’s notions of love, forgiveness, work, friendship, sex, family etc. which feel different 
because they now have to be measured and practised in accordance to the supernatural status 
they are awarded.  This is significant because it raises questions that reveal embedded power 
dynamics. Why should there be an alternate ordering in a particular way and not another? 
What are the real agendas behind such an alternate ordering? Who is the actor attempting to 
re-order society? 
1.2 Points of Clarification 
There are three clarifications which should be made regarding the application of 
Heterotopology. The first is that while heterotopia may appear to share many of the traits of 
what Agamben classified as the ‘State of Exception’481, it has a number of differences which 
set it apart. The state of exception is a condition enacted by a sovereign state to counter a 
clear and present danger for which the law may have to be broken in order to be protected, as 
according to Walzer’s notion of the Supreme Emergency, when ‘the danger must be of an 
unusual and horrifying kind’.482 When manifested in the form of concentration camps, extra-
judicial detention centres, and airport hotels where would be migrants reside while awaiting 
deportation, Agamben argues that they are not an extension of the law, but a space that is 
extra-territorial to the law- a space where the law is suspended.483 Now while this condition 
clearly reinforces and creates discourses of power between state and society which can be 
manifested into space as in creation of concentration camps, it differs from heterotopia in that 
it is an extraordinary and temporal measure designed to abate a threat in order to return 
society back to ‘normality’ or the pre-threat status quo. Heterotopias however, seek to 
transform and overturn the normal operations of the existing status quo, and can be 
normalised over time into the idiosyncracies of society. For example, a reformatory or prison 
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is a response to a crisis of crime and disorder that purports to transform and rehabilitate 
offenders. The second clarification is a response to a number of criticisms levelled against the 
usefulness of heterotopology. Genocchi raises a fundamental issue relating to an inherent 
contradiction of the concept: 
How is it that we can locate, distinguish and differentiate the essence of this difference, 
this ‘strangeness’ which is not simply outlined against the visible…how is it that 
heterotopia are ‘outside’ of or are fundamentally different to all other spaces, but also 
relate to and exist ‘within’ the general social space/order that distinguishes their 
meaning as difference?484 
In response, the most important application of heterotopia rests in analysing how space is a 
form of discourse and therefore the concept has to be treated as a methodology, rather than 
simply the identification of an absolute concrete spatiality. Hook applied the notion to South 
Africa’s growing gated communities, where fear of crime became a powerful justification for 
the removal of the white middle class from the new (black controlled) South Africa, into 
protected settlements that boasted a secure, luxurious, utopian setting, juxtaposed against the 
damaged, poor, and hazardous surroundings townships, which ultimately revived and  
perpetuated the many privileges they enjoyed during the Aparthied era.485 Thirdly heterotopia 
has no absolute universal model, because bound spatialities change over time in form, 
function and meaning according to a particular ‘synchrony of culture’ and moment in history 
when they are formed, which makes them indexes of historical change more generally.486  
2. A Heterotopology of the IDP Camp 
Having introduced the notion of heterotopia, it is necessary to now apply it to a particular 
confluence of space and power, namely the IDP camps in northern Uganda. 
2.1 Displacement Crisis 
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Given that internal displacement has become the ‘new’ crisis of the 21st century as shown in 
chapters one and two, there is little doubt that the IDP camp qualifies as a heterotopia. This is 
exemplified in the Camp Management Toolkit:    
Camps exist to ensure that the basic human right to life with dignity is upheld for 
displaced communities. Camp management best practice is based on an understanding 
that all activities in an camp should be undertaken with the core aims of ensuring the 
protection of the camp population from abusive or degrading treatment and upholding 
their rights, including to food, shelter, health care and family unity.487 
This characteristic of the heterotopia, that it is a spatial answer to a social and political 
problem, seems to be exactly what provides the IDP camp with the pragmatic rationale for 
their elaborate control of space. This quality of offering a spatial solution also provides the 
IDP camp with a precise and well-defined function within society, a function that, in 
Foucault’s terms, should prove emblematic of presiding structures of power. Indeed one of 
the strengths of Foucault’s analytics of heterotopia is the way it forces one to overturn routine 
explanations of pragmatic function in order to facilitate critical reasons fixed to broader socio-
political agendas. This leads us to query how the rationale for ‘temporary’ camp based 
emergency relief delivery becomes a powerful warrant to commence development projects 
that seek to restructure peasant society, with humanitarian agencies engaging in state building 
projects which dwarf their mandates and budgets. Or secondly, how the state which claims to 
lack the capacity and responsibility to protect its own citizens, (which is the rationale for the 
IDP Regime) can displace them into camps where the security organs are fully present (see 
Figure 48 at end). 
The IDP camp presents us with a paradox because while displacement is a state of crisis, it 
has now become its own solution. The IDP camp which has been shown to be an effective 
tool of population control by state security forces, has now become an effective tool in ending 
the suffering of displacement by further displacing people into camps.  Here it is critical to 
reiterate that the IDP camp serves a series of functions providing not only the immediate 
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relief from the effects of war, but the complete livelihood provisions entitled to citizens in 
conditions of peace, all of which are controlled and guaranteed by an exclusive club of 
international agencies. Such organisations are presented to have nothing but the complete 
‘care’ and ‘welfare’ of IDPs at heart: 
For a Camp Management Agency every intervention in the daily life of a camp, or 
camp-like setting-whether, for example, repair of shelter roofs, setting up of a pre-
school or distribution of commodities- must be done in such a way that camp residents’ 
vulnerability to violation, deprivation and dependency is reduced and opportunities to 
enjoy their fights and participate meaningfully and equitably are maximised. Likewise, 
it is the duty of the Camp Management Agency to ensure that while displaced persons 
are staying in a camp they receive legal recognition and protection, through 
registration, issuance of birth and death certificates and assurance they will not be 
forced to return home against their wishes before it is safe to do so.488 
There exists here a tactic of conflation in which humanitarian intervention, development, 
counter-insurgency, relief supremacy, vulnerability, and human security, are all carefully 
collapsed into the universal and unquestionable discourse of ‘protection’. This works to the 
benefit of a number of actors as will be discussed in later sections.    
2.2 Separate Humanitarian Space 
The IDP camp represents a separate locality of protection where citizens first relinquish their 
status to take on the new bureaucratic category of IDP. This is in line with what Malkki 
observed in refugee camps where they were ‘produced as a collective object’ through all the 
techniques of control which include control and monitoring of mobility, tours by government 
officials, reports and project evaluations, media coverage, and visits from donors489.  In IDP 
camps NGOs now take on the functions of the state in the processing and handling of citizens 
under their supervision: 
In most planned camp situations, a camp’s population will be established through an 
organised registration and referral system in cooperation with the national and local 
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authorities and the Camp Coordination or Sector Lead Agency…This information 
forms the basic demographic database for overall camp population figures throughout 
the life of the camp and should be updated regularly to reflect births, deaths, arrivals, 
departures and other fluctuations in the population.490 
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IDPs were issued with household cards by the World Food Program, which stated their 
district, village of origin, camp of residence, household size, and the food entitlement holder 
(see Figure 32 above). While such procedures may seem essential to the smooth running of 
relief delivery, it ultimately cemented IDPs as a different category of people who were now 
entitled to a raft of services and benefits within a different territorial space, which they would 
not otherwise have received outside the camp as citizens. This is further compounded by the 
IDP policy created by the government in 2004 which distinguished IDPs from the rest of the 
‘non-displaced’ population stating that: 
Local Government shall issue to IDPs all necessary documents to enable them to 
realise full enjoyment and exercise of their rights. In particular, the authorities shall 
facilitate issuance of new documents or replacement of documents lost in the course of 
displacement.491 
A Camp Management Agency can help to improve the population’s overall standard of 
living and support positive livelihoods strategies by identifying and coordinating with 
relevant agencies to provide skills training, agricultural support, where appropriate, and 
income generating projects. These should be based on a participatory analysis of the 
social, economic and environmental context of the camp population and the local 
community.492 
For IDPs living in northern Uganda such organisation of humanitarian space had both a 
positive and negative impact, as not only were they completely isolated and virtually hidden 
from public gaze, their humanitarian carers became their only lifeline within their own state 
borders, as one camp commander informed me that: 
They [aid agencies] brought a sense of hope and care, with a degree of security through 
providing for our basic needs and monthly interactions to become the mouthpiece for 
                                                          
491 The Republic of Uganda, The National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons,  OPM, August 
(2004), p. 24. 
492 Camp Management Toolkit, Chp. 18, p. 561. 
Figure 32. WFP IDP Household Card 
217 
 
the people in parliament. Aid agencies were getting facts and communicating to the 
outside world. However there was very little they could do the problem was too big. 
They came in to build classrooms and health centres and execute what government 
could not do. We were relying on them more than government.493 
4.3 Contradictions of Time & Space 
When asked, IDPs would often comment how time functioned differently in camps with the 
average day as follows: 
5.30am-9.00am: Wake up and move around the camp gathering information on security 
and general issues which needed to be handled. 
9.00am-3pm: People would be permitted to leave the camp for cultivation in small 
gardens, nearby; small business within camps would open selling various everyday 
items. Many IDPs would begin drinking, socialising, and preparing food. 
5.00pm onwards: All IDPs were to be indoors, with no movement around or within the 
camp. All socialising was forbidden, with enforced silence and darkness within huts 
throughout the whole night.494  
Time functioned in two distinct ways within the camp which both revealed and accentuated 
the power dynamic imposed within the space. First it was heavily controlled and regimented 
by the military. The Project Officer for Caritas at the time revealed how, ‘bells were placed in 
camps to mobilise people for particular times including security, food distribution, or 
addressing a particular issue. Large rims were used and when they rang especially during food 
distribution people ran in desperation dropping whatever they were doing to rush for 
relief’.495 People woke up, worked, ate, socialised, and slept at designated times decided by 
the military, and during rebel attack people would stop all movement and lie down.496 In 
contrast, time had virtually become non-existent, which was a result of the infinite space 
created by the camp based relief and the anxiety and fear caused by the threat of imminent 
rebel attack felt by all. It felt different during day and the night as one camp commander 
                                                          
493 Interview with Mr Christopher Okot, Camp Commander for Alero and Langol (2002-2007). 
494 Interview with IDP Camp Dweller Sandra Acham, Pader, (2006-2010). 
495 Interview with Paul Rubakene, Project Officer Caritas Gulu branch (2000-2004). 
496 Interview with Lemoi Dennis, Camp Commander of Pajak IDP camp (1996 to 2007). 
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commented, ‘you wanted it to remain daytime because you could see activity, but the day 
would move fast. Night was a problem because of the recurrence of fear’.497 This feeling of 
time was as a reflection of the complete absence of the everyday lives people had lived in 
homesteads where they had been in control. Time felt static because people were not 
cultivating, schooling, or engaging in Acholi culture. All had been replaced by the 
humanitarian community who were now providing all livelihoods and by the collapse of 
virtually all cultural structures and norms due to the instability and with no definitive date as 
to when displacement would end from the government.498 The Acholi people were in a state 
of limbo, ‘with no sequential flow of living, with people just kept in a corral with no freedom 
of movement, there was no progress as you could not go home and cultivate and raise 
children’.499   
2.4 Juxtaposed Incompatibilities  
Heterotopias yield a variety of contradictions and paradoxes which make them important 
focal points of critical analysis. Such juxtapositions work both internally (within its own 
contrary representations and conditions of space and time) and externally (with reference to 
its surrounding spaces). Firstly the IDP camps were presented as havens of perpetual 
protection. The utopian rhetoric of heterotopia is evident in the description of one aid agency 
manual and report, in which the camp and all its operations create the presence of the perfect 
archetype of a functioning state with all its attendant goods and services provided to its 
citizens. According to UNHCR, 
Well managed camps and camp-like settings can strengthen physical, legal and material 
protection, and security. They also facilitate access to humanitarian assistance, 
including food, clean water, life-sustaining commodities, medical services and 
education.500 
                                                          
497 Interview with Camp dweller Paul Oduny, Pabbo IDP Camp (2001-2008). 
498 Interview with Camp dweller Olanya Morris, Paicho camp (1996-2010). 
499 Interview with Camp dweller Cecelia Onen, Lalogi camp (1997-2009). 
500 UNCHR, Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, Guidance Note 12, p. 154. 
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The camp supersedes anything IDPs could have had during ‘peacetime’, by elevating them to 
a state of development beyond their current peasant/feudal existence to the realms, norms and 
practices of the information age. The utopian rhetoric is even more present, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, in the Camp Management Toolkit: 
Displaced people, who have suffered direct losses of their productive, economic, 
financial, and social assets, through natural disaster or conflict, have the right to 
protect, recover, improve and develop their livelihoods. In a camp setting where 
communities are largely dependent on the assistance and services of others to fulfil 
their basic needs and rights, this is particularly important. Livelihoods contribute to 
food security, prevent dependency, reduce vulnerability, enhance self-reliance and can 
develop or build a set of specific skills during displacement which may have a positive 
impact on their well-being and future opportunities.501 
Bearing in mind that the heterotopia are sites of ‘alternate social ordering’, what is the 
broader pattern of socio-political rationality that might be read out of the spatiality of the IDP 
camp? This creation of a separate world, a new social, moral, and political enclosure that 
departs from the existing broken,  are attempts by the international community at ‘reforming’ 
through the hand-over of citizens to relief industry which has a colonising activity of 
civilising and elevating pre-industrial peasant societies into the modern age. This begs two 
fundamental questions, firstly given that the colonial experience embedded systems of 
exploitation and manipulation under benevolent and utopian rhetoric, how are donors and 
NGOs benefiting from the camps and this expensive ‘reordering’ of fragile societies? 
Secondly, given the uniqueness and complexities of civil wars and the hopes by NGOs to 
standardise intervention mechanisms, what do international donors and NGOs know about the 
everyday lives and needs of IDPs, which the displaced people do not know themselves, and 
therefore require highly paid ‘experts’ to come and teach them, in order for them to live better 
lives?   
 2.6 Disqualifying the Exterior 
                                                          
501 Camp Management Toolkit, Chp.18, p. 561. 
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As in the case of heterotopias, IDP camps promote themselves as the closest possible 
realisation of certain social, political and moral ideals. This is not only the case in terms of 
how they promise the full gamut of protection mechanisms within the inner space, but also in 
terms of how outside space comes to be constructed. Outside the camp was cast as a 
dangerous and lawless environment because of the war, sporadic LRA movement, and 
marauding criminal bands all of which was irrefutable, due to the countless aid agencies 
present, the continuous global news reportage of the war, heart rending stories from rebel 
victims, and a heavily militarised region, some of which was captured in the testimonies and 
drawings of former child soldiers and abducted children (see Figures 33 below)502: 
In our village, we realised the rebels were coming, and my whole family hid in the bush 
at night. At dawn, we thought they were gone, and I went back to the compound to 
fetch food. But they were still there, and they took me. It was very fast. The rest of my 
family was still in hiding. The rebels had already abducted about a hundred children, 
and they had looted a lot of foodstuff. But they would just give you only very little food 
to keep you going. I saw quite a number of children killed. Most of them were killed 
with clubs. They would take five or six of the newly abducted children and make them 
kill those who had fallen or tried to escape. It was so painful to watch. Twice I had to 
help. And to do it, it was so bad, it was very bad to have to do.503 
 
                                                          
502 Broken Childhood, Children Abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army, Concerned Parents 
Association.  
503 The Scars of Death, Children Abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, Human Rights 
Watch/Africa, September (1997).  
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Figure 33. Drawings by abducted children of northern Uganda 
 
  
 
The external environment was so horrific that it justified the employment of the camp and 
could easily deflect and neutralise the deluge of criticisms of malpractice by NGOs and 
government, with the famous phrase that ‘something must be done’, which rested upon the 
notion that even a modicum of relief could have a positive impact regardless of whether it 
caused twice the suffering in return, as will be shown in later sections. The external further 
placed the camp as the only moral response for an international community reluctant to walk 
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away and ignore chronic human suffering. Inaction was simply not an option and was a factor 
which received the proportions of heavenly truth since the failures in Rwanda and Bosnia, and 
in the case of Uganda was cemented by Egeland’s rallying cry to the UN Security Council in 
2006. 
Camps were thus presented as organised spaces of peace and refuge that contained 
administrative structures of zones with leaders that could maintain order, regulate the masses 
in times of relief delivery, and facilitate information dissemination. All of which created the 
picture of an island of peace and hope surrounded by an ocean of chaos. This was further 
evident in the labelling of camps as ‘Protected Villages’ by the government which rendered 
the external areas as ‘unprotected’ and instilled the feeling of a continuation of ‘village’ life 
amid the insecurity from which many people had lost entire livelihoods.   
3. Inscribing Power into the Camp Space 
It is now important to understand what the application of the analytics of heterotopia helped 
to show about the IDP camp as we have here behind the façade of pragmatic necessity, a set 
of co-ordinated operations of power, as the surreal promise of infinite protection seem just too 
good to be true, with a series of social contradictions. From the initial discussion, one begins 
to feel that the driving force behind the establishment and running of IDP camps may be less 
about providing protection to destitute vulnerable people and more about inscribing and 
sustaining the interests, privileges and prerogatives of the humanitarian industry and fragile 
states, into physical space to the point where responsibility to protect becomes opportunity to 
control. This is the case considering the camp space was an ambiguous structure in that it was 
housing citizens who held an alternate legal status within the borders of the state.  
The IDP camp must also be considered to be an arena which had the capacity to become 
anything and everything to any intervening actor wishing to control, exploit, defraud, 
challenge, and overturn the status quo, and who simply needed to first declare their intention 
of IDP protection to thus enter. This resulted in the camp possessing multiple layers of 
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contradictory and competing structures which brought their own pathologies to the collective 
arena. The camp space was able to house and sustain a coexistence of humanitarian relief 
operations, development projects, counter-insurgency operations, a zone of social breakdown 
and deviance, a political party forum, a prison system, a battleground for rebel punishment, 
recruitment and supply, and a media spectacle. All of which resulted in 1.8 million IDPs 
experiencing the consequences of each concurrently.  
The Cluster Approach which was predicated on the notion that humanitarian agencies could 
be streamlined to become more predictable, organised, co-ordinated, accountable and efficient 
instead simply made it more efficient for NGOs to co-ordinate and manage exploitation, 
corruption, and mismanagement504 as the following section will argue by implementing 
Prendergast’s conceptualisation of the Seven Deadly Sins of Aid in Complex Emergencies.     
5.1 Institutionalising Relief Politics  
As we saw in chapter four the creation of a lucrative humanitarian economy is the primary 
unspoken objective of many aid agencies which is glossed over by charitable statements 
evident here in the ICRC’s Logistics Field Manual: 
The primary aim of relief operations in conflict situations is to protect the lives of the 
victims their moral and physical integrity, and to ensure that displacement and 
internment and the consequences of disease, injury or hunger do not jeopardize their 
future. When we plan humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and our action 
should not be viewed as such.505 
As a number of scholars have recognised, the reason why assistance programmes in war 
zones often ‘fail’ to improve the lives of those affected resides in the fact that NGOs have 
greater interests in sustaining their livelihoods with high salaries in secure well--resourced 
compounds.506 This was evident in the utopian rhetoric of the camps which buttressed the 
tactic of conflation, in which large aid worker salaries, ad hoc interventions, subjugated 
                                                          
504 Norbert Mao, NGOs have to change the way they operate, Letter from Gulu, Commentary, The New 
Vision, September (2006). 
505 ICRC Logistics Field Manual, 2004, Section 1.2 WFP Agreement (1996). 
506 De Waal (1997), p. 148-150. 
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masses, and a protracted and profitable war could all be couched in appeals to humanity, 
rights, protection, and livelihoods of IDPs. Norbert Mao the former District Chairman for 
Gulu summed up northern Uganda as follows: 
There was a humanitarian bubble with millions spent and everybody becoming a 
beneficiary and cashing in. The army whose job it was to provide security was sub-
contracted to provide security to NGO convoys. Government and civil society officials 
were being ‘facilitated’ with all expense paid overseas visits to proclaim and lobby the 
suffering of the Acholi to foreign parliaments, universities, and donor conferences. 
Senior military officials were renting out property and land to NGOs. The media was 
receiving huge amounts of money for countless advertisements and radio broadcasts on 
the war and relief situation. Local suppliers of all products (corn, transportation, 
hospitality) would inflate prices above market rate. Planes would be chartered from 
Kampala for politicians to come and engage in disaster tourism. There was a tacit 
understanding by all actors that you simply played along with the charade.507 
An interview with a former senior Save The Children worker revealed how donors would 
send money together with their own staff to manage that money through the creation of 
director positions that paid $8,000 per month and $1000 on rent. There were some fifty 4x4 
vehicles for projects across northern Uganda and in cases of poor road network, staff would 
travel by chartered planes. The project costs for the month of November 2006 was 381 
million Uganda Shillings, but the administration costs for that month was 302 million Uganda 
Shillings. Local staff became emboldened as they were undertaking all the donkey work 
compared to their international counterparts from Denmark, Norway and the UK. Anonymous 
letters of dissent began appearing after staff numbers were cut back due to the overhead costs 
which had become larger than the project between 2008 and 2009.508 Such stories were very 
common as a breakdown of some NGO budgets from the 2006 Consolidation Appeal Process 
(CAP) compared the total budget to the administration costs revealed (see Table 16 below). 
                                                          
507 Interview with Norbert Mao, Former District Chairman of Gulu, 6th October (2011). 
508 Interview with Florence Ochola, Save The Children (1999-2010). 
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Table 16  
UN CAP 2006 
NGO TOTAL BUDGET 
US$ 
ADMINISTRATION 
COSTS US$ 
% OF TOTAL 
BUDGET  
Cooperazione 
Italiana Nord Sud 
(CINS) 
410,883 183,883 44 
German Agro 
Action (GAA) 
200,000 70,000 35 
UN FAO 497,000 257,000 51 
UN OCHA 3,874,903 2,573,768 66 
UN HABITAT 450,000 200,000 44 
UNAIDS 288,000 90,000 31 
Christian 
Children’s Fund Inc 
642,371 198,000 30 
Mercy Corps 411,000 178,180 43 
Cooperazione 
Internazionale 
(COOPI) 
2,000,000 500,000 25 
UN OHCHR 1,628,000 981,600 60 
Norwegian Refugee 
Council (NRC) 
770,000 400,000 51 
Population Services 
International 
1,443,235 390,000 27 
 
The danger of such a situation was that it created the necessary conditions to assuage and 
mitigate cognitive dissonance arising within the relief industry. Marriage, in her study of 
relief assistance in Sierra Leone, Congo & Rwanda observed how NGOs employed several 
tactics to cushion the negative effects of their interventions. She showed how:  
Assistance is a game in that it attaches disproportionate and symbolic significance to 
some events and people, and uses these to distract attention from others. It is 
recreational as it does not realistically address suffering, and in that this is known by 
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the people who control it’509. One of the tactics used in this game was fantasy which 
‘involves denying reality…the discourse of assistance does not simply overlook 
uncomfortable aspects and rebuff charges but also generates ‘place’ proactively to 
protect itself, whatever the reality.510   
Protection in northern Uganda became an elastic concept with no real indication as to how it 
would reduce civilian exposure to the risk of rebel attack or the camp conditions. For example 
NGOs would report how their child protection activities included ‘peace building training for 
teachers’ and ‘training for young mothers in bricklaying’ and in many cases it simply meant 
being nice to children rather than delivering any hard services.511 
In 2007 the Spain division of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) became embroiled in a scandal 
with the local government of Gulu district, who had forced them to terminate all operations 
and leave the region. The quarrel revolved around the malpractice of MSF Spain within the 
IDP camps, where it was learnt that they had been administering paediatric drugs for 
tuberculosis to adult patients by simply doubling the dosage, which contravened Uganda 
Health Authority regulations. They had also refused directives by the District Chairman 
Norbert Mao to cease building latrines within camps and instead commence their construction 
in village areas of IDP return. In their defence MSF complained directly to central 
government and invoked   humanitarian values to de-campaign Mao, by claiming that he was 
hindering protection and their ‘life saving’ operations.  
A similar tension occurred with American Refugee Committee (ARC) who was also 
dismissed from Gulu by Mao due to their reckless conduct. ARC had been engaging in a 
controversial project to combat domestic violence in camps which involved the creation of a 
hotline for battered women to call and then be transported with their children away from their 
violent partners to lodges in town, where they would remain for two weeks receiving 
counselling and assistance. However, upon return many would find themselves rejected from 
their homes by their partners who had found new wives, and had told them ‘to return to their 
                                                          
509 Marriage (2006), p. 176. 
510 Ibid, p. 189-190. 
511 Dolan and Hovil (2006), p. 10. 
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humanitarian carers’.512 Such an incendiary intervention was not sensitive to the dynamics 
within Acholi culture, and was simply an intrusion of Western rights and norms into peasant 
society. Similarly many interventions had  outcomes with relief and development projects that 
exclusively targeted women and resulted in high levels of domestic violence, arising from 
emasculated males who saw their wives and partners usurp and undermine their 
unquestionable control of the household. In addition ARC were charged with violating 
employment codes of conduct with the mistreatment of local staff who were lower than their 
international colleagues regarding salaries and conditions of work.513     
Besides these, one of the most horrific but seemingly benevolent interventions conducted by 
humanitarian agencies to ‘improve’ livelihoods, was the World Vision/ USAID Food Security 
Project, which involved the creation of  demonstration sites around camps to ‘educate’ and 
assist IDPs in the ‘correct’ agricultural techniques for the seeds and tools they were being 
allocated. However, this project became incorporated into the relief economy, with World 
Vision selling the mega tons of beans and maize produce to the World Food Program for 
distribution to Sudanese refugees. They stated very enthusiastically that:  
WFP and World Vision would like to…encourage the people of Gulu and Kitgum to 
follow this example that will lead to self-sustainability. WFP and World Vision will 
continue supporting efforts of the Acholi people to develop Gulu and Kitgum districts. 
Development that will help build peace and understanding in the north and in 
Uganda.514 
The implicit message was clear; IDP’s deprivation was their own fault, and if only they 
acquired modern farming skills they would be ‘self-reliant’ and ‘prospering’. Such a 
programme had a complete disregard for human rights, as IDPs who were imprisoned in 
concentration camps, and were themselves recipients of food aid, and whose problem was not 
the lack of cultivation skills but access to land, were being made to grow crops for refugees in 
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camps elsewhere.515 Government in addition glossed over such violations by presenting them 
as the actual ‘benefit’ and ‘cure’ to displacement: 
Government in partnership with WFP provides 90% of the food needs of the IDPs 
(Government 15%, WFP 75%). Government in addition, supports food production 
around the IDP camps by deployment of UPDF and Auxiliary Forces to a radius of 3 
km around each camp and two km along the roads thus making IDPs capable of 
accessing production land to meet up to 26% of their food needs. This is the reason 
why some IDP camp populations have some food for sale at markets. In the past 18 
months Government and WFP provided IDPs with 143,210 metric tons of relief 
food.516 
The above two cases illustrate Sin 7: lack of accountability & professionalism which the 
camps fostered as ‘the proliferation of agencies creates huge discrepancies in the agencies’ 
adherence to basic humanitarian principles…the less of a stake communal structures have in a 
given response, the less accountable that response will be’.517 A larger schema of pathologies 
were ordained in camps which became a hub for ghost NGOs, ghost beneficiaries, ghost 
project proposals, and ghost projects. It was standard practice for public officials to receive 
‘gifts’ from NGOs wishing to obtain permission to operate freely across northern Uganda. It 
was also common for those same officials to redirect scholarships and aid packages away 
from IDPs in camps to their unaffected relatives. One local journalist revealed how funding 
proposals, images of camps and life stories of IDPs all became interchangeable and recyclable 
among NGOs wishing to simply acquire funds from donors.518 The Assistant Chief 
Administrative Officer for Gulu informed me of how many NGOs had resources but chose to 
make small insignificant interventions while withholding large funds. One NGO began an 
agricultural programme to teach IDPs how to grow boo (a green leaf vegetable), which for the 
                                                          
515 Ibid, p.129. 
516 Uganda Government Interventions on the Humanitarian Situation in Northern Uganda, Office of the 
Prime Minister, p. 6. 
517 Prendergast (1996), p. 13. 
518 Interview with Alex Odongo, Daily Monitor Journalist (2000-2010). 
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Acholi community ‘was like teaching Chinese people how to grow rice’.519 According to 
Marriage: 
Assistance discourse champions the moral over the ‘political’ or ‘criminal’-. If the 
moral and the transparent are manipulative and deceitful, this undermines the integrity 
that apparently validated their legitimacy. The mechanisms by which the game is 
sustained are the inverse of the guidance and strategy apparently offered by the rules- 
the game is sustained because it pursues an alternate strategy, and because it manages 
to obscure it.520 
As the former director of the Refugee Law Project aptly told me, northern Uganda became a 
carcass for which all actors could happily feast upon. All that was needed to guarantee a large 
share of the ‘meat’ was the ‘size’ and ‘sharpness’ of the ‘knife’ one used. A detailed funding 
proposal that ticked all the right boxes in seeking to spectacularly end suffering and contained 
the right buzz words of ‘camp based relief’, ‘women’, and ‘children’ could automatically 
release donor money, with little oversight as to the application and efficiency of such a 
program.521  
3.2 Institutionalising State Politics 
In addition to the pathologies of the relief industry, the camps provided fertile ground for the 
cultivation of government interests, discussed in the previous chapter which explained their 
longevity. In 2006 the government launched the Emergency Plan for Humanitarian 
Interventions for the North under the Office of the Prime Minister, in liaison with the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The expected outcomes were ‘to improve the humanitarian 
situation in IDP camps, especially security, enhance protection of the civilian population, 
humanitarian assistance to IDPs, peace-building and reconciliation, and support return and 
reintegration where possible’.522 However, such an initiative was a façade to assuage the true 
intentions of government, which was to keep people imprisoned in camps. The camps served 
                                                          
519 Interview with David Oponya, ACAO Gulu District, (2011). 
520 Marriage (2006), p. 198. 
521 Interview with Zachary Lomo, Former Director of the Refugee Law Project, Makerere Univesity, 5th  
January (2010). 
522 Joint Monitoring Committee, Emergency Plan for Humanitarian Interventions for the North, OPM 
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the NRM and President Yoweri Museveni’s imperative to break the will of the wider Acholi 
population to resist the NRM government which they had been in opposition to since the early 
1980s. In a presidential address of the 8th Parliament in November 2002, regarding the on-
going hostilities, Museveni alluded to this when he commented that ‘there was a tribal 
chauvinism, which had been inculcated among our Acholi people by the colonialists among 
others. They would go to the Acholi and say, ‘you Acholi you are very brave, you are like 
lions’…So this was part of the problem [of the protracted conflict] without anybody to 
destroy that chauvinism’.523 Now while such a statement may have had multiple meanings 
and needed to be read with caution, it was fully compatible with the realities on the ground as 
one government worker informed me. The violence and encampment led to the complete 
collapse of the northern socio-economic infrastructure. Government and rebels looted a great 
deal of livestock, homesteads were destroyed with houses burnt and granaries emptied. The 
north was on its back, not producing, yet it had been the bread basket of the country. The co-
operative societies (Acholi Co-Operative Union, Lint Marketing Board, Produce Marketing 
Board, and Middle North Co-Operative Union) were disbanded leaving no production and 
marketing structures.524 This was in addition to the prison-like nature of camps as one senior 
Caritas aid worker revealed: 
I have never been to prison, but I have met prisoners. At night there was no talking and 
no light. Those caught talking at night were taken and beaten in front of their families. 
Those caught walking in camps were either shot dead or taken to the barracks for 
questioning. IDPs would come from Awac camp to Gulu town to buy food. They were 
escorted once a week by the UPDF on the roads. Once in town they agreed a time to 
regroup and return to the camp. If an IDP was missing or late questions began and 
punishment with suspicion of rebel collaboration. This was the treatment you gave to 
prisoners. People who wanted to spend time had to disclose all the affairs they sought 
to conduct in town.525  
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In relation to this was the suppression of all political opposition which became easy without 
freedom of movement across the central north, which disrupted mobilisation and 
campaigning. During the 2001 election, Okot Christopher, a camp leader who stood for the 
Local Councillor 5 office, informed me how the army would harass those who spoke out 
against the camp conditions, government rhetoric, or attempted to represent the IDPs in 
camps. People who campaigned were immediately black-listed as enemies of the state and 
rebel collaborators. A number of political leaders were arrested in 2001 after being voted into 
office, and later thrown into Luzira prison without charge or trial. This included David 
Ocheng Pengto the councillor for Lamogi; Alex Otim the councillor for Paicho, Stephen 
Olanya the LC1 for Green Valley; and Lukwiya Pido a community mobiliser and activist. 
While in prison they were coerced to cross over to the government side in exchange for 
amnesty.526 Government in return used the camps for NRM political mobilisation, with 
candidates and officials given free access to campaign among IDPs (see Figure 43 & 47 at the 
end).   
Certain commanders, units and individual soldiers of the UPDF were responsible for a 
number of crimes in camps against the IDPs they were entrusted to protect (see Figure 49 at 
end). Violence against IDPs became rife as there were no police units in camps. All civil 
matters were referred directly to the military. Sexual assault against women and girls was 
very common. Illegal land use was widely documented, as one IDP protested: ‘The army in 
the camp, the relationship is not good with the civilians because they are taking food from the 
gardens which belongs to the IDPs. The army cuts down pieces of wood which the IDPs use 
for thatching their huts and use it for their own buildings and lighting fire’.527 The most 
outrageous act of exploitation with impunity by the army was perpetrated by Lt. Col 
Kayesigye who transported between 150-300 heads of cattle to graze on the land in Awach 
sub-county in 2006. He even partitioned a section of the local stream to create a small dam to 
water his cows, which were feeding on the crops of IDPs trapped in camps. The local 
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community would not protest such an abuse and kept silent out of fear of his herdsmen who 
were all armed soldiers.528 All situations of abuse, neglect and violations were documented by 
a raft of human rights organisations but very little was done to address them for reasons 
which will become clear later.    
The most indicative display of the power imposed into the camp space came from the 
President’s brother UPDF General Salim Saleh who in May 2003 proposed a camp gazetting 
programme which involved developing the rural landscape of northern Uganda into large 
farming zones that eliminated all scattered settlements, with camps becoming permanent 
‘model’ homesteads for the Acholi population. According to the Security & Production 
Programme (SPP) which was modelled on the Israeli Kibbutzim system of combining 
defence and agricultural production, farms called Security Production Units (SPU) would be 
created whereby IDPs would acquire the means of production through the division of land 
into equal sized plots allocated to each household (see Figure 34 below). This would 
galvanise security as defending and controlling organised settlements would be easy with 
‘violence robbery, defilement, vandalism in homes and neighbourhoods being easily detected 
with instilling discipline among the civic defence personnel and creating and environment for 
accountability to the population achieved’.529 
                                                          
528 Interview with Norbert Mao, 6th October (2011). 
529 Security and Production Programme (SPP), May (2003). 
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Figure 34  
Diagram of Security Production Units 
 
Such a programme was similar to the Swynerton Plan of the British during the Mau Mau 
rebellion in Kenya530, as IDPs who were imprisoned in conditions of starvation, disease and 
social breakdown would thus remain in camps to become ‘farm labourers’ upon the argument 
that:   
Through provision of information about availability of produce in Acholi region, the 
programme should be able to attract agro-processors into the area. There will be value 
addition to the produce, which will increase market value and product shelf life. It will 
lead to small scale industrialisation which will create jobs in the region. It will be easy 
to plan other social services like education, water, health services, road network, law 
and order.531 
                                                          
530 Elkins (2005), pp. 128-130. 
531 Ibid. 
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The SPP was imposed in addition to more overt plans by government to ‘utilise’ the land of 
IDPs languishing in camps.532 From 2006 government began planning the development of a 
US$80 million sugar works plant on 40,000 hectares of land in Amuru district. This was a 
joint venture between government and the Madhvani Group, which created a frightening 
contradiction, as the north, which had been presented as a war zone and humanitarian disaster 
with over 300 NGOs present, suddenly became a viable and potentially prosperous region for 
future investment.533 President Museveni himself even accompanied representatives of the 
group on a guided visit of the war affected region at the end of 2007, in order to gain support. 
Such plans created political storms by the Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG) under the 
leadership of MP Livingstone Okello-Okello, who were incensed by the prospect of one 
investor being awarded large tracts of land while people had not returned from camps amid an 
uncertain security environment.534 Overall, both ‘agricultural’ schemes lent credence to the 
accusations that government was simply using the IDP camps as a diversionary tactic to 
illegally appropriate land.535  
4. Consequences of Inscribed Power: A Circus of Vicious Cycles  
The Protected Villages in northern Uganda thus became ends in and of themselves, in order to 
harmonise the combined interests of the relief industry and Government of Uganda. This 
however unleashed a series of consequences with the imperative of all actors to adapt, cope, 
or preserve the status quo which thus reconfigured the trajectory and dynamics of the civil 
war. To understand why so many people suffered and died as a result of the horrific camp 
conditions which were designed and hailed to ‘protect’ them, we have to consider five 
concurrent and overlapping vicious cycles (see Table 17 below) that arose from this harmony 
of interests, which were a product of the opportunistic state of limbo that IDPs were thrust 
into, that ultimately imprisoned them in an indefinite complex emergency.  
                                                          
532 ‘Give investors land, Otafiire tells Acholi’, Daily Monitor, 14th October, (2008).   
533 ‘Uganda: Madhvani Group Scores on Northern Uganda ‘Deal’, Daily Monitor, 19th July , (2007). 
534 ‘Acholi MPs sue Madhvani and Kingdom over land giveaway’, Daily Monitor, 9th September 
(2010). 
535 ‘Amuru land should not go to Madhvani says Bishop Odama’, Daily Monitor, 7th April (2009). 
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Table 17  
IDP Camp Vicious Cycles 
Vicious Cycle One Food Distribution 
Vicious Cycle Two Relief Responses 
Vicious Cycle Three IDP Adaptation 
Vicious Cycle Four Army Protection 
Vicious Cycle Five Calculated Silence & Denial 
 
There was indeed an artificiality to northern Uganda from 1996-2010 in which there existed 
the atmosphere of a complex emergency but with several enigmas. Firstly the camp became a 
spectacle for humanitarian disaster tourism by state officials, politicians, donors, and 
celebrities who all arrived in obsequious fashion to extend their solidarity and charity to the 
displaced masses, but with no improvement thereafter (see Figures 40, 41 & 42 at end). So 
much money was being pledged and pumped into northern Uganda, but it became difficult to 
trace where the money had reached, with many agencies spending huge sums on interventions 
which had seemingly no relevance to the immediate needs of IDPs.536 By compartmentalising 
each of the camp dynamics in order to see them more clearly, we will make great strides in 
explaining how they were the direct manifestations of a combined process of relief delivery; 
IDP adaption; failed protection; and calculated silence and denial which were born out of the 
zone of alternate social ordering.  
4.1 Vicious Cycle One: Food Distribution 
The first vicious cycle was that of food distribution and accessibility in camps (see Figure 35 
below). The problem of starvation and malnutrition related death and morbidity in camps was 
rife, and always the number one complaint by camp commanders in letters to government and 
NGO officials: 
                                                          
536 Northern Uganda: Increased Focus, Little Change, The Uganda National NGO Forum, Policy Brief, 
January (2007), p. 7-10. 
236 
 
I am humbly informing you that the beneficiaries of this IDP camp have reached a 
desperate situation as a result of food shortage. The last food distribution was carried 
out on the 1st May 2004. As per now the food is over and people have started moving 
out of the camp in search of wild food.537 
I wish to submit to your Office with great regret complaints from the IDPs of Acet 
camp pertaining to the General Food Distribution by the World Food Programme 
yesterday 19th April 2004. Madam as a result of concurrent relief distribution by 
UNICEF and WFP and heavy down pour, more than 2500 households did not receive 
food assistance from the WFP. I am writing to you to assist in enabling the starving 
18,000 people to receive their ration.538 
This situation was perplexing given that WFP had always requested over $100 million a year 
through the Consolidation Appeal Processes (see Table 18 below) in order ‘to meet the 
minimum nutrition and dietary standards of IDPs, refugees and Drought Affected Persons, 
with special attention to women, school going children, malnourished children, HIV/AIDS 
affected families and extremely vulnerable individuals’.539 Such a breakdown was as 
follows540: 
Table 18  
WFP CAP 2006 
Beneficiaries Numbers Tonnage of Food 
Distribution  
IDPs 1,444,000 165,180 
Refugees 190,420  
Therapeutic Feeding 2,080 495 
Food-For-Education 500,000 27,075 
Maternal Child Health & 
Nutrition 
123,920 9490 
                                                          
537 Letter to Chairman of Disaster Management Committee by Mr Opwonya Martine, Camp Leader of 
Parabongo IDP Camp, 13th July (2004). 
538 Letter to LC5 Councillor of Odek/Lalogi by Mr Ojok Opolot, Camp leader of Acet IDP Camp, 20th 
April, (2004).  
539 WFP Food Aid, UNOCHA, Uganda Consolidation Appeals Process (CAP) for 2006, 30th November 
(2005), p. 32. 
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Food For Assets 168,400 10,710 
HIV/AIDS 107,000 14,830 
Drought Affected Person 70,000  
TOTAL 2,498,820 227,780 
 
The reason for such a discrepancy was that the humanitarian intervention coupled with the 
camp dynamics created a lucrative system of collusion between IDPs, aid agency staff, and 
local business men. From 1996 to 2010 there had been over 100 dismissals of NGO staff 
caught stealing and selling food aid that should have gone to IDPs. IDPs would commute 
between camps and receive double rations and sell to business men who, having stores in 
town, would come to operate close to camps in rural areas.  
 
Figure 35. Food Distribution Dynamics 
 
An interview with a Government Food Monitoring official revealed how food would be 
delivered on a specific day by the WFP and its implementing partners to IDPs. However, theft 
would occur with either camp commanders inflating the number of households receiving aid 
Food delivery to 
IDP camps 
Inflation of 
households & 
collusion 
between  Camp 
Leaders & Relief 
staff  
Excess  taken to 
Stattion Produce 
Dealer 
Repackaged & 
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Transported to 
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warehouses  
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or handing out additional cards. The excess would then be sold through various middle men 
in towns back to the station produce dealers who were business men that supplied the main 
WFP warehouses. From there the same food stocks would be loaded in trucks and supplied to 
camps where the same arrangements would continue.541 In 2005 Amuru was reported to have 
had two ghost villages with a total population of 800 people, and in Pabbo camp between 
2005-2007 the total 33 villages had all been inflated, so a village with 60 households 
suddenly increased to 80 on delivery day. It was even common for non-food items (blankets, 
jerrycans, soap and saucepans) to be offloaded in warehouses and to then have the empty 
boxes taken to camps and signed for in order to ensure ‘accountability’.542   
This was all in addition to the problem of camp dwellers stealing relief food which became so 
widespread that the military were called in to oversee deliveries to camps. Raiding food aid 
arose because NGO service providers based targeting populations on the resources available, 
and so prioritised and partitioned receiving camp dwellers (widows, orphans, former 
abducted, HIV+), which created further resentment among the mass of suffering IDPs left 
without543. However this vicious cycle was only the tip of the iceberg because it was the 
outcome of the wider assumptions by WFP and their implementing partners which form Sin 
1: Numbers Game, whereby ‘NGOs are under constant pressure to portray the huge amounts 
of aid inputs delivered to a targeted population as having a direct impact on saving lives. 
Consequently, logistical targets become ends in themselves: 1,000 metric tons delivered, 
1,000 lives saved, and so on’.544 This need to portray success in terms of quantitative impact 
hindered strategic responses to suffering as well as the containment of its negative 
externalities. The initial need for food relief was carried out by WFP Emergency Food 
Security Assessment (EFSA) which was a tool that assessed the impact of shock on the food 
security of households and communities, in order to estimate the location, number, coping 
                                                          
541 Interview with Oluba Alfred, Head of Food Distribution Monitoring, Gulu district (1996-2007). 
542 Ibid.  
543 Interview with Lemoi Dennis, Camp Commander. 
544 Prendergast (1996), p. 3. 
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strategies, and severity of affected people.545 It employed a Food Consumption Score (FCS) 
as a proxy indicator to represent the ‘dietary, diversity, energy and macro (content) value of 
the food that people eat’.546 WFP made an important admission about the usefulness of the 
FCS stating that, ‘Although it provides essential information on people’s current diet, the FCS 
is of limited value for in-depth analysis of food consumption patterns for the following 
reasons547: 
 
• It is based on a seven day recall period only. This is insufficient for a full analysis of 
food consumption for longer periods. 
• It provides no indication of the quantity if each foodstuff consumed. 
• It does not give information on intra-household food consumption, such as who eats 
first and last. 
• It does not show how food consumption has changed as a result of the crisis 
 
This is significant because these were the very issues that would determine a person’s 
entitlement to food, and in a nutshell it revealed how WFP was incapable of identifying or 
measuring the underlying power dynamics of food security, which were the most important 
variables in the planning for an effective relief response in any complex emergency. The 
EFSA were conducted at sub-office by programme assistants which calculated that 10kg of 
maize could last 15 days, but in actuality it was only for 10 days, so for 5 days people would 
starve. Calculations were based on relief being a supplement to other sources of food, but the 
reality was that there were no other sources, as people had very little access to their land, as 
this IDP lamented:   
We had problems with those recruited to write household names. But ghost names were 
common because relief was not enough to sustain them. WFP would deliver 10kg of 
                                                          
545 World Food Programme, Emergency Food Security Assessment Handbook, Second Edition, 
January (2009), p. 29. 
546Ibid, p. 62.  
547 Ibid, p. 62. 
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beans to a household of 15 people for a whole month and this was not uniform. 
Inflation was a survival strategy.548 
There was a failure to appreciate that the conditions of displacement in camps dwarfed the 
perceived gains of food delivery. In an interview with the Senior Program Assistant for WFP, 
in which I asked why food distribution had not been enough, he retorted by claiming that 
‘enough was relative and subjective, there had to be contributions from IDPs through the 
personal cultivation, milling of grain, and helping with distribution’.549 However, the need to 
survive meant that many would sell off food and other relief items, which was especially the 
case with the idle masses who had given up hope and turned to alcoholism and prostitution 
due to the endless encampment. One IDP from Paicho camp commented furiously to me how:  
They have distributed maize, beans, cooking oil but no salt. So I should sell the maize 
to get salt. I am not a weavil to eat grain throughout my life span I must sell the maize 
to get wangiri (small fish) to balance my diet. I have children who have to go to school, 
I must sell the food stuffs to keep them in school…If your relief has conditions which 
are not favourable to me, take it away so that I can die my own death.550 
In 2004 WFP sent a patronising letter to Gulu district officials in response to the unceasing 
appeals from camp leaders of incomplete distribution and the persistent raiding of food by 
camp dwellers, which laid blame for food scarcity on the IDP’s inability to understand and 
participate in fast and efficient delivery: 
I would like therefore to appeal to all the local leaders to talk to the people, educate 
them on the importance of their participation in fast unloading of food from the trucks. 
And also they should be educated on the difference between UN WFP teams and the 
Uganda Government, because sometimes they might mistake us for the Government, 
and make wrong accusations. They say we are the ones that brought them into the 
camp. Such attitudes could also be some of the underlying factors towards reluctance to 
participate willingly in unloading of food from the trucks.551  
4.2 Vicious Cycle Two: Relief Responses 
                                                          
548 Interview with Okot Christopher (2011). 
549 Interview with Moses Oryema, WFP Senior Programme Assistant, (2006-present).  
550 Interview with camp dweller Agness Ajok, Paicho Camp (1998-2008). 
551 WFP letter to Gulu District Local Authority, 26th April (2004). 
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The second vicious cycle was the wider relief responses to suffering (see Figure 36 below). 
The IDP Regime maintains that the circumstances of displacement, automatically incurs the 
loss of livelihoods and security which the humanitarian community is obliged to provide. 
While such a noble aspiration is commendable, it says nothing about conditions where agency 
responses to displacement further reinforce displacement and elevate IDPs to new levels of 
chronic suffering. MSF in a 2003 study found that IDPs in northern Uganda suffered 
mortality rates that were five times higher than expected in Uganda, which they attributed to 
the violence and measles outbreaks due to the lack of vaccinations.552 The congestion of 
thousands of people in cramped, unhygienic, make-shift huts with little protection from the 
elements or access to clean water and sanitation facilities gave birth to a host of 
communicable diseases, flooding, and fires which killed and debilitated thousands at a time.  
Household sanitation has continued to be a major problem since most camps now lack 
space where pits for latrines and garbage can be dug. Even for the proposed 
decongestion centres, we have not got sufficient support, in terms of latrine 
construction, to take up the new design which is believed to solve sanitation 
problems.553 
Many aid agencies now found themselves having to react to the after-effects of their 
protection interventions within the squalid camp conditions, which then created further 
suffering in a never ending cycle. Projects would thus create new projects with the same 
mechanisms of assistance employed over again. This accommodated Sin: 3 The Law of the 
Tool, which asserts that ‘the nature of the response is in large part dictated by the tools at 
hand…no matter what the unique causes of the emergency might be in each situation…which 
restricts ownership of program activities to external agencies rather than focussing on the 
need for local communities to rebuild their own society’.554 
                                                          
552 Nathan et al (2004).  
553 DDMC, Water and Sanitation Sub-Committee Quarterly report, May-July (2004). 
554 Prendergast (1996), p. 8. 
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Figure 36. Relief-Suffering Dynamics 
 
A case in point was the destruction of huts from fires which were common due to the close 
proximity of structures, the continuous use of open fires by IDPs’ cooking, and idle children 
playing with fire in camps, or arson during rebel attack (see Figures 45 & 46 at the end). Fires 
would tear through entire camps in minutes with little defence from IDPs. However, in the 
aftermath of camp fires many NGOs would make proposals and solicit funds from donors for 
the rebuilding of huts in camps on the basis that IDPs required immediate shelter, with no 
thought for the glaring fact that such structures and living conditions had initially caused the 
fires to occur, and in rebuilding them simply re-created the conditions for future catastrophes, 
which would undoubtedly be responded to in a similar manner.   
A second example was access to water, which was delivered primarily through the sinking of 
boreholes in camps by the Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster.  In one DDMC 
quarterly report for the Water & Sanitation sub-committee, several ‘achievements’ were 
documented by NGOs:  
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Confirmed commitment from UNICEF to provide all the 6 boreholes required for Jeng-
Gari resettlement camp (i.e. 1 for the primary school and 5 for IDPs, CARE has 
managed to identify and train 22 CBOs on sand and plat production and hygiene 
education in the camps of Pabbo, Awer, Unyama, Palaro, Paicho, Awere, Lalogi, Opit, 
Anaka and Agung, The sub-committee has also managed to map the operations of all 
the agencies/organisations involved in WATER & Sanitation activities in IDP camps. 
This will ease co-ordination and avoid duplication.555 
The sinking of boreholes as the only known and available approach to delivering clean water 
by NGOs resulted in the contamination of water sources in congested camps where latrines 
and water points were concentrated together (see Figure 44 at the end). This would then cause 
disease to spread, which would raise the alarm for rapid response interventions by a barrage 
of health experts, with their own pharmaceuticals and pseudo-experiments. These experts 
would in the first instance attempt to contain and cure people, but would more 
problematically provide the statistics and justifications for new NGO projects to construct 
‘clean’ water sources in those same camp conditions.556 This is in keeping with Dolan who 
saw that:  
For social torture succeeds precisely because of its ability to combine and create 
synergy between unconscious wants and needs and various economic and political 
interests. While the intentions of individuals and institutions are not eliminated from 
the picture, they are not the critical issue, indeed they cannot be the critical issue as 
social torture is at least in part defined by the involvement of bystanders who do not 
acknowledge their own complicity. Social Torture relies on the fact that people have 
psychological mechanism, and generated discourses to externalise these, specifically to 
convince themselves and others that they had no bad intentions.557  
This was further witnessed in the transformation of camps and IDPs into objects of academic 
inquiry with studies and experiments that sought to ‘improve’ conditions and livelihoods, but 
which augmented the knowledge power complex made easy by the availability of a large 
concentration of idle masses, which had the effect of not only making camps more permanent, 
                                                          
555 Ibid.  
556 Interview with Raphael Opira, ICRC Logistics Officer (2011).  
557 Dolan (2009), p. 259. 
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but completely white-washing and concealing their central structures of exploitation and 
violence. In 2005 the Journal of Mathematics and Statistics published a study titled 
Mathematical Models for the Dynamics of Tuberculosis in Density-dependent Populations: 
The Case of Internally Displaced Peoples’ Camps in Uganda, which was designed to uncover 
both the conditions and area of living space per individual required in order to minimise the 
incidence of tuberculosis. The study concluded that ‘there exists a stable disease-free 
equilibrium point provided that the characteristic area is greater than the product of the 
probability of survival from the latent stage to the infectious stage…the characteristic area per 
individual should be at least 0.25 square kilometres’.558 The study however fell short of 
reality because while the authors argued that ‘there is need to address the issue of limited 
knowledge on the biology of tuberculosis and host-parasite relationship’, (which laid blame 
on IDPs) they then stipulated that ‘overcrowding and unsanitary conditions play a major role 
in explaining the observed trends in Uganda’559, which was contradictory because their study 
virtually recommended that IDPs could remain in those wretched camp conditions but with 
each now having a new personal living space of 0.25 square kilometres! 
A similar study was published in Journal of Water & Health in 2008 titled: Impact of Jerry 
Can Disinfection in a Camp Environment-experiences in an IDP camp in northern Uganda, 
by the Centre for Environmental Health Engineering at the University of Surrey. The research 
was designed to show how ‘a regular jerry can cleaning procedure using high strength sodium 
hypochlorite had been shown to offer an effective method of alleviating contamination in 
water collection vessels’.560 Such a study was oblivious to wider dynamics of the conflict, and 
instead adopted patronising advice that tactfully blamed IDPs for their own inadequate 
hygiene conditions, with relief actors once again cast as the external saviours:  
In the Okidi community it was observed that the water was stored at ground level, often 
outside the house. This allowed easy access by children and animals, and could have 
                                                          
558 Ssematimba, Mugisha and Luboobi (2005), pp. 217-224. 
559 Ibid, p. 223. 
560 Steele, Clarke and Watkins (2008), p. 560. 
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resulted in contamination. This was accentuated by the fact that not one jerry can had a 
lid. These observed practices indicate that the effectiveness of hygiene promotion in a 
complex emergency environment needs to be considered. It is suggested that there may 
be an inevitable gap between the aims of the hygiene promoters and the hygiene 
practices adopted by the community.561   
However, in the end the real issue was that while establishing an effective cleaning 
programme for jerry cans may have worked to reduce the spread of disease, it did virtually 
nothing to repel rebel incursions into camps to steal, amongst other things, those very jerry 
cans. The unquestionable authority and perception of ‘rigorous’ academic inquiries conducted 
by scholars from prestigious institutions, would not only form the ‘scientific’ basis for NGO 
projects in camps that kept people imprisoned, but, more importantly, in the end justified the 
livelihoods and funds of actors involved in the wider humanitarian economy.  
4.3 Vicious Cycle Three: IDP Adaptation 
                                                          
561 Ibid, p. 562. 
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Figure 37. IDP Adaptation Dynamics 
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The third vicious cycle was that of adaptation to camp life by IDPs (see Figure 37 above). 
The camp conditions heralded the social breakdown of individuals, entire villages and 
communities, as one IDP lamented: ‘People lost hope and did not know what was going to 
happen the next day. People had to risk coming to town to Lacor to receive healthcare which 
was not part of the relief. School teachers did not want to live in camps and so stayed in 
towns and ran classes when they felt like and many children missed school’.562 Psychological 
trauma in the form of mental illness and suicides became the order of the day.  
The idle and destitute masses were forced to engage in income generating activities amid the 
shortages of relief and livelihoods, which included, among other things, prostitution, alcohol 
brewing, cultivating, and shops selling small everyday items (sweets, razor blades, soap, 
matches). However, this increased gender based violence with women becoming the sole 
breadwinners in the home due to NGO humanitarian and development projects which 
specifically targeted them. Alcohol abuse became rampant among the old and young as it was 
in plentiful supply which increased school drop out rate and theft in order for them to acquire 
it. These conditions destroyed family and cultural support structures that were essential to 
survival in such horrendous circumstances, which then increased vulnerability to starvation, 
disease and violence. This cycle is evident in Dolan’s distinction of social torture from the 
mainstream Convention Against Torture, in that ‘the categories of perpetrator, bystander and 
victim are shown to be fluid, such that, over time, as victims seek to deal with their situation 
by becoming perpetrators, membership of the perpetrator group is likely to grow’.563 This  
culminated in dependency on the limited aid which ultimately imprisoned hundreds of 
thousands in camps.564 Sin 2: High Stakes Funding mentions that ‘camps for displaced people 
are often favoured over decentralised initiatives because of their high profile, ease of 
operation and photogenic product’.565 Bigger camps were used to attract donors because they 
were more appealing compared to smaller camps which could contain a moderate lifestyle so 
                                                          
562 Interview with Okot Christopher, Camp Commander Alero IDP camp (2011). 
563 Dolan (2009) p. 259. 
564 Ibid, p. 260. 
565 Prendergast (1996), p. 5. 
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were unattractive.566 This visible suffering then reinforced the need for greater injections of 
aid into camps to counter and abate that suffering which once again set off the vicious cycle.   
4.4 Vicious Cycle Four: Army Protection 
The fourth vicious cycle was the precarious UPDF counter-insurgency and protection 
operations in camps (see Figure 38). Camps had been hailed as a protection mechanism. 
However, it soon became apparent that they instead heightened, and even facilitated, 
insecurity to the point where they became the primary theatre of war between government and 
rebels. One in question was the Pajak massacre of 2004, where close to 80 LRA fighters 
entered the camp in the evening and divided into three groups for a five hour raid that 
culminated in 21 children abducted and 32 people killed and countless goods looted.567 It was 
common for the UPDF to either be absent from duties or, even worse, desert during rebel 
attack, as was the case in Alero IDP camp in 1997, which resulted in huts being torched, ten 
people killed, and thirty abducted.568 It was also common for UPDF soldiers to hand over 
guns to IDPs in order to defend themselves from rebel attack. Parliamentary debates would 
often erupt in anger over the Ministry of Defence’s attempts to cover up the dereliction of 
duty by its soldiers569:  
Minister of State for Defence: Ms Nankabirwa Sentamu: What I got from his 
contribution was that we would have deployed where LRA is. It is impossible! This is 
not how deployment goes. You have to set positions and then you attack. You cannot 
find where LRA is and then you bring your troops and dump them there. You cannot! 
Mr Awori: Some people have been kidnapped. Have we heard anything from the hon. 
Minister in charge of Defence telling us of measures that have been taken to attend to 
this problem? Mr Speaker, with your permission, I would like to refute the statement 
from the hon. Minister of State for Defence.  
One, she says you just do not throw soldiers into a situation. I for one know, and I was 
in this Parliament when we were told, that the US Government has trained UPDF in 
                                                          
566 Interview with Raphael Opira, ICRC Logistics Officer (2006-2009). 
567 Interview with Lemoi Dennis, Camp Commander of Pajak IDP camp (2004-2006). 
568 Interview with Okot Christopher, Camp Commander of Alero IDP camp (2002-2007). 
569 Official Parliamentary Hansard, Tuesday 17th June, (2003). 
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what we call "rapid response", or getting to a situation area within 24 hours. At one 
time we even went to Jinja and trained a number of soldiers in rapid response, in order 
to go to Somalia and other African countries. Why do we train people to respond to 
external situations but not internal situations? 
The camps had been justified and created as ‘protected villages’ with many forced from their 
homes. However, the failure to secure IDPs by the army and the multitude of paramilitary 
forces led to camps becoming ‘unprotected villages’ with countless LRA incursions:  
Ms Betty Amongi (Women Representative for Apac): Let me start by giving 
information. Yesterday ten people were killed and houses were burnt when the LRA 
attacked Alito sub-county. I am still going to get more information on how many 
people were abducted.  
As I talk now, and I am grateful that the Minister noted in her statement that Alito sub-
county had no deployment of UPDF - we disclosed spots the LRA use to enter and 
escape and we thought those were the strategic spots for deployment of the UPDF. 
Today, four months after giving those possible points of deployment, there has never 
been any deployment there.  
On Thursday last week I toured the whole of that northern part of my constituency. 
There are only a few spots where the UPDF is deployed. We must talk on the basis of 
facts; and the fact is that there are no strategic deployments in all those areas where the 
LRA abduct and kill the people from.570 
This state of affairs gave birth to Sin: 6 Exploiting Competition, in which ‘warring factions 
are often able to easily exploit the competition that logically results from dozens of agencies 
trying to obtain front-row seats…operating in areas or ways that maximise benefits to warring 
parties’.571 This debacle strengthened the rebels with the logistics needed to continue fighting 
the government, who had already awarded them the initiative with the encampment of 1.8 
million people. This left the LRA free to roam and feast upon hundreds of square miles of 
uninhabited land, which further justified the need for camps. The situation had become so 
                                                          
570 Official Parliamentary Hansard, Thursday 19th June, (2003). 
571 Prendergast (1996), p. 12. 
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perilous that some IDP camps began rejecting relief aid on the basis that, once received, 
rebels would be certain to come and cause havoc to steal it.572  
 
The Barlonyo massacre in Lira district in February 2004, saw an estimated 300 people lose 
their lives in a co-ordinated rebel assault with no UPDF protection for which the president 
later apologised in a visit to the area. As one IDP survivor recounts: 
I saw rebels approaching the Barlonyo IDP Camp. They surrounded us from all 
directions. We decided to get into our houses when I heard a bomb explode. I ran 
outside and collided with people who were also running for safety. I lay flat on the 
ground trying to take cover. Meanwhile bullets were exploding in the air. I started 
running, as I was running a bullet hit the person who was running behind me. I was just 
trying my luck with a baby on my back…I returned the next morning only to find the 
body of one of my sister’s children. She had been axed to death and flies were covering 
her body. My husband’s face had been sliced onto four pieces with a machete.573 
 
                                                          
572 Interview with Joyce Acan, former UNHCR Senior Protection Officer (2004-2011).   
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4.5 Vicious Cycle Five: Calculated Silence & Denial  
The fifth vicious cycle was the most important because it overshadowed the previous four by 
initiating and sustaining them. This was the denial, inaction, and calculated silence exhibited 
by the Government of Uganda, Donors and the Humanitarian community over the events in 
northern Uganda (see Figure 39 below). This led to Sin 4: Humanitarian Aid as a Cover, 
whereby ‘foreign policy responses to complex emergencies have underplayed the complexity 
of the forces driving modern conflicts…donors avoid tough political issues and delivering 
humanitarian aid to massage symptoms and assuage consciences’.574 In northern Uganda a 
Faustian bargain was struck with all three locked into a cycle whereby the GoU would turn a 
blind eye to the mismanagement and malpractices of the relief community precisely because 
it needed them to sanitise and gloss over the human costs of its counter insurgency operation 
and general instability, which while disastrous, had become politically functional. On the 
other hand, the relief community was reluctant to confront the GoU on the glaring UPDF 
violations because of the need to maintain a prominent field presence and the continuous flow 
of donor funds, which ultimately guaranteed their privileges and heightened global status. 
Thus each was prepared to tacitly tolerate the pathologies of the other in order to cover up and 
expunge their own wrong doing. 
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Figure 39. Dynamics of Silence & Denial  
 
In the BBC Hardtalk of 2007, Allan Little confronted the then Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Sam Kutesa, over the IDP situation in the north.575 
Allan Little: The entire population of Acholi have been displaced from their homes, 
taken off their land and moved into camps. Why?  
Minister for Foreign Affairs Sam Kutesa: These people have not been taken off their 
land and these are not concentration camps. These are internally displaced persons 
(IDP) camps. The Government established these camps to protect people who were 
running away from the attacks of the terrorist organisation called LRA. It is difficult to 
protect them in their homes. So the Government organises IDP camps to be able to feed 
them, provide them with water, medicine, education and better protection. 
Allan Little: The IDP Monitoring Centre in Geneva said it suits the Government to 
keep people in the north in camps, the northerners have for a long time been seen as a 
threat to the Government, it is an opposition stronghold and that this neglect can be 
constructed as an attempt to weaken the north politically 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Sam Kutesa: That is an unfortunate perception and it is 
factually incorrect. It is not in the interest of the Government to keep the people in 
camps or in opposition. In the light of self-interest, if you help people develop you 
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generate support for yourself and we are not foolish. But we are fighting a terrorist 
organisation and we are ill-equipped because of some budgetary constraints. When we 
hose to arm our army, the LRA have fled; they are not in Garamba enjoying a holiday. 
We have done our best to make the situation in IDP camps better with the help of the 
international community.  
In an interview, the Commissioner for Disaster Preparedness, Martin Owor, was very quick to 
justify the NGOs and camps.576  
Interviewer: How did Government engage with the large numbers of NGOs? 
Mr Owor: Keeping people in camps was expensive, Government was running three 
programs at the same time for the benefit of the people (humanitarian, normal socio-
economic development, special programs for the recovery of northern Uganda). NGOs 
were everywhere and did a good job during the instability, government could not 
operate at micro level and so NGOs linked the Government to the community by 
speaking the local language and engaging the people.  
Interviewer: Did you not feel that NGOs were exploiting the people or that the camp 
based relief was causing more harm than good? 
Mr Owor: No! The conflict was based on people running away from Kony to the 
government for protection and working with government to help them be liberated. 
NGOs minimised suffering in camps by bringing out the issues in camps for 
government to then act. The camps had several advantages, first people were trained in 
modern production methods, secondly the military had two mile radius around all 
camps so people could farm while being escorted.   
However, this was in contrast to the interview conducted with the Assistant Commissioner for 
Disaster Preparedness Rose, who was very quick to state the various problems encountered 
with NGOs, but when asked why it was tolerated, immediately asserted that her hands were 
tied by her superiors.577  
                                                          
576 Interview with Commissioner for Disaster Management and Preparedness, Martin Owor, 7th January 
(2012). 
577 Interview with Assistant Commissioner for Disaster Management and Preparedness, Rose 
Nakabugo, 6th January (2012). 
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For relief agencies, any introspection regarding their interventions in northern Uganda 
brought uncomfortable questions. In a 1999 WFP internal report, the organisation scrutinised 
the role of the major humanitarian actors. The consultant noted the fact that, ‘tension still 
remains between the government’s broader political concern to control a population and the 
potential co-opting of the aid programme to this end’578. In relation to WFP’s conduct he 
came to the conclusion that ‘The programme as a whole was not designed around protection 
concerns, other than the general assumption that the camps were safer than outlying 
villages…WFP may have too readily fallen in line with government policy, in effect 
becoming both provider and legitimiser of a villagization policy’.579 
Many organisations were well aware of such dangers even before their deployments. 
UNICEF’s Emergency Field Handbook obviated the guidelines for humanitarian-military 
relations asserting that ‘insofar as military organisations have a role to play in supporting 
humanitarian work, this role should not, to the extent possible encompass direct assistance. It 
is important to keep a clear distinction between humanitarian and military roles. Any use of 
military assets should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale’.580 Similarly 
UNOCHA in 2003 published Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to 
Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, which warned 
that: 
The expedient and inappropriate use of military and civil defence resources can 
compromise neutrality, impartiality and other humanitarian principles of all 
humanitarian actors responding to the emergency. The loss of neutrality can result in 
relief workers becoming direct targets of the belligerents and being denied access to the 
affected population, not only in the current emergency, but also in future humanitarian 
crises. In addition, the loss of neutrality can result in the affected population becoming 
direct targets of the belligerents. Ultimately, decision-makers must weigh the risk to 
relief workers and their ability to operate effectively at the moment, and in the future, 
                                                          
578 WFP Report, Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Country Case Study on Internal 
Displacement Final Draft, UGANDA DISPLACEMENT IN THE NORTHERN AND WESTERN 
DISTRICTS, September (1999). 
579 Ibid. 
580 UNICEF (2006), p. 94. 
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against the immediacy of the needs of the affected population and the need for the use 
of military and civil defence assets.581 
However, many NGOs resorted to denial as an effective remedy to the cognitive dissonance 
arising from questions of their failed neutrality. As Marriage explains, ‘denial allows 
unofficial acknowledgement of the political environment to co-exist with the official version 
of neutrality and effectiveness’.582 This was managed by encouraging and facilitating the 
capacity building of the very security forces that carry out crimes against camp dwellers, in 
the hope that once trained and educated to respect human rights, many would simply 
acquiesce. The UN Office for High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) 
documented many UPDF and paramilitary crimes against the civilians in camps through their 
monthly visits.583 However, between 2007 and 2009 they took a ‘non-confrontational’ 
approach towards government, which had the effect of presenting such abuses as simple bad 
habits that could be easily overcome by creating Civil-Military Co-Operation Centres 
(CMCCs). The Uganda Human Rights Commission, The UPDF and Uganda Police, were 
integrated into a programme designed to ‘bridge the information gap between the civilian 
population and law enforcement and security forces to provide quick and effective mediation 
in minor human rights violations, to reduce impunity by channelling complaints to relevant 
justice mechanisms’.584 
However, one had to question the efficacy of such an initiative which only focussed on two 
security organs, when there exist over thirty official and unofficial state security outfits that 
operated both overtly and covertly throughout the country with virtually no Parliamentary 
oversight. Overall, the initiative quietly dissolved government accountability while 
simultaneously upholding the illusion of tireless UN advocacy and civilian protection. In a 
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Visit (2006), Pagak IDP Camp Visit (2006), Pabbo IDP Camp Visit (2006), Koch Goma IDP Camp 
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private discussion with a senior OHCHR worker, it was revealed that such an approach was 
imperative to guarantee the presence of UN OHCHR in Uganda, which would automatically 
end if the organisation ever exposed or embarrassed the government.585      
5. Creating New Power 
Up until now we have witnessed how power was instilled into the camp space and the effects 
it generated. However, this is only half the story as a final point of illumination is to observe 
how the camps were themselves instrumental in creating new structures of power. To do so 
we have to first consider heterotopia as symptomatic, precisely because all the prevailing 
contradictions highlighted above show us that the particular political rationalities at play 
within camps, transcends the stated objectives widely trumpeted for their establishment. Let 
me qualify this claim. If it can be argued that camps do not necessarily deliver on the 
pragmatic reasons that are provided for in their creation, and in reality do more harm than 
good? Indeed, as Foucault warned us not to consider the modern prison system as a failure 
due to its inability to fulfil its stated objective of reducing crime and rehabilitating criminals, 
but to consider the true purpose it served within society which was to created medicalised 
category of social deviants who could be turned upon themselves in a confined space away 
from civil society; a factor which explained its uninterrupted 200 year existence586. To answer 
this we have to recognise heterotopia to be a two way street, in that they not only house 
asymmetries of power but are also instrumental in constructing new meaning and power. 
Indeed Lefebvre asserted that space,  
Though a product to be used, to be consumed, it is also a means of production; 
networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are 
determined by it. Thus this means of production, produced as such, cannot be separated 
either from the productive forces, including technology and knowledge, or from the 
                                                          
585 Interview with Patrick Amihere, UN OHCHR field officer (2004-present). 
586 Foucault (1979), pp. 276-277. 
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social division of labour which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of 
society.587 
Furthermore, the practices of power manifested in arrangements of space may themselves 
function as points of discursive generation which can form the basis for further justifications 
and expansions of power.588 The spatiality of the IDP camp, as I have tried to show, is at one 
end of a loop of power in which humanitarian and counter-insurgency discourses validate a 
variety of prerogatives and entitlements which has the effect of entrapping people. However, 
according to Hook ‘if heterotopias do emerge in societies as a kind of ‘compromise structure’ 
between power and pragmatic necessity, then, as in the case of symptoms, we might expect 
that they would provide a cryptic indication of the underlying conflict of interests that has 
both brought them into being and given them their particular form’.589 Therefore, at the other 
end of the loop, the IDP camp thus becomes a compromise space that reproduces and sustains 
two wider diametrically opposed facets of control, which otherwise could not be guaranteed 
under ‘normal’ circumstances and hence all require an infinite and alternate zone occupied by 
a population living in a state of suspended political animation.  
7.1 Creating the Ultimate Barrier to Refugee Flows  
The first creation is the curbing of refugee flows which was the quintessential strategy in the 
origins and evolution of the IDP Regime discussed in chapters one and two. The Cluster 
Approach is today a recognised global instrument practiced in Pakistan, Liberia, and DRC in 
which, according to Crisp, ‘significant strides have been made in conceptualising some of the 
key challenges faced by IDPs as human rights issues-which has facilitated the development of 
protection strategies and effective advocacy campaigns’.590 Now while its operational 
performance has raised serious questions, with small NGOs lacking time and personnel to 
attend all meetings591, or Clusters lacking the leadership and logistics592, such evaluations 
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completely miss its real and true function. The Cluster Approach emanated from UNHCR’s 
urgent responses to the threat of extinction at the hands of powerful states in the Global 
North. The IDP camp thus becomes the material extension of this fundamental survival 
strategy of a once beleaguered international organisation, with the operational dynamics as 
tertiary considerations.  This is in keeping with what Massey cautions us against, in that, 
Instead then, of thinking of places as areas with boundaries around, they can be 
imagined as articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings. 
And this in turn allows a sense of place which is extraverted, which includes a 
consciousness of its links with the wider world, which integrates in a positive way the 
global and the local.593  
As already noted, the camp occupies an ambiguous political and legal space, because it is a 
half-way house between citizens living in a sovereign state and the international legal rights 
apportioned to refugees living in foreign lands. While this may seem contradictory and 
completely irrational, it gives UNHCR the capacity to simultaneously solve two diametrically 
opposed problems, which guarantees its existence. Indeed, as we saw in chapter one, the main 
criticism arising from UNHCRs involvement with IDPs and in-country protection in the 90s, 
was that by promoting the rights of citizens to remain within their borders, it eroded its modus 
operandi of refugee protection, especially in its ability to lobby receiving states to respect and 
contribute support to the masses fleeing into their territories.   
However, the IDP camp and its residents occupy a desensitised state of limbo that does not 
attract the protest against barrier restrictions compared to refugee flows, or of claims of neo-
colonial interventions, precisely because it is a ‘placeless place’  neither within nor without 
the state, which ultimately means that international organisations can stage interventions 
‘without’ staging interventions. The camp therefore provides the new political avenue for 
powerful states to curb refugee flows while simultaneously ‘protecting’ the vulnerable and 
assuaging any criticism or guilt. Citizens can remain at ‘home’, therefore extinguishing the 
need for flight and its associated political tensions, while the ‘root causes’ of their plight are 
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simultaneously ‘addressed’ by ‘altruistic’ NGOs. The IDP Regime becomes the ultimate 
barrier to refugee flows because it makes refugees extinct from the onset.   
This echoes the work of Dubernet who observed how measures enhancing the safety of 
displaced persons were shallow and were always subordinate to containment aims. Now while 
she focused on wider humanitarian safe areas, and not on the IDP Regime per se, with its 
systematic creation of bureaucratic structures, laws and policies in camps, her study has 
resonance for the IDP experience in camps, as  
…the international community’s impact on the size and evolution of humanitarian 
spaces is greater than accounted for so far. Indeed, in the return, containment and 
bargaining processes, places such as Kibeho, the front line areas in northern Iraq or 
Srebrenica turned into snares for their unfortunate residents. They became traps 
because they were initially created to discourage flights and thus had no escape routes: 
they were and remained humanitarian spaces without exit [emphasis added].594   
5.3 Constructing the Enemy 
Secondly the camp could be harnessed by the NRM government and international 
community, to create and sustain the prevailing images and stereotypes of the ‘enemy’ as a 
violator of human security, which was part of the propaganda machinery used for both 
international and domestic audiences respectively. As Keen states  
…when others want to define you in particular ways, this may be to recruit supporters 
or perhaps to label you as an ‘other’. This labelling as ‘other’ may be part of a process 
of defining oneself and one’s own group and of promoting self-esteem. It may also be 
part of a programme of discrimination, exploitation and/or scapegoating.595 
The camps thus came to possess a subliminal meaning, because together with the sights of 
mutilated and dismembered rebel victims, they became the international face of the suffering 
of northern Uganda. The camps were well suited to this end because unlike the insurgency 
and LRA, which were virtually hidden between Uganda’s border with Sudan and difficult to 
comprehend from afar, the camps thus became a tangible reference point to market the trauma 
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and magnitude of suffering. Their attenuated conditions were projected as an outcome of 
LRA violence and not as a deliberate strategy or mechanism of exploitation and manipulation 
by government and NGOs, with both actors perceived to be simply acting in a reactionary 
capacity to the perceived LRA madness. This was first envisaged within Donor and NGO 
reports that would always commence with a synopsis of the conflict which perpetuated this 
false and constructed image: 
On December 23rd, 1999, the Lord’s Resistance Army re-entered the Districts of Gulu 
and Kitgum, ending the relative peace the district had known. As a result the 
population returned massively to the IDP camps, leaving a large part of their crops on 
the fields. Since then, the LRA successfully managed to restrict access to roads, 
initially paralysing and later on seriously hindering relief efforts, and choking the 
economic life of the district [emphasis added].596  
The 18 year insurgency caused by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels 
characterised by massive killings, abduction, ambushes on civilian vehicles and forced 
recruitment of children, lootings and wanton destruction of property etc. resulted into 
the massive displacement of people from their original villages into 33 Government 
gazetted IDP camps [emphasis added].597 
The second came from global media which was thus mobilised to conflate and present such a 
skewed picture in which  ‘information emerging at the time of the worst disasters may 
represent the collision of one set of fictions (for example, deliberate falsehoods and 
confusions put about by abusive local governments) with another set of distortions propagated 
by the international media’.598 Beginning in 1995 with the New York Times, which published 
an article titled Rebels Without a Cause Terrorise Uganda’s Poor, the LRA were presented as 
a senseless group that ‘has only about 1,500 followers, but have killed hundreds, abducted 
thousands of children and terrorize with tactics like cutting off noses and ears, breaking legs 
with hammers and laying land mines…seeks to overthrow the Government but has no 
concrete political program but to terrorise a population of subsistence farmers and delay the 
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development of Uganda’s poorest region’.599 Throughout the early 2000s the connection 
between LRA and the camps became more pronounced with the New York Times claiming 
that ‘Over the past few weeks, as many as 30,000 villagers have been huddled together at 
night for protection on the sprawling grounds of the main hospital here. They have reason to 
be scared: the huts of thousands of people in and around Gulu have been destroyed in recent 
fighting between government soldiers and some of the world’s most bizarre rebels—the 
Lord’s Resistance Army’ [emphasis added].600  
The Economist of that year in an article entitled A Catastrophe Ignored, stated that ‘many 
flooded back into northern Uganda, murdering and massacring as they went. The Ugandan 
government then told the local people to leave their villages and settle in camps, for better 
protection. Ever since, desperate for food that is no longer grown in the countryside, the LRA 
has targeted these camps’.601 Following the ICC’s unsealing of the warrants of arrest for the 
five LRA commanders in October 2005 and Joseph Kony being placed on the US Treasury 
Department’s Special Designated Global Terrorist’ list in August 2008, it became even easier 
to make such inaccurate connections. The Washington Post similarly echoed such a biased 
message in a 2006 article entitled To End Uganda’s Nightmare, where camp life became the 
first point of reference for anyone wanting to denounce the LRA atrocities and lobby the 
world for relief: ‘In Palabek-Kal camp where thousands have been crammed into a makeshift 
village. Hearing their stories of suffering and survival made two points abundantly clear: 
They are praying for peace every moment, and they expect the world community to do 
everything possible to help them achieve it. Their yearning was deeply moving, and their 
collective intensity and faith to build a better future in the midst of such hardship was 
powerful’.602 Similarly, The Guardian, in a 2007 article entitled Teaching Peace in Uganda, 
made the leap of arguing that the rebel activity had singlehandedly destroyed farmland and 
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livestock and disrupted the education of children forced into camps, as one interview with a 
school teacher living in a camp claimed:  
The reality is that many people have nowhere to go. The camps are home, and 
everyone in them- from school teachers to the children they teach is living in the same 
cramped conditions…many children don’t have any background knowledge; either 
their education was disrupted by the fighting around them or they were recruited as 
child soldiers, drafted with thousands of others by the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army. 
Many children still don’t come to school for fear of being abducted by the LRA.603   
The Economist of 2007 argued that, ‘The violence is worth emphasising because it explains 
the almost demonic grip the LRA has over the displaced. A single LRA bullet, says aid 
workers, would be all it would take to send the resettled back to the camps…The children are 
barefoot, in tattered rags or naked, their bellies swollen with worms; traditional community 
life broke down in the centralised camps’.604 A 2008 Guardian article entitled Civil War 
Pushes Stress Levels to Record High In Uganda, proclaimed the same argument, but then 
went on to make the direct connection between war, camps and the rebels in the following 
year as the LRA gradually moved across the border to bases in DRC and Central African 
Republic, with the claim that ‘northern Uganda is now experiencing a semblance of peace. 
But while some people are making their way back to their home towns and villages, up to 
80% of the population of Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader districts are still considered 
displaced, and an estimated 85% still live in government camps’.605    
Conclusion 
This chapter has employed the Foucauldian concept of heterotopia as a clarifying light on 
how the practice of humanitarian space within the displacement camps in northern Uganda 
spatialised particular regimes of truth. It has exposed how just because arrangements of space 
exist beneath a legitimate rationale (protection of IDPs) and just because they have an 
apparent spatial, that is, pragmatic, existence (camp based delivery), does not make them 
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innocent in the retention of power or the perpetuation of relief politics. The spatial regulation 
of the IDP camp was not simply about rescuing displaced masses from untold suffering, but 
far more fundamentally, about the creation of a separate and permanent world, which could 
absorb and sustain an indefinite humanitarian economy that guaranteed countless privileges 
and upheld the unceasing trepidations of a fragile state.  
The events were a logical and predictable outcome of the IDP Regime, which revoked 
citizens of their citizenship and placed them outside the state both politically through the 
abdication of state responsibility to the international community, and physically through the 
creation of a separate territorial space within a state and the issue of a new bureaucratic label 
which ‘entitles’ them to external services and ‘benefits’. However, what was actually 
experienced was far from benevolent with the IDP camp becoming a mechanism of control 
with all actors exploiting this ‘acceptable’ and ‘urgent’ state of limbo to justify any and every 
action. The IDP Regime had catapulted humanitarian impunity to astronomical levels because 
whereas before aid agencies were heavily criticised for their lack of co-ordination, ill suited 
‘one size fits all’ interventions, and their incorporation into war economies, the Cluster 
Approach mechanism institutionalised humanitarian pathologies to create a seemingly more 
organised and sanitised intervention, which was in concordance with the imminent needs of 
the suffering masses.  
In reality, the Cluster Approach became a Trojan Horse, acting as a subterfuge for ‘business 
as usual’ within the global relief industry. Camp Co-ordination became a euphemism for the 
consolidation of relief supremacy within complex emergencies. Camp Management became a 
euphemism for the depoliticisation and technicisation of chronic horizontal inequalities and 
state predation. Emergency Shelter became a euphemism for the ‘Nightingale Effect’ with the 
co-opting of the international community into calming and cooling the collateral damage 
emanating from a haphazard counter-insurgency campaign. Each component worked to 
cement structural violence which claimed more lives than the civil conflict, with 1.8 million 
people imprisoned in a permanent state of relief that involved them living and dying in their 
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own excrement, succumbing to water borne diseases, starving from lack of access to food, 
and living in the constant fear of rebel and government violence. In practice the Cluster 
Approach, which was trumpeted as the new and effective means to end suffering, changed the 
dynamics by creating a new complex emergency within an existing complex emergency.  
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Pictures of IDP Camps in Northern Uganda 
 
Figure 40. US Congress Woman Nita Lowey & Congressman Maurice Hinchey interviewing 
Raymond Odoki in Unyama IDP Camp (Frederick Laker 19/8/2007) 
 
Figure 41. AMREF Goodwill Ambassador, actress Mena Suvari (Frederick Laker 
20/2/2008) 
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Figure 43. Kitgum LC5 Chairman Naman Ojwee (left) and NRM Vice Chairman Haji Kigongo 
(right) posing for a photo in Padibe IDP Camp (Frederick Laker 15/2/2006) 
 
 
Figure 42. UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland in Opit 
IDP Camp (Frederick Laker 1/1/2005) 
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Figure 44. IDPs in Pabbo IDP Camp lining up at bore holes (Frederick Laker 29/3/2007) 
Figure 45. Lacekocot IDP Camp gutted by fire (Frederick Laker 4/4/2007) 
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Figure 47. Presidential Candidate Dr. Abed Bwanika, PDP campaigning in IDP camp 
(Frederick Laker 9/1/2006) 
Figure 46. Pabbo IDP Camp on fire (Frederick Laker 17/12/2005) 
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Figure 49. Police and civilians carrying 65 year old Josephine Arim shot dead by army in IDP 
Camp (Frederick Laker 25/12/2005) 
Figure 48. Anaka LC3 Chairperson Denis Okema (right) leading UPDF Chief of Land 
Forces Lt.General Katumba Wamala (left) in IDP Camp (Frederick Laker 6/2/2007) 
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Conclusion 
At the beginning of this thesis we observed how the construction of Attention Deficit Hyper 
Activity Disorder (ADHD) as an unquestionable social fact, despite having no biological 
basis, facilitated a knowledge/power relationship which created norms, categories, 
institutions, publications and treatment programmes that served the multiple interests of 
schools, teachers, medical professionals, the pharmaceutical industry and the media, with 
considerable consequences for children, parents, and education. Similarly, the construction of 
the Global Internal Displacement Regime, despite being ambiguous, contradictory and having 
no conceptual basis, served a plethora of interests at each stage in its origins, evolution, 
structure and impact. It acted as a compromise initiative between powerful states, 
international institutions, fragile states, and the relief industry with considerable consequences 
for conceptions of sovereignty, state-societal relations, and the nature and trajectory of 
complex humanitarian emergencies.  
The origins and evolution of the IDP Regime were not simply about the discovery of destitute 
masses who shared the same characteristics as refugees and had no protection under 
international law, but a geo-political game in which the old frameworks of the 1951 
Convention had limited the interests of the powerful, with new ones thus required to replace it 
to manage and contain refugee flows, calm domestic pressures and conceal xenophobia while 
upholding international human rights obligations through the right to remain, which 
authorised interventions into the domestic affairs of weak states. The geo-political game saw 
the UNHCR embroiled in an existential fight to reinvent itself by recycling the Refugee 
Regime in the ‘new’ IDP Regime so as to allay Western fears and establish itself as a 
dominant humanitarian player. These events, however, paralleled the wider history of 
population control which now came to imprint itself upon new humanitarian norms and 
structures within complex emergencies, where in many cases counter-insurgency was already 
being practiced through displacement of populations into concentration camps (Sri Lanka, 
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Indonesia, Burma, and Uganda). This had a wider effect of blurring and white-washing state 
predation through systems of relief delivery.  
The structure of the IDP Regime rested upon reproducing existing power structures of 
Western paternalism, humanitarian privileges, and the control of destitute masses through the 
refugee protection system. Such structures worked to create an alternate category of people, 
residing in an alternate territorial space, protected by an alternate external actor, which 
employed an alternate set of laws and guidelines. This had the effect of completely 
depoliticising and transforming complex emergencies into technical problems that awarded 
the relief industry complete control over a given populace for indefinite periods of time that 
could instantly justify and secure the livelihoods, funding, and global status of NGOs.  
In addition, the introduction of the Cluster Approach framework created a zone of alternate 
social ordering which harmonised the interests and power dynamics of both fragile states and 
the relief industry by simultaneously infusing them into the camp space to the detriment of 
almost 2 million people, who were imprisoned in a space of permanent limbo, characterised 
by starvation, overcrowding, disease, social breakdown and continuous rebel attack.  
Internal Displacement & International Politics 
The IDP Regime, while creating a number of inherent contradictions, ambiguities, and 
distortions, makes grand prescriptions that ran at the core of international relations. Indeed, 
the removal of state borders and the entrance of the humanitarian community into fragile 
states for indefinite periods, to cradle sections of a populace in the absence of a centralised 
authority amid a complex emergency, casts serious doubt on the funding, preparedness, 
personnel, and accountability of all ‘dedicated’ relief actors. This strategy has amounted to 
what Andreopoulos terms as normative overstretch: ‘collective expectations about proper 
conduct that create impetus for behaviour in issue areas that transcend the settled cartography 
bounded by institutional mandates’606 . However, this could be considered to be a minor issue 
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compared to the underlying nature of international law, as recognised by Chimni who 
comments how: 
 
International law has always served the interests of dominant social forces and States in 
international relations. However, domination, history testifies, can coexist with varying 
degrees of autonomy for dominating States. The colonial period saw the complete and 
open negation of the autonomy of the colonised countries. In the era of globalisation, 
the reality of dominance is best conceptualised as a more stealthy, complex and 
cumulative process. A growing assemblage of international laws, institutions and 
practices coalesce to erode the independence of third world countries in favour of 
transnational capital and powerful States.607  
 
For already troubled states in the Global South, the IDP Regime provided the ‘new’ 
normative framework for the promotion of wider geo-political interests of states in the Global 
North that went far beyond refugee containment. In the same way, the Refugee Regime was 
only accepted and upheld insofar as it was useful for the West as a Cold War propaganda tool. 
The IDP Regime also came to be useful in legitimising and preserving systems of 
intervention, dependency and control, instrumental for the neo-colonial project. What was 
striking about the R2P discourse was that the arguments that ‘suffering knew no borders’, 
which then authorised intervention, were only applicable to fragile states in the Global South. 
This is arguably the latest reincarnation of the old practice of the International Administration 
of War Torn States as sections of a populace and territory which are ceded to international 
organisations with new mandates for indefinite periods of time.608  
 
Internal Displacement & Crises of Citizenship 
 
The third implication exists at the level of governance, as while proponents claimed that they 
were assisting vulnerable masses, their direct application of refugee law automatically lifted 
the veil to expose their true colours, as in order to successfully contain refugees within their 
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own borders, actors needed to create parity between IDPs and refugees. However, this 
endeavour led to a conflation of the issues of governance and internal politics, with that of the 
international politics of refugee protection. As a consequence, citizens trapped within their 
territories now ascended to the realm of international humanitarianism, which reproduced the 
systems of refugee protection and both side-lined and silenced the structural deficiency of the 
crises of citizenship that caused displacement in the first place. 
The concept of citizenship generally connotes being a member of a political community with 
prescribed rights and duties. T.H. Marshall, from a sociological perspective, defines it as “the 
right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according 
to the standards prevailing in the society”. Citizenship is therefore the trajectory and 
landscape of relations between the citizen and the political entity.609 However in many 
developing states such a concept becomes hollow with contestations over its precise meaning 
and physical value, which reveals how an ontological displacement first occurs before the 
physical displacement.610 Sudan, the country with the record highest number of internally 
displaced people has been the result of such a crisis of citizenship. Differences in ethnicity 
and religion have merged with the disparities in socio-economic status between Northern and 
Southern Sudan.611 The Dinka of Southern Sudan, who are predominantly Christian, have 
been marginalised, exploited and almost destroyed by the Arab Muslim government. 
Prendergast notes how the implementation of Islamic law in 1989 by General Omar al-Bashir, 
made non-Muslims second class citizens; Col. Nimeri’s attempts to redraw boundaries so as 
to incorporate the oil deposits in the North in 1983; attempts to reroute more water from the 
Nile for irrigation in the North, which would affect Southern nomadic pastoralists; and 
attempts by the North to depopulate the fertile agricultural land in the South through violent 
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means,612 have all been met with violence from The Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA).   
A similar case is Colombia, which has been experiencing a protracted guerrilla war, with 
military forces employing displacement of rural populations as a counter-insurgency tactic 
within a conflict that also served multiple political and economic interests for a plethora of 
international and domestic actors. Like Uganda, authorities since 1997 have also developed a 
national IDP policy which awarded services, goods and rights to over a million IDPs residing 
in urban centres. Law 387 of 1997 created a national status for IDPs providing humanitarian 
assistance. Since 1999, at the request of the government, UNHCR has maintained a field 
presence disseminating IDP legislation, registering IDPs, issuing ID cards, and creating 
protection networks among civil society groups and local authorities.613 However, there was 
an irony to the experience of internal displacement in Colombia, which was widely believed 
to have been an outcome of the 60 year war, but was, in actuality, the original cause of the 
violence and instability in the early 20th century. The main protagonists, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces (FARC), first began as civil defence units who fought to protect peasants from 
eviction and displacement off their land by rich farmers in 1930s, who then later adopted 
Marxist ideology in the 1960s and demanded greater access to land and income 
distribution.614 The conflict then mutated and hardened over the decades through the US 
involvement and the lucrative coca industry, with the emergence of a three dimensional war 
between government forces, paramilitaries and three guerrilla forces, that forced hundreds of 
thousands into cities for sanctuary.615   
For such states the IDP Regime simply distorts and inverts crises of governance and 
citizenship through the creation of a new official bureaucratic label (IDP) incorporated into 
national policies. This awards certain citizens trapped within their own states with new rights 
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and services, when the wider violence and disorder has arisen precisely because of the state’s 
inability or unwillingness to deliver on the social contract. The IDP Regime is in sum adding 
an inefficient parallel structure to existing inefficient state structures, by creating two tiers of 
citizens who are both seeking, in different ways, to reverse the same socio-economic 
iniquities.    
Internal Displacement & Accountability of International Organisations 
Finally the IDP Regime makes a considerable contribution to the emerging debates regarding 
the accountability of international institutions which are seldom considered, with obligations 
always falling on state actors, with continuous efforts invested in moralising and socialising 
the state. The failures and inconsistencies of international organisations fall below the radar 
without question and can easily be deflected. This is evident in the famous case which ignited 
this debate in the late 1970s, when former employees of the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) who were unfairly dismissed, challenged their termination first within the internal 
system of the OAS, through a tribunal (Broadbent v. OAS) which while ruling in their favour, 
exploited them by agreeing to pay them compensation instead of their full reinstatement. 
Unsatisfied with this outcome they sued the OAS in US courts. However, this became a futile 
exercise as their case was thrown out after many appeals on the grounds that the OAS was 
immune from the jurisdiction of American courts.616 Immunity has thus always since been the 
biggest obstacle to the accountability of international organisations.617 In light of this, a slew 
of scholars have attempted to navigate this minefield with potential solutions618. More 
recently, Verdirame rested hopes of ‘guarding the guardians’ on the obligations of 
international organisations. While most actors trumpet the rights of international 
organisations, they rarely focus on the obligations which match a particular right. Therefore, 
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if an organisation is going to be on the ground promoting policies and practices that cause 
harm, then it has violated the UN Charter.619  
However in light of these debates there was a turn of the tide in June 2011, when the 
European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Sufi and Elmi versus United Kingdom, made 
a juridical pronouncement on the conditions of humanitarian relief camps that set a 
precedence which sent shockwaves for this wider debate. The case involved the deportation 
of two Somali refugees, Mr Abdisamad Adow Sufi & Mr Abdiaziz Ibrahim Elmi from Britain 
back to the Afgooye corridor and Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya, with the former not only 
entering the UK legally and the latter’s rejection of asylum, but more seriously for the 
criminal acts of burglary, fraud, road traffic offenses, drugs and possession of firearms which 
made them a danger to the public. However, on being referred to the ECHR, and following a 
long investigation into the security situation in camps and Somalia, through visits and 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports, the court ruled that Sufi & Elmi 
could not be deported on the grounds that the conditions constituted torture:  
As sufficiently dire to amount to treatment reaching the thresholds of Article 3 of the 
Convention. IDPs in the Afgooye Corridor have very limited access to food and water, 
and shelter appears to be an emerging problem as landlords seek to exploit their 
predicament for profit. Although humanitarian assistance is available in the Dadaab 
camps, due to extreme overcrowding access to shelter, water, and sanitation facilities is 
extremely limited. The inhabitants of both camps are vulnerable to violent crime, 
exploitation, abuse and forcible recruitment. Moreover, the refugees living in- or, 
indeed, trying to get to- the Dadaab camps are also at risk of refoulement by the 
Kenyan authorities. Finally the Court notes that the inhabitants of both camps have 
very little prospect of their situation improving within a reasonable timeframe. The 
refugees in the Dadaab camps are not permitted to leave and would therefore appear to 
be trapped in the camps until the conflict in Somalia comes to an end.620 
This landmark case ended a long battle between proponents and opponents of camp based 
humanitarian relief. As while we have always known about camp conditions with fierce 
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arguments from opponents who would reveal horrific conditions and would cite the Torture 
Convention621, they would be quickly countered as the practice of torture would be open to 
debate and contested by many camp proponents.622 However, European jurisprudence closed 
that debate by specifically defining the thresholds that match what the black letter of the law 
mentions.  Encampment now constituted torture and a violation of international law, with a 
measure of whether a particular international actor has breached this convention. There would 
be a breach of obligations by an organisation’s acts or omissions that created the conditions 
that subjected human beings to degrading treatment or punishment which would lead to their 
responsibility being engaged in international law, with considerable consequences of ceasing 
their conduct and activities or making huge reparations.   
As I have shown in this thesis, the creation, maintenance and control of the IDP camps in 
northern Uganda by the UPDF and UN agencies, together with their implementing partners 
under the Cluster Approach system, inscribed their own power dynamics into space, which 
then created a precarious environment that exposed its inhabitants to a whole set of risks 
covered under Article 3 (rape, murder, starvation, restricted movement, disease, crime and 
rebel attack) which debilitated and violated 1.8 million people. While they appeared to be 
unforeseen events in a complex emergency, they were tolerated, disguised, and legitimated 
under the language of ‘protection’.  However, they were ultimately the logical outcome of the 
establishment of a lucrative humanitarian economy, grafted to a counter-insurgency 
operation, amid a protracted civil conflict, that divided the country to perpetuate a variety of 
local and global interests. Indeed, the IDP Regime, through the mainstream Cluster Approach 
system which defined and allocated responsibility but instead facilitated structural violence, 
can be instrumental in holding aid agencies accountable for the injury they cause, and for 
their failure to fulfil their stated obligations.   
Recommendations for further research 
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This research has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation. The first is a 
deeper assessment of the Cluster Approach framework in comparative cases. A point of 
caution comes from UN Habitat’s 2003 The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human 
Settlements which asserted that ‘in order to do so [tackle the scourge of slums] governments, 
international aid agencies, and NGOs involved in facing the slum challenge must first come to 
grips with what slums really are, why they exist, and in fact, why the number of people living 
in such places is projected to double by 2030’.623 UN Habitat thus defined a slum as ‘an area 
that combines to various extents the following characteristics: Inadequate access to safe 
water; inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure; poor structural quality of 
housing; overcrowding; and insecure residential status’[emphasis added].624 However, given 
such a definition and attempts by the UN to end slums in accordance to the Millennium 
Development Goals, it therefore becomes prudent to ask whether the debut performance of 
the UN Cluster Approach and the Camp Management Toolkit were in practice simply 
creating slums under the legitimate label of IDP camp.  
This was witnessed in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, which left an 
estimated 300,000 dead and countless homeless with 1.5 million people residing in IDP 
camps in Port au Prince which were supposed to guarantee protection through the application 
of the Cluster Approach system under the aegis of UN OCHA. However, Schuller, in his visit 
to 31 camps, documented how the camps had created a disaster within a disaster, through the 
plummeting conditions of health, education, sanitation, and water. One camp dweller reported 
how, ‘In my camp, there are 12 toilets in the front, 12 toilets in the back for 4,200 people. In 
the camp, the shower is…Everyone at their tent has a little plastic basin, where they throw 
water over themselves, or they just shower in public’.625 In addition there were a series of 
cholera outbreaks that arose from the lack of clean water and healthcare facilities which in 
one camp alone killed 1700 people in December 2010.  
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From afar such catastrophes seemed perplexing given that there were over 400 NGOs active 
in the health sector alone. However, on closer inspection such conditions of acute 
unaddressed suffering became very logical. The impact of the Cluster Approach system in 
Haiti revealed how, like Uganda, there existed a huge gulf between theory and practice, as 
while OCHA was attempting to co-ordinate planning and implementation of relief activities, 
many NGOs did not recognise the ‘authority’ of OCHA, considering themselves to be 
independent barons. For many NGOs ‘when planning has to be put into action, co-ordination 
efforts with OCHA tend to decrease, while aspects of visibility, competition and donor 
accountability play an increasingly important role. This leads to a large number of 
independent projects. In this phase some NGOs tend to neglect the feedback to the clusters 
regarding initiated, completed, or abandoned projects’ [emphasis added].626 This ‘free for all’ 
like Uganda therefore created the many gaps in service delivery for which many IDPs were 
left to their own devices to endure.   
Second, if the debate is to move forward, a better understanding of the end of displacement 
may need to develop. This derives from observing how the commencement, practice and 
experience of displacement serve a multitude of macro, mezzo, and micro interests which 
explain its longevity. Therefore, it may be prudent to understand the events, political 
processes, and interests that determine its conclusion. This is of serious concern in many post-
displacement states where new displacements have arisen due to the inability of many to 
return and resettle in their original ‘homes’ due to situations of disaster, land grabbing, and 
government consolidation of rebel territory.     
The final recommendation for further research would be an analysis of UNHCR to understand 
how the organisation is balancing its refugee protection obligations with that of IDP 
protection. This is of concern because of the diametrically opposed priorities and problems 
that each produces. For now UNHCR is on the one hand promoting the right to seek asylum, 
while on the other upholding the rights of citizens to remain within their borders under a new 
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bureaucratic structure. Furthermore, thereis the giant task that arises when refugees exist in 
the same states as IDPs. In the case of Uganda which was hosting refugees from Sudan, 
Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in addition to its own 2 million IDPs, 
UNHCR became increasingly overstretched with tensions emerging from the division of 
labour, resources and mixed mandates.  
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